UBUNTU-CVE-2026-74637 (CVE-2026-74637)

Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu – Published: 2026-08-22 16:16 – Updated: 2026-11-19 11:57 – Source website
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/core: Fix group leader use-after-free after sibling detach perf_group_detach() handles leader and sibling detach differently. When the group leader is detached, all siblings are promoted to singleton events and their group_leader pointer is reset to themselves. When a sibling is detached, it is removed from the leader's sibling_list, but its group_leader pointer is left pointing at the old leader. That is harmless when the sibling is being closed and freed immediately, as in the DETACH_DEAD path. It is not safe when the sibling is detached but kept alive, such as during CPU hotplug with DETACH_GROUP. In that case the sibling is removed from the context, while its file descriptor can still keep it alive. A typical failing sequence is: - A group contains leader L and sibling S. - CPU hot-unplug detaches S with DETACH_GROUP, removing it from L->sibling_list but leaving S->group_leader == L. - L is later closed and freed. - A PERF_IOC_FLAG_GROUP ioctl on S follows S->group_leader and dereferences the freed leader. This was reproduced by running the perf event fuzzer, CPU hotplug, and a stress workload concurrently: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 006b6b6b6b6b6cdb CPU: 2 PID: 12489 Comm: perf_fuzzer 6.18.7 PREEMPT pc : perf_ioctl+0x34c/0xc68 x20: ffffff89a3fa2c70 x8 : 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b Code: 943c4a0e 340047a0 f9404a94 f9411e88 (f940b908) Call trace: perf_ioctl+0x34c/0xc68 (P) __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa0/0xf4 invoke_syscall+0x58/0xe4 el0_svc_common+0xa8/0xdc do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x40/0xc0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xdc el0t_64_sync+0x1c4/0x1c8 The fault happened in perf_ioctl(), where perf_event_for_each() follows the stale group_leader pointer and perf_event_for_each_child() then dereferences the freed leader's context. Fix the use-after-free by promoting the detached sibling to a singleton. Also fix __event_disable() cgroup accounting and event state change.

References
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-74637 REPORT
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-74637 REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80c6054a4c40a0ffa… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8a07021679aadfb6… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42c5ca1f0a288a528… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e92e03984364d93e… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a979a642402d0b1f8… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e7abfeb23c12bf46… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b42948f9e0d1ea4db… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f867c0e8da4c2303… REPORT
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8886-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8962-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8961-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8959-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8963-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9020-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9023-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9025-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9022-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9029-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9024-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9026-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9019-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9039-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9040-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9066-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9021-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9160-1 ADVISORY

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