RUSTSEC-2026-0553 (GHSA-9543-CJ4X-H76Q)

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-11-16 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-17 10:14 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Malformed quoted chunk extensions can end HTTP/1.1 request bodies early
Details

Affected versions of actix-http do not track quoted strings when parsing HTTP/1.1 chunk extensions. A carriage return inside a quoted extension value is treated as the end of the chunk-size line, even if the closing quote is missing. For example, 0;x="\r\n\r\n is accepted as the end of a chunked body, and a following pipelined request is dispatched on the same connection.

A remote client can trigger this without authentication. CR and LF are invalid inside HTTP quoted strings, including after a backslash; they must be rejected rather than interpreted as framing or accepted as quoted data.

Request smuggling requires an upstream intermediary that forwards the malformed input while using a different request boundary. Dispatching two requests on the sender's own connection does not by itself demonstrate an authorization bypass or an effect on another user. Proxy bypass, cache poisoning, and cross-user response mixing were not demonstrated by the reproduction.

Upgrade to actix-http 3.21.3 or later. The fix preserves quote and escape state across reads and rejects invalid control bytes inside quoted strings and quoted pairs before consuming the following body or request bytes.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [],
        "cvss": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "actix-http",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/actix-http"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.21.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-9543-cj4x-h76q"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC-BY-4.0"
  },
  "details": "Affected versions of `actix-http` do not track quoted strings when parsing\nHTTP/1.1 chunk extensions. A carriage return inside a quoted extension value\nis treated as the end of the chunk-size line, even if the closing quote is\nmissing. For example, `0;x=\"\\r\\n\\r\\n` is accepted as the end of a chunked body,\nand a following pipelined request is dispatched on the same connection.\n\nA remote client can trigger this without authentication. CR and LF are invalid\ninside HTTP quoted strings, including after a backslash; they must be rejected\nrather than interpreted as framing or accepted as quoted data.\n\nRequest smuggling requires an upstream intermediary that forwards the malformed\ninput while using a different request boundary. Dispatching two requests on the\nsender\u0027s own connection does not by itself demonstrate an authorization bypass\nor an effect on another user. Proxy bypass, cache poisoning, and cross-user\nresponse mixing were not demonstrated by the reproduction.\n\nUpgrade to `actix-http` 3.21.3 or later. The fix preserves quote and escape state\nacross reads and rejects invalid control bytes inside quoted strings and quoted\npairs before consuming the following body or request bytes.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0553",
  "modified": "2026-11-17T10:14:35Z",
  "published": "2026-11-16T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/actix-http"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0553.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/actix/actix-web/releases/tag/actix-http-v3.21.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/actix/actix-web/security/advisories/GHSA-9543-cj4x-h76q"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Malformed quoted chunk extensions can end HTTP/1.1 request bodies early"
}



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