OESA-2025-2697 (CVE-2025-40115)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2025-11-22 11:09 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:09 – Source websiteThe Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.
Security Fix(es):
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mpt3sas: Fix crash in transport port remove by using ioc_info()
During mpt3sas_transport_port_remove(), messages were logged with dev_printk() against &mpt3sas_port->port->dev. At this point the SAS transport device may already be partially unregistered or freed, leading to a crash when accessing its struct device.
Using ioc_info(), which logs via the PCI device (ioc->pdev->dev), guaranteed to remain valid until driver removal.
[83428.295776] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6f702f323a33312d: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [83428.295785] CPU: 145 UID: 0 PID: 113296 Comm: rmmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.16.0-rc1+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [83428.295792] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [83428.295795] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 7875 Tower/, BIOS 89.1.67 02/23/2024 [83428.295799] RIP: 0010:__dev_printk+0x1f/0x70 [83428.295805] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 d1 48 85 f6 74 52 4c 8b 46 50 4d 85 c0 74 1f 48 8b 46 68 48 85 c0 74 22 <48> 8b 08 0f b6 7f 01 48 c7 c2 db e8 42 ad 83 ef 30 e9 7b f8 ff ff [83428.295813] RSP: 0018:ff85aeafc3137bb0 EFLAGS: 00010206 [83428.295817] RAX: 6f702f323a33312d RBX: ff4290ee81292860 RCX: 5000cca25103be32 [83428.295820] RDX: ff85aeafc3137bb8 RSI: ff4290eeb1966c00 RDI: ffffffffc1560845 [83428.295823] RBP: ff85aeafc3137c18 R08: 74726f702f303a33 R09: ff85aeafc3137bb8 [83428.295826] R10: ff85aeafc3137b18 R11: ff4290f5bd60fe68 R12: ff4290ee81290000 [83428.295830] R13: ff4290ee6e345de0 R14: ff4290ee81290000 R15: ff4290ee6e345e30 [83428.295833] FS: 00007fd9472a6740(0000) GS:ff4290f5ce96b000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [83428.295837] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [83428.295840] CR2: 00007f242b4db238 CR3: 00000002372b8006 CR4: 0000000000771ef0 [83428.295844] PKRU: 55555554 [83428.295846] Call Trace: [83428.295848] <TASK> [83428.295850] _dev_printk+0x5c/0x80 [83428.295857] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [83428.295863] mpt3sas_transport_port_remove+0x1c7/0x420 [mpt3sas] [83428.295882] _scsih_remove_device+0x21b/0x280 [mpt3sas] [83428.295894] ? _scsih_expander_node_remove+0x108/0x140 [mpt3sas] [83428.295906] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [83428.295910] mpt3sas_device_remove_by_sas_address.part.0+0x8f/0x110 [mpt3sas] [83428.295921] _scsih_expander_node_remove+0x129/0x140 [mpt3sas] [83428.295933] _scsih_expander_node_remove+0x6a/0x140 [mpt3sas] [83428.295944] scsih_remove+0x3f0/0x4a0 [mpt3sas] [83428.295957] pci_device_remove+0x3b/0xb0 [83428.295962] device_release_driver_internal+0x193/0x200 [83428.295968] driver_detach+0x44/0x90 [83428.295971] bus_remove_driver+0x69/0xf0 [83428.295975] pci_unregister_driver+0x2a/0xb0 [83428.295979] _mpt3sas_exit+0x1f/0x300 [mpt3sas] [83428.295991] __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x174/0x310 [83428.295997] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [83428.296000] ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9a/0x110 [83428.296005] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [83428.296009] ? syscall_trace_enter+0xf6/0x1b0 [83428.296014] do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x2c0 [83428.296019] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [83428.296023] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e(CVE-2025-40115)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: quota: create dedicated workqueue for quota_release_work
There is a kernel panic due to WARN_ONCE when panic_on_warn is set.
