OESA-2026-1613 (CVE-2025-69418)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-03-15 07:31 – Updated: 2026-03-15 07:31 – Source websiteEDK II is a modern, feature-rich, cross-platform firmware development environment for the UEFI and PI specifications.
Security Fix(es):
Issue summary: When using the low-level OCB API directly with AES-NI or<br>other hardware-accelerated code paths, inputs whose length is not a multiple<br>of 16 bytes can leave the final partial block unencrypted and unauthenticated.<br><br>Impact summary: The trailing 1-15 bytes of a message may be exposed in<br>cleartext on encryption and are not covered by the authentication tag,<br>allowing an attacker to read or tamper with those bytes without detection.<br><br>The low-level OCB encrypt and decrypt routines in the hardware-accelerated<br>stream path process full 16-byte blocks but do not advance the input/output<br>pointers. The subsequent tail-handling code then operates on the original<br>base pointers, effectively reprocessing the beginning of the buffer while<br>leaving the actual trailing bytes unprocessed. The authentication checksum<br>also excludes the true tail bytes.<br><br>However, typical OpenSSL consumers using EVP are not affected because the<br>higher-level EVP and provider OCB implementations split inputs so that full<br>blocks and trailing partial blocks are processed in separate calls, avoiding<br>the problematic code path. Additionally, TLS does not use OCB ciphersuites.<br>The vulnerability only affects applications that call the low-level<br>CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt() or CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt() functions directly with<br>non-block-aligned lengths in a single call on hardware-accelerated builds.<br>For these reasons the issue was assessed as Low severity.<br><br>The FIPS modules in 3.6, 3.5, 3.4, 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected<br>by this issue, as OCB mode is not a FIPS-approved algorithm.<br><br>OpenSSL 3.6, 3.5, 3.4, 3.3, 3.0 and 1.1.1 are vulnerable to this issue.<br><br>OpenSSL 1.0.2 is not affected by this issue.(CVE-2025-69418)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"edk2-debuginfo-202308-33.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"edk2-debugsource-202308-33.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"edk2-devel-202308-33.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm"
],
"noarch": [
"edk2-aarch64-202308-33.oe2403sp3.noarch.rpm",
"edk2-help-202308-33.oe2403sp3.noarch.rpm",
"edk2-ovmf-202308-33.oe2403sp3.noarch.rpm",
"python3-edk2-devel-202308-33.oe2403sp3.noarch.rpm"
],
"src": [
"edk2-202308-33.oe2403sp3.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"edk2-debuginfo-202308-33.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"edk2-debugsource-202308-33.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"edk2-devel-202308-33.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3",
"name": "edk2",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/edk2\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "202308-33.oe2403sp3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "Medium"
},
"details": "EDK II is a modern, feature-rich, cross-platform firmware development environment for the UEFI and PI specifications.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nIssue summary: When using the low-level OCB API directly with AES-NI or\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;other hardware-accelerated code paths, inputs whose length is not a multiple\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;of 16 bytes can leave the final partial block unencrypted and unauthenticated.\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;Impact summary: The trailing 1-15 bytes of a message may be exposed in\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;cleartext on encryption and are not covered by the authentication tag,\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;allowing an attacker to read or tamper with those bytes without detection.\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;The low-level OCB encrypt and decrypt routines in the hardware-accelerated\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;stream path process full 16-byte blocks but do not advance the input/output\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;pointers. The subsequent tail-handling code then operates on the original\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;base pointers, effectively reprocessing the beginning of the buffer while\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;leaving the actual trailing bytes unprocessed. The authentication checksum\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;also excludes the true tail bytes.\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;However, typical OpenSSL consumers using EVP are not affected because the\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;higher-level EVP and provider OCB implementations split inputs so that full\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;blocks and trailing partial blocks are processed in separate calls, avoiding\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;the problematic code path. Additionally, TLS does not use OCB ciphersuites.\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;The vulnerability only affects applications that call the low-level\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt() or CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt() functions directly with\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;non-block-aligned lengths in a single call on hardware-accelerated builds.\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;For these reasons the issue was assessed as Low severity.\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;The FIPS modules in 3.6, 3.5, 3.4, 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;by this issue, as OCB mode is not a FIPS-approved algorithm.\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;OpenSSL 3.6, 3.5, 3.4, 3.3, 3.0 and 1.1.1 are vulnerable to this issue.\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;\u0026lt;br\u0026gt;OpenSSL 1.0.2 is not affected by this issue.(CVE-2025-69418)",
"id": "OESA-2026-1613",
"modified": "2026-03-15T07:31:24Z",
"published": "2026-03-15T07:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1613"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69418"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "edk2 security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2025-69418"
]
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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