CVE-2026-95692 (GCVE-0-2026-95692)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-10 18:16 – Updated: 2026-11-10 18:16
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Out-of-Bounds Read and Incorrect IV Length Handling in AES-GCM-SIV
Summary
Issue summary: Setting an AES-GCM-SIV IV shorter than the expected nonce
length via EVP_CipherInit_ex() may trigger a heap out-of-bounds read.
Supplying a longer IV is silently truncated instead of rejected.
Impact summary: An application passing a caller-supplied IV of the wrong
length may crash or read beyond its buffer. Because trailing IV bytes are
ignored, an attacker who knows one message and tag may forge messages under a
different IV.
CWE: CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read
Description: AES-GCM-SIV copies the caller-supplied IV or nonce into its
internal state using a copy whose length is taken from the expected nonce size
rather than from the length the caller actually provided. When the caller
passes a shorter IV, the copy reads past the end of the caller's buffer;
AddressSanitizer confirms a heap out-of-bounds read reached through
EVP_CipherInit_ex() into ossl_aes_gcm_siv_init(). When the caller passes a
longer IV, the implementation silently discards the trailing bytes instead of
rejecting the length.
The truncation breaks the binding between the IV and the computed
authentication tag. An attacker who has observed a message and its tag under
one IV can produce a message and tag that verify under a different IV whose
first bytes match, since the surplus bytes never influence the computation.
The message itself is unchanged, so this is a failure of IV commitment rather
than a classic existential forgery.
Only applications that call EVP_CipherInit_ex() (or the equivalent provider
cipher initialization) with an IV length other than the standard 12 bytes for
AES-GCM-SIV are affected. The severity is limited because the out-of-bounds
read is small and attacker-controlled only in length, and the forgery requires
an unusual IV length choice by the application.
FIPS impact: no
The FIPS modules are not affected by this issue, as AES-GCM-SIV is not an
approved algorithm.
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
- CWE-125 - Out-of-bounds Read
Assigner
openssl
CNA
References
4 references
Impacted products
Date Public
2026-11-10 11:00
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"containers": {
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"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "OpenSSL",
"vendor": "OpenSSL",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "4.1.0",
"versionType": "semver"
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"lessThan": "4.0.4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.0.0",
"versionType": "semver"
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{
"lessThan": "3.5.10",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.5.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Billy Brumley (Rochester Institute of Technology)"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Billy Brumley (Rochester Institute of Technology)"
}
],
"datePublic": "2026-11-10T11:00:00.000Z",
"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
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"type": "text/html",
"value": "Issue summary: Setting an AES-GCM-SIV IV shorter than the expected nonce\u003cbr\u003elength via EVP_CipherInit_ex() may trigger a heap out-of-bounds read.\u003cbr\u003eSupplying a longer IV is silently truncated instead of rejected.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eImpact summary: An application passing a caller-supplied IV of the wrong\u003cbr\u003elength may crash or read beyond its buffer. Because trailing IV bytes are\u003cbr\u003eignored, an attacker who knows one message and tag may forge messages under a\u003cbr\u003edifferent IV.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eCWE: CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eDescription: AES-GCM-SIV copies the caller-supplied IV or nonce into its\u003cbr\u003einternal state using a copy whose length is taken from the expected nonce size\u003cbr\u003erather than from the length the caller actually provided. When the caller\u003cbr\u003epasses a shorter IV, the copy reads past the end of the caller\u0027s buffer;\u003cbr\u003eAddressSanitizer confirms a heap out-of-bounds read reached through\u003cbr\u003eEVP_CipherInit_ex() into ossl_aes_gcm_siv_init(). When the caller passes a\u003cbr\u003elonger IV, the implementation silently discards the trailing bytes instead of\u003cbr\u003erejecting the length.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe truncation breaks the binding between the IV and the computed\u003cbr\u003eauthentication tag. An attacker who has observed a message and its tag under\u003cbr\u003eone IV can produce a message and tag that verify under a different IV whose\u003cbr\u003efirst bytes match, since the surplus bytes never influence the computation.\u003cbr\u003eThe message itself is unchanged, so this is a failure of IV commitment rather\u003cbr\u003ethan a classic existential forgery.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eOnly applications that call EVP_CipherInit_ex() (or the equivalent provider\u003cbr\u003ecipher initialization) with an IV length other than the standard 12 bytes for\u003cbr\u003eAES-GCM-SIV are affected. The severity is limited because the out-of-bounds\u003cbr\u003eread is small and attacker-controlled only in length, and the forgery requires\u003cbr\u003ean unusual IV length choice by the application.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFIPS impact: no\u003cbr\u003eThe FIPS modules are not affected by this issue, as AES-GCM-SIV is not an\u003cbr\u003eapproved algorithm."
