OESA-2025-1577 (CVE-2024-27050)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2025-05-30 11:08 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:08 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
libbpf security update
Details

A mirror of bpf-next linux tree bpf-next/tools/lib/bpf directory plus its supporting header files. The version of the package reflects the version of ABI.

Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libbpf: Use OPTS_SET() macro in bpf_xdp_query()

When the feature_flags and xdp_zc_max_segs fields were added to the libbpf bpf_xdp_query_opts, the code writing them did not use the OPTS_SET() macro. This causes libbpf to write to those fields unconditionally, which means that programs compiled against an older version of libbpf (with a smaller size of the bpf_xdp_query_opts struct) will have its stack corrupted by libbpf writing out of bounds.

The patch adding the feature_flags field has an early bail out if the feature_flags field is not part of the opts struct (via the OPTS_HAS) macro, but the patch adding xdp_zc_max_segs does not. For consistency, this fix just changes the assignments to both fields to use the OPTS_SET() macro.(CVE-2024-27050)


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "libbpf-1.2.2-9.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "libbpf-debuginfo-1.2.2-9.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "libbpf-debugsource-1.2.2-9.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "libbpf-devel-1.2.2-9.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "libbpf-static-1.2.2-9.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "libbpf-1.2.2-9.oe2403sp1.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "libbpf-1.2.2-9.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "libbpf-debuginfo-1.2.2-9.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "libbpf-debugsource-1.2.2-9.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "libbpf-devel-1.2.2-9.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "libbpf-static-1.2.2-9.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1",
        "name": "libbpf",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/libbpf\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.2-9.oe2403sp1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "Medium"
  },
  "details": "A mirror of bpf-next linux tree bpf-next/tools/lib/bpf directory plus its supporting header files. The version of the package reflects the version of ABI.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibbpf: Use OPTS_SET() macro in bpf_xdp_query()\n\nWhen the feature_flags and xdp_zc_max_segs fields were added to the libbpf\nbpf_xdp_query_opts, the code writing them did not use the OPTS_SET() macro.\nThis causes libbpf to write to those fields unconditionally, which means\nthat programs compiled against an older version of libbpf (with a smaller\nsize of the bpf_xdp_query_opts struct) will have its stack corrupted by\nlibbpf writing out of bounds.\n\nThe patch adding the feature_flags field has an early bail out if the\nfeature_flags field is not part of the opts struct (via the OPTS_HAS)\nmacro, but the patch adding xdp_zc_max_segs does not. For consistency, this\nfix just changes the assignments to both fields to use the OPTS_SET()\nmacro.(CVE-2024-27050)",
  "id": "OESA-2025-1577",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:08:40Z",
  "published": "2025-05-30T11:08:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2025-1577"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27050"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "libbpf security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-27050"
  ]
}



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