UBUNTU-CVE-2026-74348 (CVE-2026-74348)

Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu – Published: 2026-08-15 06:22 – Updated: 2026-11-19 04:07 – Source website
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2/dlm: require a ref for locking_state debugfs open debug_lockres_open() copies inode->i_private into struct debug_lockres and debug_lockres_release() later drops that pointer with dlm_put(). That only works if open successfully pins the struct dlm_ctxt. Today open calls dlm_grab(dlm) but ignores its return value. Once the last domain unregister has removed the context from dlm_domains, dlm_grab() returns NULL, yet open still stores the raw pointer and returns success. The later release path is outside the debugfs removal barrier, so it can call dlm_put() after dlm_free_ctxt_mem() has freed the context. KASAN reports this as a slab-use-after-free in dlm_put() called from debug_lockres_release(). Fail the open when dlm_grab() cannot acquire the reference and unwind the seq_file private state before returning. That keeps locking_state from handing out a file descriptor whose release path does not own the dlm_ctxt. The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order within that path: locking_state debugfs open: last domain unregister: 1. debug_lockres_open() reads 1. dlm_unregister_domain() calls inode->i_private. dlm_complete_dlm_shutdown(). 2. debug_lockres_open() calls 2. shutdown removes the dlm_ctxt from dlm_grab(dlm) and gets NULL. dlm_domains. 3. open still stores the raw dlm 3. final teardown reaches pointer in dl->dl_ctxt and dlm_free_ctxt_mem() and frees it. returns success. 4. debug_lockres_release() later calls dlm_put(dl->dl_ctxt). Validation reproduced this kernel report: KASAN slab-use-after-free in dlm_put+0x82/0x200 RIP: 0033:0x7f4d349bc9e0 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888103a3c000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 816 bytes inside of freed 2048-byte region [ffff888103a3c000, ffff888103a3c800) Write of size 4 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?) print_report+0xd0/0x630 (?:?) dlm_put+0x82/0x200 (?:?) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0 (?:?) kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 (?:?) kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 (?:?) debug_lockres_release+0x53/0x80 (fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c:587) dlm_put+0x9/0x200 (?:?) debug_lockres_release+0x5c/0x80 (fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c:587) full_proxy_release+0x67/0x90 (?:?) __fput+0x1df/0x4b0 (?:?) do_raw_spin_lock+0x10f/0x1b0 (?:?) fput_close_sync+0xd2/0x170 (?:?) __x64_sys_close+0x55/0x90 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0x10c/0x640 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) irqentry_exit+0xac/0x6e0 (?:?) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?) Freed by task stack: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 (?:?) kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 (?:?) kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 (?:?) __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 (?:?) kfree+0x30f/0x580 (?:?) dlm_put+0x1ce/0x200 (?:?) dlm_unregister_domain+0xf6/0xb30 (?:?) o2cb_cluster_disconnect+0x6b/0x90 (?:?) ocfs2_cluster_disconnect+0x41/0x70 (?:?) ocfs2_dlm_shutdown+0x1c4/0x220 (?:?) ocfs2_dismount_volume+0x38a/0x550 (?:?) generic_shutdown_super+0xc3/0x220 (?:?) kill_block_super+0x29/0x60 (?:?) deactivate_locked_super+0x66/0xe0 (?:?) cleanup_mnt+0x13d/0x210 (?:?) task_work_run+0xfa/0x170 (?:?) exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xd6/0x430 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0x3cb/0x640 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)

Severity
N/A (UNKNOWN)
References
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-74348 REPORT
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-74348 REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/linus/03ad858ce8064861ea58… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03ad858ce8064861e… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5bee5d5f67aedd26d… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6cc93dea4078cbcdd… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/90a6512425414098a… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c81c1a61a52b6ecf… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a087b2d3411e7f9df… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a09831214912a1f27… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa7883b6a3c76301a… REPORT
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8876-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8878-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8879-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8877-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8875-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8888-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8889-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8887-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8888-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8887-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8875-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8887-3 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8917-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8918-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8963-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9003-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9025-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9029-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9024-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9026-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9040-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9043-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9066-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9021-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9091-1 ADVISORY

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