}
],
"value": "Issue summary: Setting an AES-GCM-SIV IV shorter than the expected nonce\nlength via EVP_CipherInit_ex() may trigger a heap out-of-bounds read.\nSupplying a longer IV is silently truncated instead of rejected.\n\nImpact summary: An application passing a caller-supplied IV of the wrong\nlength may crash or read beyond its buffer. Because trailing IV bytes are\nignored, an attacker who knows one message and tag may forge messages under a\ndifferent IV.\n\nCWE: CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read\n\nDescription: AES-GCM-SIV copies the caller-supplied IV or nonce into its\ninternal state using a copy whose length is taken from the expected nonce size\nrather than from the length the caller actually provided. When the caller\npasses a shorter IV, the copy reads past the end of the caller\u0027s buffer;\nAddressSanitizer confirms a heap out-of-bounds read reached through\nEVP_CipherInit_ex() into ossl_aes_gcm_siv_init(). When the caller passes a\nlonger IV, the implementation silently discards the trailing bytes instead of\nrejecting the length.\n\nThe truncation breaks the binding between the IV and the computed\nauthentication tag. An attacker who has observed a message and its tag under\none IV can produce a message and tag that verify under a different IV whose\nfirst bytes match, since the surplus bytes never influence the computation.\nThe message itself is unchanged, so this is a failure of IV commitment rather\nthan a classic existential forgery.\n\nOnly applications that call EVP_CipherInit_ex() (or the equivalent provider\ncipher initialization) with an IV length other than the standard 12 bytes for\nAES-GCM-SIV are affected. The severity is limited because the out-of-bounds\nread is small and attacker-controlled only in length, and the forgery requires\nan unusual IV length choice by the application.\n\nFIPS impact: no\nThe FIPS modules are not affected by this issue, as AES-GCM-SIV is not an\napproved algorithm."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"format": "other",
"other": {
"content": {
"text": "Low"
},
"type": "https://openssl-library.org/policies/general/security-policy/"
}
}
],
"problemTypes": [
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"descriptions": [
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"cweId": "CWE-125",
"description": "CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
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"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-10T18:16:18.675Z",
"orgId": "3a12439a-ef3a-4c79-92e6-6081a721f1e5",
"shortName": "openssl"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "OpenSSL Advisory",
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory"
],
"url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20261110.txt"
},
{
"name": "4.1.1 git commit",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/70a47ac78b6f3be1b22fb1551bd0bfcff4f29613"
},
{
"name": "4.0.4 git commit",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/510872388f5d145cf870868b3d288a23822cb776"
},
{
"name": "3.5.10 git commit",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/257a3427aa0ef8d9dd2ef5b3e2d1c021a221b116"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "Out-of-Bounds Read and Incorrect IV Length Handling in AES-GCM-SIV",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 0.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "3a12439a-ef3a-4c79-92e6-6081a721f1e5",
"assignerShortName": "openssl",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-95692",
"datePublished": "2026-11-10T18:16:18.675Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-22T14:18:48.635Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-10T18:16:18.675Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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