UBUNTU-CVE-2024-51744 (CVE-2024-51744)
Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu – Published: 2024-11-04 22:15 – Updated: 2026-10-17 09:28 – Source websitegolang-jwt is a Go implementation of JSON Web Tokens. Unclear documentation of the error behavior in ParseWithClaims can lead to situation where users are potentially not checking errors in the way they should be. Especially, if a token is both expired and invalid, the errors returned by ParseWithClaims return both error codes. If users only check for the jwt.ErrTokenExpired using error.Is, they will ignore the embedded jwt.ErrTokenSignatureInvalid and thus potentially accept invalid tokens. A fix has been back-ported with the error handling logic from the v5 branch to the v4 branch. In this logic, the ParseWithClaims function will immediately return in "dangerous" situations (e.g., an invalid signature), limiting the combined errors only to situations where the signature is valid, but further validation failed (e.g., if the signature is valid, but is expired AND has the wrong audience). This fix is part of the 4.5.1 release. We are aware that this changes the behaviour of an established function and is not 100 % backwards compatible, so updating to 4.5.1 might break your code. In case you cannot update to 4.5.0, please make sure that you are properly checking for all errors ("dangerous" ones first), so that you are not running in the case detailed above.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-dev",
"binary_version": "4.2.0-1ubuntu0.1"
},
{
"binary_name": "jwt",
"binary_version": "4.2.0-1ubuntu0.1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:22.04:LTS",
"name": "golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt@4.2.0-1ubuntu0.1?arch=source\u0026distro=jammy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"4.1.0-1",
"4.1.0-2",
"4.2.0-1",
"4.2.0-1ubuntu0.1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-dev",
"binary_version": "5.0.0+really4.5.0-1"
},
{
"binary_name": "jwt",
"binary_version": "5.0.0+really4.5.0-1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:24.04:LTS",
"name": "golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt@5.0.0+really4.5.0-1?arch=source\u0026distro=noble"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"4.4.3-1build1",
"5.0.0+really4.5.0-1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-v5-dev",
"binary_version": "5.2.0-2"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:24.04:LTS",
"name": "golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-v5",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-v5@5.2.0-2?arch=source\u0026distro=noble"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"5.2.0-2"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-dev",
"binary_version": "5.0.0+really4.5.2-1"
},
{
"binary_name": "jwt",
"binary_version": "5.0.0+really4.5.2-1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:25.10",
"name": "golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt@5.0.0+really4.5.2-1?arch=source\u0026distro=questing"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"5.0.0+really4.5.2-1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-v5-dev",
"binary_version": "5.2.2-1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:25.10",
"name": "golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-v5",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-v5@5.2.2-1?arch=source\u0026distro=questing"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"5.2.2-1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-dev",
"binary_version": "5.0.0+really4.5.2-1build1"
},
{
"binary_name": "jwt",
"binary_version": "5.0.0+really4.5.2-1build1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.10",
"name": "golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt@5.0.0+really4.5.2-1build1?arch=source\u0026distro=stonking"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"5.0.0+really4.5.2-1build1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-v5-dev",
"binary_version": "5.3.1-1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.10",
"name": "golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-v5",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-v5@5.3.1-1?arch=source\u0026distro=stonking"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"5.3.0-1",
"5.3.1-1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-dev",
"binary_version": "5.0.0+really4.5.2-1build1"
},
{
"binary_name": "jwt",
"binary_version": "5.0.0+really4.5.2-1build1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.04:LTS",
"name": "golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt@5.0.0+really4.5.2-1build1?arch=source\u0026distro=resolute"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"5.0.0+really4.5.2-1",
"5.0.0+really4.5.2-1build1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-v5-dev",
"binary_version": "5.3.0-1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.04:LTS",
"name": "golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-v5",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-v5@5.3.0-1?arch=source\u0026distro=resolute"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"5.2.2-1",
"5.3.0-1"
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"details": "golang-jwt is a Go implementation of JSON Web Tokens. Unclear documentation of the error behavior in `ParseWithClaims` can lead to situation where users are potentially not checking errors in the way they should be. Especially, if a token is both expired and invalid, the errors returned by `ParseWithClaims` return both error codes. If users only check for the `jwt.ErrTokenExpired ` using `error.Is`, they will ignore the embedded `jwt.ErrTokenSignatureInvalid` and thus potentially accept invalid tokens. A fix has been back-ported with the error handling logic from the `v5` branch to the `v4` branch. In this logic, the `ParseWithClaims` function will immediately return in \"dangerous\" situations (e.g., an invalid signature), limiting the combined errors only to situations where the signature is valid, but further validation failed (e.g., if the signature is valid, but is expired AND has the wrong audience). This fix is part of the 4.5.1 release. We are aware that this changes the behaviour of an established function and is not 100 % backwards compatible, so updating to 4.5.1 might break your code. In case you cannot update to 4.5.0, please make sure that you are properly checking for all errors (\"dangerous\" ones first), so that you are not running in the case detailed above.",
"id": "UBUNTU-CVE-2024-51744",
"modified": "2026-10-17T09:28:37Z",
"published": "2024-11-04T22:15:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2024-51744"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-51744"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-29wx-vh33-7x7r"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/commit/7b1c1c00a171c6c79bbdb40e4ce7d197060c1c2c"
}
],
"related": [],
"schema_version": "1.7.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "medium",
"type": "Ubuntu"
}
],
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-51744"
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.