UBUNTU-CVE-2026-80876 (CVE-2026-80876)

Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu – Published: 2026-09-04 17:16 – Updated: 2026-11-19 04:10 – Source website
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Fix event length with forced 8-byte alignment When RB_FORCE_8BYTE_ALIGNMENT is true, rb_calculate_event_length() reserves the space of event->array[0] for placing the data length and rb_update_event() stores the data length in event->array[0] accordingly. As a result the whole event length will add extra 4 bytes for sizeof(event.array[0]) unconditionally. But ring_buffer_event_length() only subtracts the sizeof(event->array[0]) for events larger than RB_MAX_SMALL_DATA + sizeof(event->array[0]). As a result, small events on architectures with RB_FORCE_8BYTE_ALIGNMENT=true report a data length that is 4 bytes larger than expected. To fix it, add the RB_FORCE_8BYTE_ALIGNMENT as a condition to subtract the size of that length field whenever RB_FORCE_8BYTE_ALIGNMENT is true. This issue is observed in a riscv64 kernel with CONFIG_HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS set to y, when we run ftrace selftest trace_marker_raw.tc, we get the weird log: for cases where the id is 1..100, the number of data field is 8N, but once id exceeds 100, the number of data field becomes 8N+4: # 1 buf: 58 00 00 00 80 5e d1 63 (number of data field is 81) ... # a buf: 58 ... (number of data field is 82) ... # 64 buf: 58 ... (number of data field is 813) # 65 buf: 58 ... (number of data field is 813+4) After applying this change, the number of data field keeps being 8*N+4 consistently.

Severity
N/A (UNKNOWN)
References
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-80876 REPORT
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-80876 REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/linus/c37e0a4b79a6bbb96ce5… REPORT
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8878-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8879-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8877-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8875-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8888-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8889-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8887-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8888-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8887-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8875-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8887-3 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8917-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8918-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8963-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9003-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9025-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9029-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9024-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9026-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9040-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9043-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9066-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9021-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9091-1 ADVISORY

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