CVE-2025-68183 (GCVE-0-2025-68183)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2025-12-16 13:43
Modified
2026-10-15 22:02
Severity ?
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ima: don't clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr Currently when both IMA and EVM are in fix mode, the IMA signature will be reset to IMA hash if a program first stores IMA signature in security.ima and then writes/removes some other security xattr for the file. For example, on Fedora, after booting the kernel with "ima_appraise=fix evm=fix ima_policy=appraise_tcb" and installing rpm-plugin-ima, installing/reinstalling a package will not make good reference IMA signature generated. Instead IMA hash is generated, # getfattr -m - -d -e hex /usr/bin/bash # file: usr/bin/bash security.ima=0x0404... This happens because when setting security.selinux, the IMA_DIGSIG flag that had been set early was cleared. As a result, IMA hash is generated when the file is closed. Similarly, IMA signature can be cleared on file close after removing security xattr like security.evm or setting/removing ACL. Prevent replacing the IMA file signature with a file hash, by preventing the IMA_DIGSIG flag from being reset. Here's a minimal C reproducer which sets security.selinux as the last step which can also replaced by removing security.evm or setting ACL, #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/xattr.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> int main() { const char* file_path = "/usr/sbin/test_binary"; const char* hex_string = "030204d33204490066306402304"; int length = strlen(hex_string); char* ima_attr_value; int fd; fd = open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644); if (fd == -1) { perror("Error opening file"); return 1; } ima_attr_value = (char*)malloc(length / 2 ); for (int i = 0, j = 0; i < length; i += 2, j++) { sscanf(hex_string + i, "%2hhx", &ima_attr_value[j]); } if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.ima", ima_attr_value, length/2, 0) == -1) { perror("Error setting extended attribute"); close(fd); return 1; } const char* selinux_value= "system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0"; if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.selinux", selinux_value, strlen(selinux_value), 0) == -1) { perror("Error setting extended attribute"); close(fd); return 1; } close(fd); return 0; }
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a
Version: e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a
Version: e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a
Version: e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a
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          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nima: don\u0027t clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr\n\nCurrently when both IMA and EVM are in fix mode, the IMA signature will\nbe reset to IMA hash if a program first stores IMA signature in\nsecurity.ima and then writes/removes some other security xattr for the\nfile.\n\nFor example, on Fedora, after booting the kernel with \"ima_appraise=fix\nevm=fix ima_policy=appraise_tcb\" and installing rpm-plugin-ima,\ninstalling/reinstalling a package will not make good reference IMA\nsignature generated. Instead IMA hash is generated,\n\n    # getfattr -m - -d -e hex /usr/bin/bash\n    # file: usr/bin/bash\n    security.ima=0x0404...\n\nThis happens because when setting security.selinux, the IMA_DIGSIG flag\nthat had been set early was cleared. As a result, IMA hash is generated\nwhen the file is closed.\n\nSimilarly, IMA signature can be cleared on file close after removing\nsecurity xattr like security.evm or setting/removing ACL.\n\nPrevent replacing the IMA file signature with a file hash, by preventing\nthe IMA_DIGSIG flag from being reset.