{
  "guidislink": false,
  "id": "https://tailscale.com/security-bulletins/#ts-2026-013",
  "link": "https://tailscale.com/security-bulletins/#ts-2026-013",
  "links": [
    {
      "href": "https://tailscale.com/security-bulletins/#ts-2026-013",
      "rel": "alternate",
      "type": "text/html"
    }
  ],
  "published": "Wed, 21 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT",
  "summary": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003eDescription\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e: Leaked private keys for eMudhra TLS intermediate certificates\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eWhat happened?\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo validate TLS connections, the Tailscale client and Tailscale servers rely on the host operating system\u0027s root certificate store (for example, \u003ccode\u003eca-certificates\u003c/code\u003e on Linux).\nOur control plane certificates are signed by Let\u0027s Encrypt, so the Tailscale client also embeds Let\u0027s Encrypt CA certificates, in case they\u0027re absent from your system\u0027s certificate store.\nTailscale accepts any TLS connection which is signed by a certificate trusted by the system certificate store.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEight TLS intermediate certificates owned by eMudhra Limited have been compromised.\nThis would allow an attacker to create new certificates for websites they do not control, and these certificates would be trusted by any device that trusts the compromised certificates.\nUsers connecting to the malicious website would receive no warning about incorrect certificates.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTailscale v1.104.2 or later includes Go 1.27.3, which explicitly distrusts the compromised certificates, even if they are still included in your system certificate store.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTailscale\u0027s internal services have been updated to distrust the compromised certificates, by updating to Go 1.27.3 and updating the host certificate stores.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eWhat was the impact?\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAn attacker could create TLS certificate for domains they did not own.\nDevices would accept these TLS certificates as valid and connect to the attacker-controlled website.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eWho was affected?\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects any device running on an operating system where the compromised eMudhra intermediate root certificates remain in the system certificate store.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStandard Tailscale mesh traffic between nodes (WireGuard end-to-end encryption using Tailscale node keys) is not affected, as node-to-node data plane traffic does not rely on public Web PKI or system certificate stores.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eWhat do I need to do?\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUpdate to Tailscale v1.104.2 or later.\u003c/p\u003e",
  "summary_detail": {
    "base": "https://tailscale.com/security-bulletins/index.xml",
    "language": null,
    "type": "text/html",
    "value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003eDescription\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e: Leaked private keys for eMudhra TLS intermediate certificates\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eWhat happened?\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo validate TLS connections, the Tailscale client and Tailscale servers rely on the host operating system\u0027s root certificate store (for example, \u003ccode\u003eca-certificates\u003c/code\u003e on Linux).\nOur control plane certificates are signed by Let\u0027s Encrypt, so the Tailscale client also embeds Let\u0027s Encrypt CA certificates, in case they\u0027re absent from your system\u0027s certificate store.\nTailscale accepts any TLS connection which is signed by a certificate trusted by the system certificate store.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEight TLS intermediate certificates owned by eMudhra Limited have been compromised.\nThis would allow an attacker to create new certificates for websites they do not control, and these certificates would be trusted by any device that trusts the compromised certificates.\nUsers connecting to the malicious website would receive no warning about incorrect certificates.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTailscale v1.104.2 or later includes Go 1.27.3, which explicitly distrusts the compromised certificates, even if they are still included in your system certificate store.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTailscale\u0027s internal services have been updated to distrust the compromised certificates, by updating to Go 1.27.3 and updating the host certificate stores.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eWhat was the impact?\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAn attacker could create TLS certificate for domains they did not own.\nDevices would accept these TLS certificates as valid and connect to the attacker-controlled website.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eWho was affected?\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects any device running on an operating system where the compromised eMudhra intermediate root certificates remain in the system certificate store.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStandard Tailscale mesh traffic between nodes (WireGuard end-to-end encryption using Tailscale node keys) is not affected, as node-to-node data plane traffic does not rely on public Web PKI or system certificate stores.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eWhat do I need to do?\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUpdate to Tailscale v1.104.2 or later.\u003c/p\u003e"
  },
  "title": "TS-2026-013",
  "title_detail": {
    "base": "https://tailscale.com/security-bulletins/index.xml",
    "language": null,
    "type": "text/plain",
    "value": "TS-2026-013"
  }
}