RUSTSEC-2026-0552 (GHSA-9W4R-XC43-V236)
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-11-16 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-17 10:14 – Source websiteAffected versions of actix-http skip a bare line feed (LF) inside an HTTP/1.1
chunked trailer instead of rejecting the invalid line ending. Trailer lines
must end with a carriage return and line feed (CRLF).
For example, after 0\r\nX\n, the parser continues reading trailer data. If a
request follows on the same connection, its head can be consumed as part of the
trailer, so that request is never dispatched. If no more bytes arrive, body
decoding waits for more input instead of reporting an error. A remote client
can trigger these effects without authentication.
Request smuggling additionally requires an HTTP intermediary that forwards the malformed body but uses a different request boundary. The tested HTTP intermediaries either rejected the input or consumed and normalized it before forwarding. Proxy access-control bypass, cache poisoning, and effects on other users were not demonstrated.
Upgrade to actix-http 3.21.1 or later. The fix rejects bare LF and invalid
control bytes in trailers before consuming the following request, while
preserving partial reads and valid CRLF-terminated trailers.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [],
"cvss": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "actix-http",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/actix-http"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.21.1"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"GHSA-9w4r-xc43-v236"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC-BY-4.0"
},
"details": "Affected versions of `actix-http` skip a bare line feed (LF) inside an HTTP/1.1\nchunked trailer instead of rejecting the invalid line ending. Trailer lines\nmust end with a carriage return and line feed (CRLF).\n\nFor example, after `0\\r\\nX\\n`, the parser continues reading trailer data. If a\nrequest follows on the same connection, its head can be consumed as part of the\ntrailer, so that request is never dispatched. If no more bytes arrive, body\ndecoding waits for more input instead of reporting an error. A remote client\ncan trigger these effects without authentication.\n\nRequest smuggling additionally requires an HTTP intermediary that forwards the\nmalformed body but uses a different request boundary. The tested HTTP\nintermediaries either rejected the input or consumed and normalized it before\nforwarding. Proxy access-control bypass, cache poisoning, and effects on other\nusers were not demonstrated.\n\nUpgrade to `actix-http` 3.21.1 or later. The fix rejects bare LF and invalid\ncontrol bytes in trailers before consuming the following request, while\npreserving partial reads and valid CRLF-terminated trailers.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0552",
"modified": "2026-11-17T10:14:35Z",
"published": "2026-11-16T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/actix-http"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0552.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/actix/actix-web/releases/tag/actix-http-v3.21.1"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/actix/actix-web/security/advisories/GHSA-9w4r-xc43-v236"
}
],
"related": [
"GHSA-2q7f-mf9f-5qhr"
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Bare LF in chunked trailers can consume pipelined requests or stall body decoding"
}
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