RUSTSEC-2026-0529 (GHSA-MJ2M-JXGV-R446)

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-11-13 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-13 12:33 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
KVStoreInterpreter::verify_signature_legacy answers true for every token and every key
Details

KVStoreInterpreter::verify_signature_legacy(&PushDrop, &PublicKey), public and deprecated since 0.2.0 (the crate's first release), read neither argument and answered true. A KVStore token signed by nobody, a signed token checked against a key other than its controller's, and a PushDrop with no fields each passed. Its documentation said it delegated to the KVStoreFields-based verifier; it did not.

An application that checks, with this function, a KVStore token it did not write (an overlay lookup's answer, or a transaction output a peer hands it) and acts on true accepts a value no controller signed, attributed to whatever controller the token names. No caller in the crate itself uses the function. This was run on 0.2.0, 0.5.0, 0.8.0, 0.8.7, 0.8.8, 0.9.0-beta.1 and 0.9.0-beta.7 as crates.io serves them, and the source of all 63 published versions carries the same constant body (the yanked 0.3.21 included).

0.8.9 answers true only for a token whose controller field is the given key and whose last field is that key's signature over the others (the 0.9 line's next prerelease carries the same fix). There is no workaround: upgrade to 0.8.9, or, on the 0.9 line, to its next prerelease.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "crypto-failure"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [
            "bsv_rs::kvstore::KVStoreInterpreter::verify_signature_legacy"
          ],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "bsv-rs",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/bsv-rs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.9"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "0.9.0-beta.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.0-beta.7.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-mj2m-jxgv-r446"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "`KVStoreInterpreter::verify_signature_legacy(\u0026PushDrop, \u0026PublicKey)`, public\nand deprecated since 0.2.0 (the crate\u0027s first release), read neither argument\nand answered `true`. A KVStore token signed by nobody, a signed token checked\nagainst a key other than its controller\u0027s, and a PushDrop with no fields each\npassed. Its documentation said it delegated to the `KVStoreFields`-based\nverifier; it did not.\n\nAn application that checks, with this function, a KVStore token it did not\nwrite (an overlay lookup\u0027s answer, or a transaction output a peer hands it) and\nacts on `true` accepts a value no controller signed, attributed to whatever\ncontroller the token names. No caller in the crate itself uses the function.\nThis was run on 0.2.0, 0.5.0, 0.8.0, 0.8.7, 0.8.8, 0.9.0-beta.1 and\n0.9.0-beta.7 as crates.io serves them, and the source of all 63 published\nversions carries the same constant body (the yanked 0.3.21 included).\n\n0.8.9 answers `true` only for a token whose controller field is the\ngiven key and whose last field is that key\u0027s signature over the others (the\n0.9 line\u0027s next prerelease carries the same fix). There is no workaround:\nupgrade to 0.8.9, or, on the 0.9 line, to its next prerelease.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0529",
  "modified": "2026-11-13T12:33:03Z",
  "published": "2026-11-13T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/bsv-rs"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0529.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Calhooon/bsv-rs/blob/v0.8.9/CHANGELOG.md"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "KVStoreInterpreter::verify_signature_legacy answers true for every token and every key"
}



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