UBUNTU-CVE-2026-68105 (CVE-2026-68105)

Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu – Published: 2026-08-10 13:19 – Updated: 2026-11-19 04:04 – Source website
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Fix kernel panic during driver load failure Avoid kernel panic if MES init fails during driver load. The KIQ ring is falsely marked as ready as ASICs that use MES, KIQ is owned by MES. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:gfx_v12_1_wait_reg_mem+0x5a/0x1f0 [amdgpu] Call Trace: gfx_v12_1_ring_emit_reg_write_reg_wait+0x1f/0x30 [amdgpu] amdgpu_gmc_fw_reg_write_reg_wait+0xb2/0x190 [amdgpu] amdgpu_gmc_flush_gpu_tlb+0x1cc/0x230 [amdgpu] amdgpu_gart_invalidate_tlb+0x81/0xa0 [amdgpu] amdgpu_gart_unbind+0x72/0x90 [amdgpu] amdgpu_ttm_backend_unbind+0xa4/0xb0 [amdgpu] amdgpu_ttm_tt_unpopulate+0x13/0xd0 [amdgpu] amdttm_tt_unpopulate+0x29/0x70 [amdttm] ttm_bo_put+0x1eb/0x360 [amdttm] amdgpu_bo_free_kernel+0xf9/0x1f0 [amdgpu] amdgpu_ih_ring_fini+0x5a/0x90 [amdgpu] amdgpu_irq_fini_hw+0x58/0x80 [amdgpu] amdgpu_device_fini_hw+0x4e0/0x5b0 [amdgpu] amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x60/0xa0 [amdgpu] amdgpu_pci_probe+0x28e/0x6d0 [amdgpu] pci_device_probe+0x19f/0x220 really_probe+0x1ed/0x340 driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x80 __driver_attach+0xd3/0x1a0 bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0xa0 bus_add_driver+0x19f/0x270 driver_register+0x5d/0xf0 do_one_initcall+0xac/0x200 do_init_module+0x1ec/0x280 __se_sys_finit_module+0x2de/0x310 do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x250 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 (cherry picked from commit 4623b958dd6da0f4c3026afdf330626a09ecb0f0)

Severity
N/A (UNKNOWN)

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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

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How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

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    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.