This issue occurs when writeback is triggered due to sync call for an opened file(ie, writeback reason is WB_REASON_SYNC). When f2fs balance is needed at sync path, flush for quota_release_work is triggered. By default quota_release_work is queued to "events_unbound" queue which does not have WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag. During f2fs balance "writeback" workqueue tries to flush quota_release_work causing kernel panic due to MEM_RECLAIM flag mismatch errors.
This patch creates dedicated workqueue with WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag for work quota_release_work.
------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 14867 at kernel/workqueue.c:3721 check_flush_dependency+0x13c/0x148 Call trace: check_flush_dependency+0x13c/0x148 __flush_work+0xd0/0x398 flush_delayed_work+0x44/0x5c dquot_writeback_dquots+0x54/0x318 f2fs_do_quota_sync+0xb8/0x1a8 f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x3cc/0x99c f2fs_gc+0x190/0x750 f2fs_balance_fs+0x110/0x168 f2fs_write_single_data_page+0x474/0x7dc f2fs_write_data_pages+0x7d0/0xd0c do_writepages+0xe0/0x2f4 __writeback_single_inode+0x44/0x4ac writeback_sb_inodes+0x30c/0x538 wb_writeback+0xf4/0x440 wb_workfn+0x128/0x5d4 process_scheduled_works+0x1c4/0x45c worker_thread+0x32c/0x3e8 kthread+0x11c/0x1b0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...(CVE-2025-40196)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"bpftool-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"bpftool-debuginfo-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-debuginfo-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-debugsource-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-devel-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-source-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-debuginfo-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-devel-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"perf-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"python2-perf-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"python2-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"python3-perf-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"python3-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"kernel-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"bpftool-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"bpftool-debuginfo-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-debuginfo-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-debugsource-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-devel-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-source-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-debuginfo-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-devel-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"perf-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"python2-perf-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"python2-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"python3-perf-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"python3-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.19.90-2511.3.0.0352.oe2003sp4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "Medium"
},
"details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: mpt3sas: Fix crash in transport port remove by using ioc_info()\n\nDuring mpt3sas_transport_port_remove(), messages were logged with\ndev_printk() against \u0026amp;mpt3sas_port-\u0026gt;port-\u0026gt;dev. At this point the SAS\ntransport device may already be partially unregistered or freed, leading\nto a crash when accessing its struct device.\n\nUsing ioc_info(), which logs via the PCI device (ioc-\u0026gt;pdev-\u0026gt;dev),\nguaranteed to remain valid until driver removal.\n\n[83428.295776] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6f702f323a33312d: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n[83428.295785] CPU: 145 UID: 0 PID: 113296 Comm: rmmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.16.0-rc1+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)\n[83428.295792] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE\n[83428.295795] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 7875 Tower/, BIOS 89.1.67 02/23/2024\n[83428.295799] RIP: 0010:__dev_printk+0x1f/0x70\n[83428.295805] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 d1 48 85 f6 74 52 4c 8b 46 50 4d 85 c0 74 1f 48 8b 46 68 48 85 c0 74 22 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 8b 08 0f b6 7f 01 48 c7 c2 db e8 42 ad 83 ef 30 e9 7b f8 ff ff\n[83428.295813] RSP: 0018:ff85aeafc3137bb0 