CVE-2026-13734 (GCVE-0-2026-13734)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-28 20:38
Modified
2026-08-28 20:38
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-294 - auth
Summary
Zephyr's WireGuard VPN data-plane receive handler wg_process_data_message() in subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg_crypto.c validated the anti-replay counter too late. After AEAD decryption of a MESSAGE_TRANSPORT_DATA packet succeeded, the code committed several peer-state changes — update_peer_addr() (endpoint roaming update), the keypair->last_rx/peer->last_rx liveness timers, and keypair_update() (promote next→current and destroy the previous keypair) — and only afterward called wg_check_replay(). On a replayed packet the replay check returned -EINVAL, but none of the preceding mutations were rolled back.
The AEAD tag authenticates content but not freshness, so a replayed-but-authentic transport packet decrypts correctly. An attacker who captures one valid ciphertext off the wire (an on-path or shared-medium observer) can re-inject it from an arbitrary spoofed source address. Reaching the handler requires no credentials: it is driven directly from inbound UDP datagrams via the dispatch in subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg.c.
Because the state mutations committed before the replay check, the replay repoints the peer endpoint to the attacker-chosen source address (roaming hijack), redirecting the victim's subsequent outbound tunnel traffic until the legitimate peer's next packet re-corrects it; it also prematurely destroys the previous keypair and refreshes the RX liveness timer. The tunnel payload stays encrypted under the session keypair, so this is an integrity/availability impact (traffic redirection and session disruption), not payload disclosure. The fix moves wg_check_replay() to immediately after a successful decrypt, before any peer-state mutation, matching the WireGuard specification and the Linux reference implementation.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject | zephyr |
Version: 4.4.0 ≤ |
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"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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"status": "affected",
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"value": "Zephyr\u0027s WireGuard VPN data-plane receive handler wg_process_data_message() in subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg_crypto.c validated the anti-replay counter too late. After AEAD decryption of a MESSAGE_TRANSPORT_DATA packet succeeded, the code committed several peer-state changes \u2014 update_peer_addr() (endpoint roaming update), the keypair-\u003elast_rx/peer-\u003elast_rx liveness timers, and keypair_update() (promote next\u2192current and destroy the previous keypair) \u2014 and only afterward called wg_check_replay(). On a replayed packet the replay check returned -EINVAL, but none of the preceding mutations were rolled back.\n\nThe AEAD tag authenticates content but not freshness, so a replayed-but-authentic transport packet decrypts correctly. An attacker who captures one valid ciphertext off the wire (an on-path or shared-medium observer) can re-inject it from an arbitrary spoofed source address. Reaching the handler requires no credentials: it is driven directly from inbound UDP datagrams via the dispatch in subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg.c.\n\nBecause the state mutations committed before the replay check, the replay repoints the peer endpoint to the attacker-chosen source address (roaming hijack), redirecting the victim\u0027s subsequent outbound tunnel traffic until the legitimate peer\u0027s next packet re-corrects it; it also prematurely destroys the previous keypair and refreshes the RX liveness timer. The tunnel payload stays encrypted under the session keypair, so this is an integrity/availability impact (traffic redirection and session disruption), not payload disclosure. The fix moves wg_check_replay() to immediately after a successful decrypt, before any peer-state mutation, matching the WireGuard specification and the Linux reference implementation."
}
],
"metrics": [
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"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
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"descriptions": [
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"description": "auth",
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"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-28T20:38:49.617Z",
"orgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad",
"shortName": "zephyr"
},
"references": [
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"name": "Fix commit",
"tags": [
"patch"
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"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/260c32ef9a89824bd25e17170e77aa4b98c84069"
},
{
"name": "GHSA-x7q7-fjx9-4vj2",
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-x7q7-fjx9-4vj2"
}
],
"title": "Zephyr WireGuard mutates peer state before anti-replay check, enabling capture-replay endpoint hijack",
"x_generator": {
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"datePublished": "2026-08-28T20:38:49.617Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-06-29T14:44:08.624Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-28T20:38:49.617Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
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"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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