OESA-2026-4993 (CVE-2026-119741)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-11-19 01:43 – Updated: 2026-11-19 01:43 – Source websiteRsync is an open source utility that provides fast incremental file transfer. It uses the "rsync algorithm" which provides a very fast method for bringing remote files into sync. It does this by sending just the differences in the files across the link, without requiring that both sets of files are present at one of the ends of the link beforehand.
Security Fix(es):
rsync before 3.5.2 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the delta-transfer sender's hash_search() in match.c that allows malicious receivers to trigger unbounded strong-checksum work at consecutive offsets. Unauthenticated attackers pulling from a public daemon module can supply weak checksums colliding with consecutive rolling windows plus non-matching strong checksums, exhausting sender CPU across concurrent connections.(CVE-2026-119741)
rsync 3.2.5 before 3.5.0 contains a heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability that allows remote unauthenticated attackers to write one attacker-controlled byte past the end of a heap allocation by supplying a crafted files-from entry. Attackers can trigger the vulnerability against a read-only rsync daemon module by providing a files-from entry containing both an interior and trailing backslash, causing the add_implied_include() function to under-count the trailing backslash when sizing the destination buffer.(CVE-2026-70461)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"rsync-3.2.5-10.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"rsync-debuginfo-3.2.5-10.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"rsync-debugsource-3.2.5-10.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm"
],
"noarch": [
"rsync-help-3.2.5-10.oe2203sp4.noarch.rpm"
],
"src": [
"rsync-3.2.5-10.oe2203sp4.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"rsync-3.2.5-10.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"rsync-debuginfo-3.2.5-10.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"rsync-debugsource-3.2.5-10.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4",
"name": "rsync",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/rsync\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.5-10.oe2203sp4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "Rsync is an open source utility that provides fast incremental file transfer. It uses the \u0026amp;quot;rsync algorithm\u0026amp;quot; which provides a very fast method for bringing remote files into sync. It does this by sending just the differences in the files across the link, without requiring that both sets of files are present at one of the ends of the link beforehand.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nrsync before 3.5.2 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the delta-transfer sender\u0026apos;s hash_search() in match.c that allows malicious receivers to trigger unbounded strong-checksum work at consecutive offsets. Unauthenticated attackers pulling from a public daemon module can supply weak checksums colliding with consecutive rolling windows plus non-matching strong checksums, exhausting sender CPU across concurrent connections.(CVE-2026-119741)\n\nrsync 3.2.5 before 3.5.0\u00a0contains a heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability that allows remote unauthenticated attackers to write one attacker-controlled byte past the end of a heap allocation by supplying a crafted files-from entry. Attackers can trigger the vulnerability against a read-only rsync daemon module by providing a files-from entry containing both an interior and trailing backslash, causing the add_implied_include() function to under-count the trailing backslash when sizing the destination buffer.(CVE-2026-70461)",
"id": "OESA-2026-4993",
"modified": "2026-11-19T01:43:54Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T01:43:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-4993"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119741"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-70461"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "rsync security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-119741",
"CVE-2026-70461"
]
}
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