CVE-2025-38264 (GCVE-0-2025-38264)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2025-07-09 10:42
Modified
2026-08-05 12:00
Severity ?
9.8 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme-tcp: sanitize request list handling Validate the request in nvme_tcp_handle_r2t() to ensure it's not part of any list, otherwise a malicious R2T PDU might inject a loop in request list processing.
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: 3f2304f8c6d6ed97849057bd16fee99e434ca796
Version: 3f2304f8c6d6ed97849057bd16fee99e434ca796
Version: 3f2304f8c6d6ed97849057bd16fee99e434ca796
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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "78a4adcd3fedb0728436e8094848ebf4c6bae006",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3f2304f8c6d6ed97849057bd16fee99e434ca796",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "f054ea62598197714a6ca7b3b387a027308f8b13",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3f2304f8c6d6ed97849057bd16fee99e434ca796",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "0bf04c874fcb1ae46a863034296e4b33d8fbd66c",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3f2304f8c6d6ed97849057bd16fee99e434ca796",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.0"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.0",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.36",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.15.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.15.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.16",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.36",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "5.0",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.15.5",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "5.0",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.16",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "5.0",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvme-tcp: sanitize request list handling\n\nValidate the request in nvme_tcp_handle_r2t() to ensure it\u0027s not part of\nany list, otherwise a malicious R2T PDU might inject a loop in request\nlist processing."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 9.8,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:N - The vulnerable code is the NVMe-over-TCP host driver\u0027s PDU receive path, parsing an R2T PDU sent by a remote NVMe-oF target over TCP (port 4420); the malicious input arrives purely over the network from a compromised/rogue target or an on-path attacker.\nAC:L - The target fully controls PDU content and timing \u2014 placing two R2T PDUs for the same command_id in a single TCP segment guarantees both are processed inside one nvme_tcp_recv_skb() pass with no send-path progress between them, creating the llist cycle deterministically with no race to win and no memory-layout dependency.\nPR:N - NVMe/TCP requires no authentication by default (TLS and DH-HMAC-CHAP are optional, off in stock configs), so the remote peer needs zero privileges or credentials on the victim host \u2014 it simply answers I/O it is already being sent.\nUI:N - No victim action is required; once the host is connected to the target, ordinary filesystem/block I/O generates the in-flight commands and the malicious target triggers the bug on its own by replying with duplicate R2T PDUs.\nS:U - The corruption and the resulting hang are confined to the host kernel\u0027s own memory and scheduling authority; no VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - Beyond the list corruption, duplicate queueing lets the RX path reset req-\u003estate/offset/pdu_len while the TX path is consuming the request, desynchronizing req-\u003eiter so nvme_tcp_req_cur_page() reads past the bvec array and sock_sendmsg() splices unintended kernel pages directly to the attacker-controlled socket.\nI:H - Attacker-controlled input produces kernel linked-list pointer corruption (double llist_add plus repeated list_add of an already-linked entry into send_list) and lets an in-flight request\u0027s PDU header, ttag, and iterator state be rewritten mid-transfer, which is memory/state corruption leverageable for further control over kernel structures.\nA:H - The injected cycle makes nvme_tcp_process_req_list() spin forever in the nvme_tcp_wq kworker while holding queue-\u003esend_mutex with no cond_resched(), producing a CPU soft lockup, RCU stalls, and a permanently wedged storage queue \u2014 a deterministic, unauthenticated remote kernel hang."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:00:51.571Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/78a4adcd3fedb0728436e8094848ebf4c6bae006"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f054ea62598197714a6ca7b3b387a027308f8b13"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0bf04c874fcb1ae46a863034296e4b33d8fbd66c"
        }
      ],
      "title": "nvme-tcp: sanitize request list handling",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2025-38264",
    "datePublished": "2025-07-09T10:42:38.602Z",
    "dateReserved": "2025-04-16T04:51:23.997Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:00:51.571Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}


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