CVE-2024-50294 (GCVE-0-2024-50294)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2024-11-19 01:30
Modified
2026-08-05 11:43
Severity ?
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix missing locking causing hanging calls If a call gets aborted (e.g. because kafs saw a signal) between it being queued for connection and the I/O thread picking up the call, the abort will be prioritised over the connection and it will be removed from local->new_client_calls by rxrpc_disconnect_client_call() without a lock being held. This may cause other calls on the list to disappear if a race occurs. Fix this by taking the client_call_lock when removing a call from whatever list its ->wait_link happens to be on.
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: 9d35d880e0e4a3ab32d8c12f9e4d76198aadd42d
Version: 9d35d880e0e4a3ab32d8c12f9e4d76198aadd42d
Version: 9d35d880e0e4a3ab32d8c12f9e4d76198aadd42d
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