OESA-2026-4789 (CVE-2026-119194)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-11-11 12:26 – Updated: 2026-11-11 12:26 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
python-pyasn1 security update
Details

Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) is a technology for exchanging structured data in a universally understood, hardware agnostic way. Many industrial, security and telephony applications heavily rely on ASN.1. The pyasn1 library implements ASN.1 support in pure-Python.

Security Fix(es):

pyasn1 is a generic ASN.1 library for Python. From 0.3.3 until 0.6.5, schemaless container decoding stores every decoded component's TagSet in a growing set even though only one-versus-multiple tag types must be distinguished. Attacker-controlled BER, CER, or DER input contains many distinct long tag IDs whose TagSet hashes collide. Each later set insertion compares against an increasing number of earlier colliding tags in ConstructedPayloadDecoderBase._decodeComponentsSchemaless, producing quadratic CPU work while decoded values and order remain valid. Repeated inputs can exhaust decoder CPU and reduce service availability. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.5.(CVE-2026-119194)

pyasn1 is a generic ASN.1 library for Python. Prior to 0.6.5, constructed string and indefinite-length ANY decoding repeatedly concatenates each fragment onto a growing bytes value. Attacker-controlled BER or CER data can use many constructed OCTET STRING or character-string fragments. DER rejects constructed OCTET STRING without a schema, but accepts its definite-length form when asn1Spec selects univ.OctetString; it also accepts constructed character strings such as UTF8String without a schema, even though those encodings are not valid DER. The separate indefinite-length ANY path is reachable in BER and CER when asn1Spec selects univ.Any; DER rejects indefinite lengths. OctetStringPayloadDecoder uses growing header concatenation and AnyPayloadDecoder.indefLenValueDecoder uses growing chunk concatenation, repeatedly copying an increasing prefix and causing quadratic work. A sufficiently fragmented value can occupy decoding workers and cause CPU exhaustion without confidentiality or integrity impact. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.5.(CVE-2026-119195)

pyasn1 is a generic ASN.1 library for Python. Prior to 0.6.5, constructed BIT STRING decoding repeatedly shifts and copies the complete bit value accumulated from earlier fragments. Attacker-controlled BER or CER input contains many constructed BIT STRING fragments; schema-driven DER also accepts a definite-length constructed BIT STRING. BitStringPayloadDecoder repeatedly calls BitString.fromOctetString with the prior bitString as prepend, shifting an ever-growing SizedInteger for each fragment and causing quadratic work. Large fragmented values can exhaust CPU during decode() without requiring later conversion or formatting. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.5.(CVE-2026-119196)

pyasn1 is a generic ASN.1 library for Python. Prior to 0.6.5, binary REAL decoding builds a large mantissa one octet at a time by shifting a growing integer and slicing the remaining byte string. Attacker-controlled ASN.1 includes a binary-encoded REAL with a large mantissa and reaches BER, CER, or DER decode(), with or without a schema containing REAL. RealPayloadDecoder.valueDecoder repeatedly performs a left shift, OR, and suffix copy for every mantissa octet, making decode time quadratic in mantissa length. A comparatively small REAL value can hold a decoding worker on one CPU core for seconds or longer and cause availability loss. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.5.(CVE-2026-119197)


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "noarch": [
          "python-pyasn1-help-0.4.8-8.oe2203sp4.noarch.rpm",
          "python3-pyasn1-0.4.8-8.oe2203sp4.noarch.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "python-pyasn1-0.4.8-8.oe2203sp4.src.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4",
        "name": "python-pyasn1",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/python-pyasn1\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.4.8-8.oe2203sp4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) is a technology for exchanging structured data in a universally understood, hardware agnostic way. Many industrial, security and telephony applications heavily rely on ASN.1. The pyasn1 library implements ASN.1 support in pure-Python.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\npyasn1 is a generic ASN.1 library for Python. From 0.3.3 until 0.6.5, schemaless container decoding stores every decoded component\u0026apos;s TagSet in a growing set even though only one-versus-multiple tag types must be distinguished. Attacker-controlled BER, CER, or DER input contains many distinct long tag IDs whose TagSet hashes collide. Each later set insertion compares against an increasing number of earlier colliding tags in ConstructedPayloadDecoderBase._decodeComponentsSchemaless, producing quadratic CPU work while decoded values and order remain valid. Repeated inputs can exhaust decoder CPU and reduce service availability. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.5.(CVE-2026-119194)\n\npyasn1 is a generic ASN.1 library for Python. Prior to 0.6.5, constructed string and indefinite-length ANY decoding repeatedly concatenates each fragment onto a growing bytes value. Attacker-controlled BER or CER data can use many constructed OCTET STRING or character-string fragments. DER rejects constructed OCTET STRING without a schema, but accepts its definite-length form when asn1Spec selects univ.OctetString; it also accepts constructed character strings such as UTF8String without a schema, even though those encodings are not valid DER. The separate indefinite-length ANY path is reachable in BER and CER when asn1Spec selects univ.Any; DER rejects indefinite lengths. OctetStringPayloadDecoder uses growing header concatenation and AnyPayloadDecoder.indefLenValueDecoder uses growing chunk concatenation, repeatedly copying an increasing prefix and causing quadratic work. A sufficiently fragmented value can occupy decoding workers and cause CPU exhaustion without confidentiality or integrity impact. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.5.(CVE-2026-119195)\n\npyasn1 is a generic ASN.1 library for Python. Prior to 0.6.5, constructed BIT STRING decoding repeatedly shifts and copies the complete bit value accumulated from earlier fragments. Attacker-controlled BER or CER input contains many constructed BIT STRING fragments; schema-driven DER also accepts a definite-length constructed BIT STRING. BitStringPayloadDecoder repeatedly calls BitString.fromOctetString with the prior bitString as prepend, shifting an ever-growing SizedInteger for each fragment and causing quadratic work. Large fragmented values can exhaust CPU during decode() without requiring later conversion or formatting. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.5.(CVE-2026-119196)\n\npyasn1 is a generic ASN.1 library for Python. Prior to 0.6.5, binary REAL decoding builds a large mantissa one octet at a time by shifting a growing integer and slicing the remaining byte string. Attacker-controlled ASN.1 includes a binary-encoded REAL with a large mantissa and reaches BER, CER, or DER decode(), with or without a schema containing REAL. RealPayloadDecoder.valueDecoder repeatedly performs a left shift, OR, and suffix copy for every mantissa octet, making decode time quadratic in mantissa length. A comparatively small REAL value can hold a decoding worker on one CPU core for seconds or longer and cause availability loss. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.5.(CVE-2026-119197)",
  "id": "OESA-2026-4789",
  "modified": "2026-11-11T12:26:11Z",
  "published": "2026-11-11T12:26:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-4789"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119194"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119195"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119196"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119197"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "python-pyasn1 security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-119194",
    "CVE-2026-119195",
    "CVE-2026-119196",
    "CVE-2026-119197"
  ]
}



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