OESA-2026-4438 (CVE-2026-74291)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-10-22 14:35 – Updated: 2026-10-22 14:35 – Source websiteThe Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.
Security Fix(es):
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: topology: Check PCM and DAI name strings before use
Topology objects store several PCM and DAI names in fixed-size UAPI arrays. Other topology parser paths validate these fields with bounded strnlen() checks before using them as C strings, but the PCM and DAI paths still pass some fixed-size arrays directly to strlen(), devm_kstrdup(), DAI lookup, and diagnostic prints.
A malformed topology blob with a non-NUL-terminated PCM, DAI, or stream capability name can therefore make the parser read past the end of the fixed-size field.
Reject unterminated PCM and DAI name fields before consuming them as C strings.(CVE-2026-74291)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix ilock leak on error in xfs_dq_get_next_id
xfs_dq_get_next_id() takes the quota inode ILOCK before calling xfs_iread_extents(). If xfs_iread_extents() fails, the function returns immediately without releasing the lock, leaking the quota inode ILOCK. This can leave the quota inode locked and cause subsequent quota operations to hang.
Fix this by jumping to a common unlock path on error instead of returning directly.(CVE-2026-80534)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: idxd: fix double free of wq, engine, and group structs
The release callbacks for wq, engine, and group devices (idxd_conf_wq_release, idxd_conf_engine_release, idxd_conf_group_release) each call kfree() on the enclosing struct. The setup error paths and cleanup functions also call kfree() explicitly after put_device(), producing a double free whenever put_device() drops the reference count to zero and fires the release.
In the setup functions, device_initialize() is called before device_add(), so the reference count is exactly 1 at the error sites. put_device() unconditionally fires the release, which frees the struct; the subsequent explicit kfree() then operates on freed memory.
For idxd_setup_wqs(), the wq release callback also owns opcap_bmap and wqcfg. The error unwind additionally freed those fields explicitly before calling put_device(), causing further double frees on both.
Remove the redundant explicit kfree() calls from all setup error paths and cleanup functions for wq, engine, and group structs, delegating sole ownership of those allocations to the release callbacks.(CVE-2026-80698)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"bpftool-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-devel-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-extra-modules-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-headers-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-source-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"perf-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"python3-perf-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"kernel-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"bpftool-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-devel-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-extra-modules-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-headers-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-source-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"perf-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"python3-perf-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.0-145.3.36.167.oe2403sp3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nASoC: topology: Check PCM and DAI name strings before use\n\nTopology objects store several PCM and DAI names in fixed-size UAPI\narrays. Other topology parser paths validate these fields with bounded\nstrnlen() checks before using them as C strings, but the PCM and DAI\npaths still pass some fixed-size arrays directly to strlen(),\ndevm_kstrdup(), DAI lookup, and diagnostic prints.\n\nA malformed topology blob with a non-NUL-terminated PCM, DAI, or stream\ncapability name can therefore make the parser read past the end of the\nfixed-size field.\n\nReject unterminated PCM and DAI name fields before consuming them as C\nstrings.(CVE-2026-74291)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfs: fix ilock leak on error in xfs_dq_get_next_id\n\nxfs_dq_get_next_id() takes the quota inode ILOCK before calling\nxfs_iread_extents(). If xfs_iread_extents() fails, the function returns\nimmediately without releasing the lock, leaking the quota inode ILOCK.\nThis can leave the quota inode locked and cause subsequent quota\noperations to hang.\n\nFix this by jumping to a common unlock path on error instead of returning\ndirectly.(CVE-2026-80534)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndmaengine: idxd: fix double free of wq, engine, and group structs\n\nThe release callbacks for wq, engine, and group devices\n(idxd_conf_wq_release, idxd_conf_engine_release,\nidxd_conf_group_release) each call kfree() on the enclosing struct.\nThe setup error paths and cleanup functions also call kfree()\nexplicitly after put_device(), producing a double free whenever\nput_device() drops the reference count to zero and fires the release.\n\nIn the setup functions, device_initialize() is called before\ndevice_add(), so the reference count is exactly 1 at the error sites.\nput_device() unconditionally fires the release, which frees the struct;\nthe subsequent explicit kfree() then operates on freed memory.\n\nFor idxd_setup_wqs(), the wq release callback also owns opcap_bmap\nand wqcfg. The error unwind additionally freed those fields explicitly\nbefore calling put_device(), causing further double frees on both.\n\nRemove the redundant explicit kfree() calls from all setup error paths\nand cleanup functions for wq, engine, and group structs, delegating\nsole ownership of those allocations to the release callbacks.(CVE-2026-80698)",
"id": "OESA-2026-4438",
"modified": "2026-10-22T14:35:08Z",
"published": "2026-10-22T14:35:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-4438"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74291"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80534"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80698"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "kernel security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-74291",
"CVE-2026-80534",
"CVE-2026-80698"
]
}
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