\n\nHere\u0027s a minimal C reproducer which sets security.selinux as the last\nstep which can also replaced by removing security.evm or setting ACL,\n\n    #include \u003cstdio.h\u003e\n    #include \u003csys/xattr.h\u003e\n    #include \u003cfcntl.h\u003e\n    #include \u003cunistd.h\u003e\n    #include \u003cstring.h\u003e\n    #include \u003cstdlib.h\u003e\n\n    int main() {\n        const char* file_path = \"/usr/sbin/test_binary\";\n        const char* hex_string = \"030204d33204490066306402304\";\n        int length = strlen(hex_string);\n        char* ima_attr_value;\n        int fd;\n\n        fd = open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644);\n        if (fd == -1) {\n            perror(\"Error opening file\");\n            return 1;\n        }\n\n        ima_attr_value = (char*)malloc(length / 2 );\n        for (int i = 0, j = 0; i \u003c length; i += 2, j++) {\n            sscanf(hex_string + i, \"%2hhx\", \u0026ima_attr_value[j]);\n        }\n\n        if (fsetxattr(fd, \"security.ima\", ima_attr_value, length/2, 0) == -1) {\n            perror(\"Error setting extended attribute\");\n            close(fd);\n            return 1;\n        }\n\n        const char* selinux_value= \"system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0\";\n        if (fsetxattr(fd, \"security.selinux\", selinux_value, strlen(selinux_value), 0) == -1) {\n            perror(\"Error setting extended attribute\");\n            close(fd);\n            return 1;\n        }\n\n        close(fd);\n\n        return 0;\n    }"
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              "value": "AV:L - Triggering requires local syscalls against a file on the system \u2014 `setxattr`/`fsetxattr` on an EVM-protected xattr, `setfacl`, or `fremovexattr` \u2014 followed by an open/close of the target file. No network, adjacent-network, or physical path reaches the IMA appraisal hooks.\nAC:L - The commit ships a deterministic reproducer: setting any EVM-protected xattr or a POSIX ACL unconditionally clears IMA_DIGSIG every time, with no memory-layout or timing luck involved. The enforce-mode variant needs a race against `process_measurement()`\u0027s `MAY_WRITE` check, but `ima_reset_appraise_flags()` takes no `iint-\u003emutex`, and the attacker drives both sides (one thread spinning on `setxattr(\"system.posix_acl_access\")`, another on `open(O_WRONLY)`); the required IMA-appraise + EVM configuration is a shipped, supported Fedora/RHEL setup, not a rare build option.\nPR:L - `vfs_set_acl()` invokes `security_inode_set_acl()` \u2192 `ima_inode_set_acl()` \u2192 `ima_reset_appraise_flags(inode, 0)` before `set_posix_acl()` ever reaches its `inode_owner_or_capable()` check, so an unprivileged user with no capabilities and no ownership of the file clears the cached IMA_DIGSIG bit on any signed appraised binary \u2014 the syscall fails with -EPERM only after the flag is already gone. No CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed for this path, unlike the `security.ima` path guarded by `ima_protect_xattr()`.\nUI:N - The attacker performs the xattr/ACL operation and the file open/close entirely from their own process; no victim must mount a filesystem, open a file, or take any other action for the IMA_DIGSIG flag to be cleared and the signature to be replaced.\nS:U - The defeated control (IMA appraisal) and the affected resources (files and their security xattrs) live in the same kernel security authority; no VM, hypervisor, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - Clearing IMA_DIGSIG both drops the \"signed files cannot be opened for write\" enforcement at `ima_main.c:472` and lets `ima_update_xattr()` re-bless the modified content with a fresh hash plus EVM HMAC, so attacker-substituted content in an appraised executable passes appraisal and subsequently runs \u2014 typically in a privileged/service context \u2014 yielding full disclosure of data reachable by that code. This is the standard treatment of a code-integrity/signature-verification bypass; the bug itself contains no direct memory-read primitive.\nI:H - The file\u0027s IMA digital signature \u2014 the one integrity artifact a local attacker cannot forge, since it is verified against the trusted IMA keyring \u2014 is silently destroyed and replaced by a locally computed hash written through `__vfs_setxattr_noperm()`, which bypasses the `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` gate in `ima_protect_xattr()`. Combined with the lost write-block, this converts \"signed and immutable\" into \"mutable and re-blessed on close\", a complete integrity bypass of IMA appraisal for the affected file.\nA:H - Once a signature is replaced by a plain hash, any policy carrying IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED (`appraise_type=imasig`) rejects that file in enforce mode, so appraised binaries become permanently unexecutable \u2014 applied to system-critical files such as init, sshd, or libc consumers this denies service and can leave the system unbootable, and the corrupted xattr persists on disk until the file is re-signed out of band."
