OESA-2026-3531 (CVE-2026-68160)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-08-30 04:15 – Updated: 2026-08-30 04:15 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
kernel security update
Details

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()

ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:

snaptrace     = h + 1;
snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len);
p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;
...
case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:
    if (snaptrace_len) {
        ...
        if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,
                                   snaptrace + snaptrace_len,
                                   false, &realm)) { ... }

ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad) with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len. With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past the legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps / ri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds reads of the encoded snap arrays.

The eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks above the op switch each catch this OOB through their ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised MDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with no version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The shape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced.

Validate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before consuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room() helper. The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p, guarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe for the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where p + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space. This matches the rest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines below), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit path.(CVE-2026-68160)


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "bpftool-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "python2-perf-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "python2-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "kernel-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "bpftool-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "python2-perf-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "python2-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "Critical"
  },
  "details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()\n\nceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format\nceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake\nend pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to\nceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:\n\n    snaptrace     = h + 1;\n    snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h-\u0026gt;snap_trace_len);\n    p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;\n    ...\n    case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:\n        if (snaptrace_len) {\n            ...\n            if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,\n                                       snaptrace + snaptrace_len,\n                                       false, \u0026amp;realm)) { ... }\n\nceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm\nfrom snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(\u0026amp;p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)\nwith the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.\nWith snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially\nsatisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past\nthe legitimate msg-\u0026gt;front buffer, and ri-\u0026gt;num_snaps /\nri-\u0026gt;num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds\nreads of the encoded snap arrays.\n\nThe eleven msg_version \u0026gt;= 2 .. msg_version \u0026gt;= 12 decoder blocks\nabove the op switch each catch this OOB through their\nceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit\nbehind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised\nMDS that sets msg-\u0026gt;hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with\nno version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The\nshape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced.\n\nValidate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before\nconsuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room()\nhelper.  The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n \u0026lt;= end - p,\nguarded by end \u0026gt;= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe\nfor the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where\np + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space.  This matches the\nrest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines\nbelow), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit\npath.(CVE-2026-68160)",
  "id": "OESA-2026-3531",
  "modified": "2026-08-30T04:15:03Z",
  "published": "2026-08-30T04:15:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-3531"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68160"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "kernel security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-68160"
  ]
}



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