CVE-2025-38492 (GCVE-0-2025-38492)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-07-28 11:22 – Updated: 2026-05-11 21:29
VLAI
Title
netfs: Fix race between cache write completion and ALL_QUEUED being set
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: Fix race between cache write completion and ALL_QUEUED being set When netfslib is issuing subrequests, the subrequests start processing immediately and may complete before we reach the end of the issuing function. At the end of the issuing function we set NETFS_RREQ_ALL_QUEUED to indicate to the collector that we aren't going to issue any more subreqs and that it can do the final notifications and cleanup. Now, this isn't a problem if the request is synchronous (NETFS_RREQ_OFFLOAD_COLLECTION is unset) as the result collection will be done in-thread and we're guaranteed an opportunity to run the collector. However, if the request is asynchronous, collection is primarily triggered by the termination of subrequests queuing it on a workqueue. Now, a race can occur here if the app thread sets ALL_QUEUED after the last subrequest terminates. This can happen most easily with the copy2cache code (as used by Ceph) where, in the collection routine of a read request, an asynchronous write request is spawned to copy data to the cache. Folios are added to the write request as they're unlocked, but there may be a delay before ALL_QUEUED is set as the write subrequests may complete before we get there. If all the write subreqs have finished by the ALL_QUEUED point, no further events happen and the collection never happens, leaving the request hanging. Fix this by queuing the collector after setting ALL_QUEUED. This is a bit heavy-handed and it may be sufficient to do it only if there are no extant subreqs. Also add a tracepoint to cross-reference both requests in a copy-to-request operation and add a trace to the netfs_rreq tracepoint to indicate the setting of ALL_QUEUED.
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
Linux CNA
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Affected: e2d46f2ec332533816417b60933954173f602121 , < 110188a13c4853bd4c342e600ced4dfd26c3feb5 (git)
Affected: e2d46f2ec332533816417b60933954173f602121 , < 89635eae076cd8eaa5cb752f66538c9dc6c9fdc3 (git)
Create a notification for this product.
Linux Linux Affected: 6.14
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.14 (semver)
Unaffected: 6.15.8 , ≤ 6.15.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.16 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/netfs/read_pgpriv2.c",
            "include/trace/events/netfs.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "110188a13c4853bd4c342e600ced4dfd26c3feb5",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e2d46f2ec332533816417b60933954173f602121",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "89635eae076cd8eaa5cb752f66538c9dc6c9fdc3",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e2d46f2ec332533816417b60933954173f602121",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/netfs/read_pgpriv2.c",
            "include/trace/events/netfs.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.14"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.14",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.15.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.15.8",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.16",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.15.8",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.14",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.16",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.14",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfs: Fix race between cache write completion and ALL_QUEUED being set\n\nWhen netfslib is issuing subrequests, the subrequests start processing\nimmediately and may complete before we reach the end of the issuing\nfunction.  At the end of the issuing function we set NETFS_RREQ_ALL_QUEUED\nto indicate to the collector that we aren\u0027t going to issue any more subreqs\nand that it can do the final notifications and cleanup.\n\nNow, this isn\u0027t a problem if the request is synchronous\n(NETFS_RREQ_OFFLOAD_COLLECTION is unset) as the result collection will be\ndone in-thread and we\u0027re guaranteed an opportunity to run the collector.\n\nHowever, if the request is asynchronous, collection is primarily triggered\nby the termination of subrequests queuing it on a workqueue.  Now, a race\ncan occur here if the app thread sets ALL_QUEUED after the last subrequest\nterminates.\n\nThis can happen most easily with the copy2cache code (as used by Ceph)\nwhere, in the collection routine of a read request, an asynchronous write\nrequest is spawned to copy data to the cache.  Folios are added to the\nwrite request as they\u0027re unlocked, but there may be a delay before\nALL_QUEUED is set as the write subrequests may complete before we get\nthere.\n\nIf all the write subreqs have finished by the ALL_QUEUED point, no further\nevents happen and the collection never happens, leaving the request\nhanging.\n\nFix this by queuing the collector after setting ALL_QUEUED.  This is a bit\nheavy-handed and it may be sufficient to do it only if there are no extant\nsubreqs.\n\nAlso add a tracepoint to cross-reference both requests in a copy-to-request\noperation and add a trace to the netfs_rreq tracepoint to indicate the\nsetting of ALL_QUEUED."
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-05-11T21:29:03.942Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/110188a13c4853bd4c342e600ced4dfd26c3feb5"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89635eae076cd8eaa5cb752f66538c9dc6c9fdc3"
        }
      ],
      "title": "netfs: Fix race between cache write completion and ALL_QUEUED being set",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2025-38492",
    "datePublished": "2025-07-28T11:22:01.017Z",
    "dateReserved": "2025-04-16T04:51:24.021Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-05-11T21:29:03.942Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2025-38492",
      "date": "2026-11-19",
      "epss": "0.00102",
      "percentile": "0.00938"
    },
    "redhat_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
      "current_release_date": "2026-11-05T15:01:47+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2025-38492",
      "id": "CVE-2025-38492",
      "initial_release_date": "2025-07-28T00:00:00+00:00",
      "product_status:known_affected": "1",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "199",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "kernel: netfs: Fix race between cache write completion and ALL_QUEUED being set",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2025/cve-2025-38492.json",
      "version": "3"
    }
  }
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.