EFLAGS: 00010206\n[83428.295817] RAX: 6f702f323a33312d RBX: ff4290ee81292860 RCX: 5000cca25103be32\n[83428.295820] RDX: ff85aeafc3137bb8 RSI: ff4290eeb1966c00 RDI: ffffffffc1560845\n[83428.295823] RBP: ff85aeafc3137c18 R08: 74726f702f303a33 R09: ff85aeafc3137bb8\n[83428.295826] R10: ff85aeafc3137b18 R11: ff4290f5bd60fe68 R12: ff4290ee81290000\n[83428.295830] R13: ff4290ee6e345de0 R14: ff4290ee81290000 R15: ff4290ee6e345e30\n[83428.295833] FS: 00007fd9472a6740(0000) GS:ff4290f5ce96b000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[83428.295837] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[83428.295840] CR2: 00007f242b4db238 CR3: 00000002372b8006 CR4: 0000000000771ef0\n[83428.295844] PKRU: 55555554\n[83428.295846] Call Trace:\n[83428.295848] \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n[83428.295850] _dev_printk+0x5c/0x80\n[83428.295857] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n[83428.295863] mpt3sas_transport_port_remove+0x1c7/0x420 [mpt3sas]\n[83428.295882] _scsih_remove_device+0x21b/0x280 [mpt3sas]\n[83428.295894] ? _scsih_expander_node_remove+0x108/0x140 [mpt3sas]\n[83428.295906] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n[83428.295910] mpt3sas_device_remove_by_sas_address.part.0+0x8f/0x110 [mpt3sas]\n[83428.295921] _scsih_expander_node_remove+0x129/0x140 [mpt3sas]\n[83428.295933] _scsih_expander_node_remove+0x6a/0x140 [mpt3sas]\n[83428.295944] scsih_remove+0x3f0/0x4a0 [mpt3sas]\n[83428.295957] pci_device_remove+0x3b/0xb0\n[83428.295962] device_release_driver_internal+0x193/0x200\n[83428.295968] driver_detach+0x44/0x90\n[83428.295971] bus_remove_driver+0x69/0xf0\n[83428.295975] pci_unregister_driver+0x2a/0xb0\n[83428.295979] _mpt3sas_exit+0x1f/0x300 [mpt3sas]\n[83428.295991] __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x174/0x310\n[83428.295997] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n[83428.296000] ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9a/0x110\n[83428.296005] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n[83428.296009] ? syscall_trace_enter+0xf6/0x1b0\n[83428.296014] do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x2c0\n[83428.296019] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n[83428.296023] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e(CVE-2025-40115)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfs: quota: create dedicated workqueue for quota_release_work\n\nThere is a kernel panic due to WARN_ONCE when panic_on_warn is set.\n\nThis issue occurs when writeback is triggered due to sync call for an\nopened file(ie, writeback reason is WB_REASON_SYNC). When f2fs balance\nis needed at sync path, flush for quota_release_work is triggered.\nBy default quota_release_work is queued to \u0026quot;events_unbound\u0026quot; queue which\ndoes not have WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag. During f2fs balance \u0026quot;writeback\u0026quot;\nworkqueue tries to flush quota_release_work causing kernel panic due to\nMEM_RECLAIM flag mismatch errors.\n\nThis patch creates dedicated workqueue with WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag\nfor work quota_release_work.\n\n------------[ cut here ]------------\nWARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 14867 at kernel/workqueue.c:3721 check_flush_dependency+0x13c/0x148\nCall trace:\n check_flush_dependency+0x13c/0x148\n __flush_work+0xd0/0x398\n flush_delayed_work+0x44/0x5c\n dquot_writeback_dquots+0x54/0x318\n f2fs_do_quota_sync+0xb8/0x1a8\n f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x3cc/0x99c\n f2fs_gc+0x190/0x750\n f2fs_balance_fs+0x110/0x168\n f2fs_write_single_data_page+0x474/0x7dc\n f2fs_write_data_pages+0x7d0/0xd0c\n do_writepages+0xe0/0x2f4\n __writeback_single_inode+0x44/0x4ac\n writeback_sb_inodes+0x30c/0x538\n wb_writeback+0xf4/0x440\n wb_workfn+0x128/0x5d4\n process_scheduled_works+0x1c4/0x45c\n worker_thread+0x32c/0x3e8\n kthread+0x11c/0x1b0\n ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20\nKernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...(CVE-2025-40196)",
"id": "OESA-2025-2697",
"modified": "2026-08-06T11:09:49Z",
"published": "2025-11-22T11:09:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2025-2697"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40115"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40196"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "kernel security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2025-40115",
"CVE-2025-40196"
]
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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