OESA-2026-3985 (CVE-2026-74330)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-09-20 13:23 – Updated: 2026-09-20 13:23 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
kernel security update
Details

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

configfs: fix lockless traversals of ->s_children

Having the parent directory locked protects entries from removal by another thread, but it does not protect cursors from being moved around by lseek() - or freed, for that matter.(CVE-2026-74330)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

configfs_lookup(): don't leave ->s_dentry dangling on failure

Normally ->s_dentry is cleared when dentry it's pointing to becomes negative (on eviction, realistically). However, that only happens if dentry gets to be positive in the first place; in case of inode allocation failure dentry never becomes positive, so ->d_iput() is not called at all.

We do part of what normally would've been done by configfs_d_iput() (dropping the reference to configfs_dirent) manually, but we do not clear ->s_dentry there. Sloppy as it is, it does not matter in case of configfs_create_{dir,link}() - there configfs_dirent does not survive dropping the sole reference to it.

However, for configfs_lookup() it does survive, with a dangling pointer to soon to be freed dentry sitting it its ->s_dentry.

Subsequent getdents(2) in that directory will end up dereferencing that pointer in order to pick the inode number. Use after free...

This is the minimal fix; the right approach is to set the linkage between dentry and configfs_dirent only after we know that we have an inode, but that takes more surgery and the bug had been there since 2006, so...(CVE-2026-74359)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

NFS: Pin the 'struct nfs_server' during a FREE_STATEID call

Dan Aloni reports that he was able to hit a use-after-free bug if a FREE_STATEID operation gets delayed for whatever reason. Fix this by bumping the refcount of the 'struct nfs_server' object for the duration of the FREE_STATEID so it doesn't get cleaned up from underneath us while operations are still in flight.(CVE-2026-74730)


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "bpftool-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "python2-perf-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "python2-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "kernel-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "bpftool-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "python2-perf-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "python2-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.19.90-2609.2.0.0390.oe2003sp4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "Critical"
  },
  "details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nconfigfs: fix lockless traversals of -\u0026gt;s_children\n\nHaving the parent directory locked protects entries from removal\nby another thread, but it does *not* protect cursors from being\nmoved around by lseek() - or freed, for that matter.(CVE-2026-74330)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nconfigfs_lookup(): don\u0026apos;t leave -\u0026gt;s_dentry dangling on failure\n\nNormally -\u0026gt;s_dentry is cleared when dentry it\u0026apos;s pointing to becomes\nnegative (on eviction, realistically).  However, that only happens\nif dentry gets to be positive in the first place; in case of inode\nallocation failure dentry never becomes positive, so -\u0026gt;d_iput()\nis not called at all.\n\nWe do part of what normally would\u0026apos;ve been done by configfs_d_iput()\n(dropping the reference to configfs_dirent) manually, but we do\nnot clear -\u0026gt;s_dentry there.  Sloppy as it is, it does not matter in\ncase of configfs_create_{dir,link}() - there configfs_dirent does\nnot survive dropping the sole reference to it.\n\nHowever, for configfs_lookup() it *does* survive, with a dangling\npointer to soon to be freed dentry sitting it its -\u0026gt;s_dentry.\n\nSubsequent getdents(2) in that directory will end up dereferencing\nthat pointer in order to pick the inode number.  Use after free...\n\nThis is the minimal fix; the right approach is to set the linkage\nbetween dentry and configfs_dirent only after we know that we have\nan inode, but that takes more surgery and the bug had been there\nsince 2006, so...(CVE-2026-74359)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFS: Pin the \u0026apos;struct nfs_server\u0026apos; during a FREE_STATEID call\n\nDan Aloni reports that he was able to hit a use-after-free bug if a\nFREE_STATEID operation gets delayed for whatever reason. Fix this by\nbumping the refcount of the \u0026apos;struct nfs_server\u0026apos; object for the duration\nof the FREE_STATEID so it doesn\u0026apos;t get cleaned up from underneath us\nwhile operations are still in flight.(CVE-2026-74730)",
  "id": "OESA-2026-3985",
  "modified": "2026-09-20T13:23:51Z",
  "published": "2026-09-20T13:23:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-3985"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74330"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74359"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74730"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "kernel security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-74330",
    "CVE-2026-74359",
    "CVE-2026-74730"
  ]
}



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