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No network, adjacent-network, or physical path reaches the IMA appraisal hooks.\\nAC:L - The commit ships a deterministic reproducer: setting any EVM-protected xattr or a POSIX ACL unconditionally clears IMA_DIGSIG every time, with no memory-layout or timing luck involved. The enforce-mode variant needs a race against `process_measurement()`\u0027s `MAY_WRITE` check, but `ima_reset_appraise_flags()` takes no `iint-\u003emutex`, and the attacker drives both sides (one thread spinning on `setxattr(\\\"system.posix_acl_access\\\")`, another on `open(O_WRONLY)`); the required IMA-appraise + EVM configuration is a shipped, supported Fedora/RHEL setup, not a rare build option.\\nPR:L - `vfs_set_acl()` invokes `security_inode_set_acl()` \\u2192 `ima_inode_set_acl()` \\u2192 `ima_reset_appraise_flags(inode, 0)` before `set_posix_acl()` ever reaches its `inode_owner_or_capable()` check, so an unprivileged user with no capabilities and no ownership of the file clears the cached IMA_DIGSIG bit on any signed appraised binary \\u2014 the syscall fails with -EPERM only after the flag is already gone. No CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed for this path, unlike the `security.ima` path guarded by `ima_protect_xattr()`.\\nUI:N - The attacker performs the xattr/ACL operation and the file open/close entirely from their own process; no victim must mount a filesystem, open a file, or take any other action for the IMA_DIGSIG flag to be cleared and the signature to be replaced.\\nS:U - The defeated control (IMA appraisal) and the affected resources (files and their security xattrs) live in the same kernel security authority; no VM, hypervisor, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\\nC:H - Clearing IMA_DIGSIG both drops the \\\"signed files cannot be opened for write\\\" enforcement at `ima_main.c:472` and lets `ima_update_xattr()` re-bless the modified content with a fresh hash plus EVM HMAC, so attacker-substituted content in an appraised executable passes appraisal and subsequently runs \\u2014 typically in a privileged/service context \\u2014 yielding full disclosure of data reachable by that code. This is the standard treatment of a code-integrity/signature-verification bypass; the bug itself contains no direct memory-read primitive.\\nI:H - The file\u0027s IMA digital signature \\u2014 the one integrity artifact a local attacker cannot forge, since it is verified against the trusted IMA keyring \\u2014 is silently destroyed and replaced by a locally computed hash written through `__vfs_setxattr_noperm()`, which bypasses the `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` gate in `ima_protect_xattr()`. Combined with the lost write-block, this converts \\\"signed and immutable\\\" into \\\"mutable and re-blessed on close\\\", a complete integrity bypass of IMA appraisal for the affected file.\\nA:H - Once a signature is replaced by a plain hash, any policy carrying IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED (`appraise_type=imasig`) rejects that file in enforce mode, so appraised binaries become permanently unexecutable \\u2014 applied to system-critical files such as init, sshd, or libc consumers this denies service and can leave the system unbootable, and the corrupted xattr persists on disk until the file is re-signed out of band.\"}]}], \"affected\": [{\"repo\": \"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\", \"vendor\": \"Linux\", \"product\": \"Linux\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a\", \"lessThan\": \"d2993a7e98eb70c737c6f5365a190e79c72b8407\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a\", \"lessThan\": \"edd824eb45e4f7e05ad3ab090dab6dbdb79cd292\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a\", \"lessThan\": \"02aa671c08a4834bef5166743a7b88686fbfa023\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a\", \"lessThan\": \"88b4cbcf6b041ae0f2fc8a34554a5b6a83a2b7cd\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}], \"programFiles\": [\"security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c\"], \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\"}, {\"repo\": \"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\", \"vendor\": \"Linux\", \"product\": \"Linux\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"5.14\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"0\", \"lessThan\": \"5.14\", \"versionType\": \"semver\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.6.117\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.6.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.12.58\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.12.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.17.8\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.17.