OESA-2026-4341 (CVE-2026-19033)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-10-16 11:59 – Updated: 2026-10-16 11:59 – Source websiteBIND (Berkeley Internet Name Domain) is an implementation of the DNS (Domain Name System) protocols. BIND includes a DNS server (named), which resolves host names to IP addresses; a resolver library (routines for applications to use when interfacing with DNS); and tools for verifying that the DNS server is operating properly.
Security Fix(es):
For a secondary zone with transfers restricted by TSIG, named may start to serve the data provided in a zone transfer before the final message with the TSIG signature arrives. This could allow an attacker that does not actually possess a valid TSIG signature to send unauthorized zone contents to a secondary server. Although no TSIG signature ever arrives, named does not rollback to the pre-transfer state. To exploit the vulnerability, the transfer must be a multi-message TCP IXFR, as described by RFC 8945.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.27, 9.21.0 through 9.21.25, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.27-S1.(CVE-2026-19033)
An attacker may be able to cause a named resolver to abort. The attack requires inducing the victim resolver to send multiple queries for a DNSSEC-signed zone hosted by an authoritative server under the control of the attacker. If the auth responds with a particular sequence of crafted answers, and those answers arrive in a particular order with particular timing, the named resolver will encounter a use-after-free bug, and abort.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.27, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.27-S1.(CVE-2026-19662)
A BIND recursive resolver may experience excessive resource consumption if it encounters large numbers of a particular kind of invalid DNSSEC record. Default limits on "max-records-per-type" and "max-types-per-name" help mitigate the exposure. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.27, 9.21.0 through 9.21.25, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.27-S1.(CVE-2026-19668)
An inapplicable NSEC record may be accepted by a named resolver as proof that no wildcard exists, which could allow an attacker at the same or an upstream level of the zone name to mask the existence of a victim's wildcard record.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.27, 9.21.0 through 9.21.25, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.27-S1.(CVE-2026-19941)
In a query response, an attacker may send named multiple copies of a record that should only exist once (such as an SOA record). If the RDATA is the same on all the copies, the record is appended to the in-memory RDATA set, which can cause increased memory usage of the negative cache and possibly lead to other memory attack vectors.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.27, 9.21.0 through 9.21.25, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.27-S1.(CVE-2026-75029)
A validly signed NSEC3 from an unrelated sibling zone may be accepted as an insecurity proof, downgrading a secure delegation and letting a forged unsigned answer through. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.27, 9.21.0 through 9.21.25, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.27-S1.(CVE-2026-77119)
A malformed zone may contain an NS or DNAME node above its origin, which named treats as a zone cut. If an attacker inserts a malformed zone into a BIND authoritative server (e.g., via zone transfer), queries for names inside the configured zone then lose authoritative status and return an out-of-zone delegation. On a server that also provides recursion BIND can follow this locally sourced cut and cache attacker-supplied data, affecting names outside the configured zone. This situation persists as long as the malformed zone remains in the zone database.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.27, 9.21.0 through 9.21.25, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.27-S1.(CVE-2026-78301)
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"bind-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"bind-chroot-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"bind-debuginfo-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"bind-debugsource-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"bind-devel-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"bind-dnssec-utils-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"bind-libs-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"bind-utils-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm"
],
"noarch": [
"bind-dnssec-doc-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.noarch.rpm",
"bind-license-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.noarch.rpm"
],
"src": [
"bind-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"bind-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"bind-chroot-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"bind-debuginfo-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"bind-debugsource-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"bind-devel-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"bind-dnssec-utils-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"bind-libs-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"bind-utils-9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP4",
"name": "bind",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/bind\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.20.21-7.oe2403sp4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "Medium"
},
"details": "BIND (Berkeley Internet Name Domain) is an implementation of the DNS (Domain Name System) protocols. BIND includes a DNS server (named), which resolves host names to IP addresses; a resolver library (routines for applications to use when interfacing with DNS); and tools for verifying that the DNS server is operating properly.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nFor a secondary zone with transfers restricted by TSIG, `named` may start to serve the data provided in a zone transfer before the final message with the TSIG signature arrives. This could allow an attacker that does not actually possess a valid TSIG signature to send unauthorized zone contents to a secondary server. Although no TSIG signature ever arrives, `named` does not rollback to the pre-transfer state. To exploit the vulnerability, the transfer must be a multi-message TCP IXFR, as described by RFC 8945.\nThis issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.27, 9.21.0 through 9.21.25, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.27-S1.(CVE-2026-19033)\n\nAn attacker may be able to cause a `named` resolver to abort. The attack requires inducing the victim resolver to send multiple queries for a DNSSEC-signed zone hosted by an authoritative server under the control of the attacker. If the auth responds with a particular sequence of crafted answers, and those answers arrive in a particular order with particular timing, the `named` resolver will encounter a use-after-free bug, and abort.\nThis issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.27, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.27-S1.(CVE-2026-19662)\n\nA BIND recursive resolver may experience excessive resource consumption if it encounters large numbers of a particular kind of invalid DNSSEC record. Default limits on \u0026quot;max-records-per-type\u0026quot; and \u0026quot;max-types-per-name\u0026quot; help mitigate the exposure.\nThis issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.27, 9.21.0 through 9.21.25, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.27-S1.(CVE-2026-19668)\n\nAn inapplicable NSEC record may be accepted by a `named` resolver as proof that no wildcard exists, which could allow an attacker at the same or an upstream level of the zone name to mask the existence of a victim\u0026apos;s wildcard record.\nThis issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.27, 9.21.0 through 9.21.25, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.27-S1.(CVE-2026-19941)\n\nIn a query response, an attacker may send `named` multiple copies of a record that should only exist once (such as an SOA record). If the RDATA is the same on all the copies, the record is appended to the in-memory RDATA set, which can cause increased memory usage of the negative cache and possibly lead to other memory attack vectors.\nThis issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.27, 9.21.0 through 9.21.25, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.27-S1.(CVE-2026-75029)\n\nA validly signed NSEC3 from an unrelated sibling zone may be accepted as an insecurity proof, downgrading a secure delegation and letting a forged unsigned answer through.\nThis issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.27, 9.21.0 through 9.21.25, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.27-S1.(CVE-2026-77119)\n\nA malformed zone may contain an NS or DNAME node above its origin, which `named` treats as a zone cut. If an attacker inserts a malformed zone into a BIND authoritative server (e.g., via zone transfer), queries for names inside the configured zone then lose authoritative status and return an out-of-zone delegation. On a server that also provides recursion BIND can follow this locally sourced cut and cache attacker-supplied data, affecting names outside the configured zone. This situation persists as long as the malformed zone remains in the zone database.\nThis issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.27, 9.21.0 through 9.21.25, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.27-S1.(CVE-2026-78301)",
"id": "OESA-2026-4341",
"modified": "2026-10-16T11:59:32Z",
"published": "2026-10-16T11:59:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-4341"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19033"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19662"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19668"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19941"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75029"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77119"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78301"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "bind security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-19033",
"CVE-2026-19662",
"CVE-2026-19668",
"CVE-2026-19941",
"CVE-2026-75029",
"CVE-2026-77119",
"CVE-2026-78301"
]
}
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