UBUNTU-CVE-2026-64103 (CVE-2026-64103)

Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu – Published: 2026-07-20 00:00 – Updated: 2026-11-19 04:03 – Source website
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: isci: Fix use-after-free in device removal path The ISCI completion tasklet is initialized in isci_host_alloc() (drivers/scsi/isci/init.c:496) and scheduled from both MSI-X and legacy interrupt handlers (drivers/scsi/isci/host.c:223,613). isci_host_deinit() stops the controller and waits for stop completion, but it never kills completion_tasklet before teardown continues. A top-of-function tasklet_kill() is not sufficient here: interrupts are only disabled when isci_host_stop_complete() runs, so until wait_for_stop() returns the IRQ handlers can still requeue the tasklet. The tasklet callback also re-enables interrupts after draining completions, so killing the tasklet before the source is quiesced leaves the same race open. Once wait_for_stop() returns, no further IRQ-driven scheduling can occur. Kill completion_tasklet there so teardown cannot race a queued tasklet running on a dead ihost. On remove or unload, the stale callback can otherwise dereference ihost and touch ihost->smu_registers after the host lifetime ends. A UML + KASAN analogue reproduced the failure class both with no tasklet_kill() and with tasklet_kill() placed before source quiesce, and stayed clean once the kill happened after quiescing the scheduling source. This mirrors commit f6ab594672d4 ("scsi: aic94xx: fix use-after-free in device removal path"), but ISCI needs the kill after wait_for_stop().

References
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-64103 REPORT
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-64103 REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/linus/b52a8d52c3125ec9a931… REPORT
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8575-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8576-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8593-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8575-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8576-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8603-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8575-3 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8610-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8618-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8620-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8620-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8620-3 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8620-4 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8663-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8664-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8668-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8728-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8729-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8761-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8729-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8761-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8781-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8668-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8729-3 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8761-3 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8802-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8728-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8729-4 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8729-5 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8729-6 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8728-3 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8906-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9066-1 ADVISORY

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