OESA-2026-4768 (CVE-2026-32280)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-11-11 12:25 – Updated: 2026-11-11 12:25 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
golang security update
Details

.

Security Fix(es):

During chain building, the amount of work that is done is not correctly limited when a large number of intermediate certificates are passed in VerifyOptions.Intermediates, which can lead to a denial of service. This affects both direct users of crypto/x509 and users of crypto/tls.(CVE-2026-32280)

When "Trailer" headers are sent by a client, the HTTP server internally uses the header values to populate the Request.Trailer map passed to the server handler. Because Request.Trailer is a map, each entry incurs memory overhead. For HTTP/2 servers, a malicious client can exploit this by sending a "Trailer" header that declares a large number of fields, causing the server to allocate a disproportionate amount of memory while bypassing Server.MaxHeaderValueCount and Server.MaxHeaderBytes limits. This exploit is not applicable for HTTP/1 servers, which do not support multiplexing a large number of requests over one TCP connection, and whose Server.MaxHeaderBytes are calculated differently.(CVE-2026-78659)

The HTTP/2 server can refund connection-level flow control twice for the same data: Once when a client resets a stream (refunding data for any sent-but-unread portion of the stream), and again when a request handler reads the buffered data. A malicious client can exploit this to bypass the configured connection-level flow control limit (MaxReceiveBufferPerConnection). Total buffered data is still limited by the concurrent stream limit and stream-level flow control.(CVE-2026-78663)

A malicious HTTP/2 peer can cause excessive CPU consumption in the client or server by opening a large number of streams and then sending many small SETTINGS frames containing SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE values.(CVE-2026-78669)

When an HTTP server handler sends a 2xx response to an HTTP/1 CONNECT request and returns without hijacking the connection, the server improperly continues to read and serve requests from the connection. Since a 2xx response to an HTTP/1 CONNECT converts the connection into a tunnel, the server should not treat the connection as continuing to contain HTTP. The impact of this misbehavior is mostly limited to potential request smuggling, where an intermediate proxy considers the data on the connection to be tunneled and the server considers it to be HTTP.(CVE-2026-94439)

Previously, a user operating inside of a malicious Go project that defines a bogus golang.org/toolchain go.sum entry and operates a malicious GOMODPROXY the user chooses to use can bypass the intended checksum. We now ensure that golang.org/toolchain always goes to the network for the canonical checksum.(CVE-2026-94447)

HTTP/2 servers could end up crashing due to inadvertently modifying its HPACK encoder concurrently. This happens because the server modifies the HPACK encoder from two goroutines without synchronization: one uses the encoder to encode a HEADERS frame as part of a response sent to a client and the other modifies the encoder's table size when handling a SETTINGS frame containing SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE that a client sends. A malicious client can repeatedly send a request while changing the header table size to crash the server.(CVE-2026-97032)


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "golang-1.21.4-53.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "noarch": [
          "golang-devel-1.21.4-53.oe2403sp3.noarch.rpm",
          "golang-help-1.21.4-53.oe2403sp3.noarch.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "golang-1.21.4-53.oe2403sp3.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "golang-1.21.4-53.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3",
        "name": "golang",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/golang\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.21.4-53.oe2403sp3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "Critical"
  },
  "details": ".\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nDuring chain building, the amount of work that is done is not correctly limited when a large number of intermediate certificates are passed in VerifyOptions.Intermediates, which can lead to a denial of service. This affects both direct users of crypto/x509 and users of crypto/tls.(CVE-2026-32280)\n\nWhen \u0026quot;Trailer\u0026quot; headers are sent by a client, the HTTP server internally uses the header values to populate the Request.Trailer map passed to the server handler. Because Request.Trailer is a map, each entry incurs memory overhead. For HTTP/2 servers, a malicious client can exploit this by sending a \u0026quot;Trailer\u0026quot; header that declares a large number of fields, causing the server to allocate a disproportionate amount of memory while bypassing Server.MaxHeaderValueCount and Server.MaxHeaderBytes limits. This exploit is not applicable for HTTP/1 servers, which do not support multiplexing a large number of requests over one TCP connection, and whose Server.MaxHeaderBytes are calculated differently.(CVE-2026-78659)\n\nThe HTTP/2 server can refund connection-level flow control twice for the same data: Once when a client resets a stream (refunding data for any sent-but-unread portion of the stream), and again when a request handler reads the buffered data. A malicious client can exploit this to bypass the configured connection-level flow control limit (MaxReceiveBufferPerConnection). Total buffered data is still limited by the concurrent stream limit and stream-level flow control.(CVE-2026-78663)\n\nA malicious HTTP/2 peer can cause excessive CPU consumption in the client or server by opening a large number of streams and then sending many small SETTINGS frames containing SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE values.(CVE-2026-78669)\n\nWhen an HTTP server handler sends a 2xx response to an HTTP/1 CONNECT request and returns without hijacking the connection, the server improperly continues to read and serve requests from the connection. Since a 2xx response to an HTTP/1 CONNECT converts the connection into a tunnel, the server should not treat the connection as continuing to contain HTTP. The impact of this misbehavior is mostly limited to potential request smuggling, where an intermediate proxy considers the data on the connection to be tunneled and the server considers it to be HTTP.(CVE-2026-94439)\n\nPreviously, a user operating inside of a malicious Go project that defines a bogus golang.org/toolchain go.sum entry and operates a malicious GOMODPROXY the user chooses to use can bypass the intended checksum. We now ensure that golang.org/toolchain always goes to the network for the canonical checksum.(CVE-2026-94447)\n\nHTTP/2 servers could end up crashing due to inadvertently modifying its HPACK encoder concurrently. This happens because the server modifies the HPACK encoder from two goroutines without synchronization: one uses the encoder to encode a HEADERS frame as part of a response sent to a client and the other modifies the encoder\u0026apos;s table size when handling a SETTINGS frame containing SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE that a client sends. A malicious client can repeatedly send a request while changing the header table size to crash the server.(CVE-2026-97032)",
  "id": "OESA-2026-4768",
  "modified": "2026-11-11T12:25:58Z",
  "published": "2026-11-11T12:25:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-4768"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32280"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78659"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78663"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78669"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-94439"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-94447"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97032"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "golang security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-32280",
    "CVE-2026-78659",
    "CVE-2026-78663",
    "CVE-2026-78669",
    "CVE-2026-94439",
    "CVE-2026-94447",
    "CVE-2026-97032"
  ]
}



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