RUSTSEC-2017-0004 (CVE-2017-1000430)

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2017-05-03 12:00 – Updated: 2023-06-13 13:10 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Integer overflow leads to heap-based buffer overflow in encode_config_buf
Details

Affected versions of this crate suffered from an integer overflow bug when calculating the size of a buffer to use when encoding base64 using the encode_config_buf and encode_config functions. If the input string was large, this would cause a buffer to be allocated that was too small. Since this function writes to the buffer using unsafe code, it would allow an attacker to write beyond the buffer, causing memory corruption and possibly the execution of arbitrary code.

This flaw was corrected by using checked arithmetic to calculate the size of the buffer.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "base64",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/base64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-1000430",
    "GHSA-x67x-vg9m-65c3"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "Affected versions of this crate suffered from an integer overflow bug when\ncalculating the size of a buffer to use when encoding base64 using the\n`encode_config_buf` and `encode_config` functions.  If the input string\nwas large, this would cause a buffer to be allocated that was too small.\nSince this function writes to the buffer using unsafe code, it would\nallow an attacker to write beyond the buffer, causing memory corruption\nand possibly the execution of arbitrary code.\n\nThis flaw was corrected by using checked arithmetic to calculate\nthe size of the buffer.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2017-0004",
  "modified": "2023-06-13T13:10:24Z",
  "published": "2017-05-03T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/base64"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2017-0004.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/alicemaz/rust-base64/commit/24ead980daf11ba563e4fb2516187a56a71ad319"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Integer overflow leads to heap-based buffer overflow in encode_config_buf"
}



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