CVE-2025-37816 (GCVE-0-2025-37816)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-05-08 06:26 – Updated: 2026-05-11 21:15
VLAI
Title
mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use gcc 15 honors the __counted_by(len) attribute on vsc_tp_packet.buf[] and the vsc-tp.c code is using this in a wrong way. len does not contain the available size in the buffer, it contains the actual packet length *without* the crc. So as soon as vsc_tp_xfer() tries to add the crc to buf[] the fortify-panic handler gets triggered: [ 80.842193] memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0 [ 80.842243] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 272 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x45/0x50 ... [ 80.843175] __fortify_panic+0x9/0xb [ 80.843186] vsc_tp_xfer.cold+0x67/0x67 [mei_vsc_hw] [ 80.843210] ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90 [ 80.843229] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7c/0x110 [ 80.843250] mei_vsc_hw_start+0x98/0x120 [mei_vsc] [ 80.843270] mei_reset+0x11d/0x420 [mei] The easiest fix would be to just drop the counted-by but with the exception of the ack buffer in vsc_tp_xfer_helper() which only contains enough room for the packet-header, all other uses of vsc_tp_packet always use a buffer of VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE bytes for the packet. Instead of just dropping the counted-by, split the vsc_tp_packet struct definition into a header and a full-packet definition and use a fixed size buf[] in the packet definition, this way fortify-source buffer overrun checking still works when enabled.
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
Linux CNA
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Affected: 566f5ca9768075e453b7b51a397733968df4287d , < 3e243378f27cc7d11682a3ad720228b0723affa5 (git)
Affected: 566f5ca9768075e453b7b51a397733968df4287d , < ac04663c67f244810b3492e9ecd9f7cdbefeca2d (git)
Affected: 566f5ca9768075e453b7b51a397733968df4287d , < 00f1cc14da0f06d2897b8c528df7c7dcf1b8da50 (git)
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Linux Linux Affected: 6.8
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.8 (semver)
Unaffected: 6.12.26 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.14.5 , ≤ 6.14.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.15 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
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Show details on NVD website

{
  "containers": {
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          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c"
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              "version": "566f5ca9768075e453b7b51a397733968df4287d",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
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          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.8"
            },
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              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
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              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
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              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.14.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
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              "operator": "OR"
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      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use\n\ngcc 15 honors the __counted_by(len) attribute on vsc_tp_packet.buf[]\nand the vsc-tp.c code is using this in a wrong way. len does not contain\nthe available size in the buffer, it contains the actual packet length\n*without* the crc. So as soon as vsc_tp_xfer() tries to add the crc to\nbuf[] the fortify-panic handler gets triggered:\n\n[   80.842193] memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0\n[   80.842243] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 272 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x45/0x50\n...\n[   80.843175]  __fortify_panic+0x9/0xb\n[   80.843186]  vsc_tp_xfer.cold+0x67/0x67 [mei_vsc_hw]\n[   80.843210]  ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90\n[   80.843229]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7c/0x110\n[   80.843250]  mei_vsc_hw_start+0x98/0x120 [mei_vsc]\n[   80.843270]  mei_reset+0x11d/0x420 [mei]\n\nThe easiest fix would be to just drop the counted-by but with the exception\nof the ack buffer in vsc_tp_xfer_helper() which only contains enough room\nfor the packet-header, all other uses of vsc_tp_packet always use a buffer\nof VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE bytes for the packet.\n\nInstead of just dropping the counted-by, split the vsc_tp_packet struct\ndefinition into a header and a full-packet definition and use a fixed\nsize buf[] in the packet definition, this way fortify-source buffer\noverrun checking still works when enabled."
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-05-11T21:15:41.996Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
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          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e243378f27cc7d11682a3ad720228b0723affa5"
        },
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          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac04663c67f244810b3492e9ecd9f7cdbefeca2d"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00f1cc14da0f06d2897b8c528df7c7dcf1b8da50"
        }
      ],
      "title": "mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use",
      "x_generator": {
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      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2025-37816",
    "datePublished": "2025-05-08T06:26:12.063Z",
    "dateReserved": "2025-04-16T04:51:23.946Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-05-11T21:15:41.996Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2025-37816",
      "date": "2026-11-19",
      "epss": "0.00205",
      "percentile": "0.10609"
    },
    "redhat_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
      "current_release_date": "2026-11-05T14:33:44+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2025-37816",
      "id": "CVE-2025-37816",
      "initial_release_date": "2025-05-08T00:00:00+00:00",
      "product_status:known_affected": "1",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "199",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "kernel: mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2025/cve-2025-37816.json",
      "version": "3"
    }
  }
}



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