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.18\", \"versionType\": \"original_commit_for_fix\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"*\"}], \"programFiles\": [\"security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c\"], \"defaultStatus\": \"affected\"}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2993a7e98eb70c737c6f5365a190e79c72b8407\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edd824eb45e4f7e05ad3ab090dab6dbdb79cd292\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02aa671c08a4834bef5166743a7b88686fbfa023\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88b4cbcf6b041ae0f2fc8a34554a5b6a83a2b7cd\"}], \"x_generator\": {\"engine\": \"bippy-1.2.0\"}, \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nima: don\u0027t clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr\\n\\nCurrently when both IMA and EVM are in fix mode, the IMA signature will\\nbe reset to IMA hash if a program first stores IMA signature in\\nsecurity.ima and then writes/removes some other security xattr for the\\nfile.\\n\\nFor example, on Fedora, after booting the kernel with \\\"ima_appraise=fix\\nevm=fix ima_policy=appraise_tcb\\\" and installing rpm-plugin-ima,\\ninstalling/reinstalling a package will not make good reference IMA\\nsignature generated. Instead IMA hash is generated,\\n\\n    # getfattr -m - -d -e hex /usr/bin/bash\\n    # file: usr/bin/bash\\n    security.ima=0x0404...\\n\\nThis happens because when setting security.selinux, the IMA_DIGSIG flag\\nthat had been set early was cleared. As a result, IMA hash is generated\\nwhen the file is closed.\\n\\nSimilarly, IMA signature can be cleared on file close after removing\\nsecurity xattr like security.evm or setting/removing ACL.\\n\\nPrevent replacing the IMA file signature with a file hash, by preventing\\nthe IMA_DIGSIG flag from being reset.\\n\\nHere\u0027s a minimal C reproducer which sets security.selinux as the last\\nstep which can also replaced by removing security.evm or setting ACL,\\n\\n    #include \u003cstdio.h\u003e\\n    #include \u003csys/xattr.h\u003e\\n    #include \u003cfcntl.h\u003e\\n    #include \u003cunistd.h\u003e\\n    #include \u003cstring.h\u003e\\n    #include \u003cstdlib.h\u003e\\n\\n    int main() {\\n        const char* file_path = \\\"/usr/sbin/test_binary\\\";\\n        const char* hex_string = \\\"030204d33204490066306402304\\\";\\n        int length = strlen(hex_string);\\n        char* ima_attr_value;\\n        int fd;\\n\\n        fd = open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644);\\n        if (fd == -1) {\\n            perror(\\\"Error opening file\\\");\\n            return 1;\\n        }\\n\\n        ima_attr_value = (char*)malloc(length / 2 );\\n        for (int i = 0, j = 0; i \u003c length; i += 2, j++) {\\n            sscanf(hex_string + i, \\\"%2hhx\\\", \u0026ima_attr_value[j]);\\n        }\\n\\n        if (fsetxattr(fd, \\\"security.ima\\\", ima_attr_value, length/2, 0) == -1) {\\n            perror(\\\"Error setting extended attribute\\\");\\n            close(fd);\\n            return 1;\\n        }\\n\\n        const char* selinux_value= \\\"system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0\\\";\\n        if (fsetxattr(fd, \\\"security.selinux\\\", selinux_value, strlen(selinux_value), 0) == -1) {\\n            perror(\\\"Error setting extended attribute\\\");\\n            close(fd);\\n            return 1;\\n        }\\n\\n        close(fd);\\n\\n        return 0;\\n    }\"}], \"cpeApplicability\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"negate\": false, \"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"6.6.117\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"5.14\"}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"6.12.58\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"5.14\"}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"6.17.8\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"5.14\"}, {\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"6.18\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"5.14\"}], \"operator\": \"OR\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\", \"shortName\": \"Linux\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-05T12:10:06.378Z\"}}}",
      "cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2025-68183\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-10-15T22:02:47.257Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2025-12-16T13:41:40.252Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\", \"datePublished\": \"2025-12-16T13:43:01.178Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"Linux\"}",
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }
  }
}


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