CVE-2026-99042 (GCVE-0-2026-99042)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-23 12:22
Modified
2026-10-24 14:10
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/net: populate CONNECT filter fields for 24-byte sockaddr_in6
io_connect_bpf_populate() fills connect.port and connect.v6_addr for
AF_INET6 only when addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6), i.e. 28
bytes.
The IPv6 connect paths accept SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 (24 bytes), which
already holds sin6_port and sin6_addr. io_connect() passes addr_len to
the socket layer unchanged.
At addr_len 24 the filter sees family AF_INET6 with port and address
zero, while the kernel connects to the real destination. A filter that
denies an IPv6 port or address is bypassed. Denying connect.port == P
rejects [::1]:P with -EACCES at addr_len 28 but connects at addr_len 24.
Use SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 as the threshold. sin6_scope_id stays zero when
absent.
The threshold mismatch was found by an AI coding assistant (Claude Code)
comparing this hook against the net/ipv6 length checks on my
instructions; it also drafted the reproducer and this patch. I verified
the bypass and the fix in a VM on 7.3-rc6 and that 7.2 has the same
code.
References
Impacted products
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"io_uring/net.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "899bea8248cee35d54760a5e7d61a76af8e64411",
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"programFiles": [
"io_uring/net.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.2"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
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"version": "7.2.11",
"versionType": "semver"
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{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
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"versionStartIncluding": "7.2",
"vulnerable": true
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{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
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],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring/net: populate CONNECT filter fields for 24-byte sockaddr_in6\n\nio_connect_bpf_populate() fills connect.port and connect.v6_addr for\nAF_INET6 only when addr_len \u003e= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6), i.e. 28\nbytes.\n\nThe IPv6 connect paths accept SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 (24 bytes), which\nalready holds sin6_port and sin6_addr. io_connect() passes addr_len to\nthe socket layer unchanged.\n\nAt addr_len 24 the filter sees family AF_INET6 with port and address\nzero, while the kernel connects to the real destination. A filter that\ndenies an IPv6 port or address is bypassed. Denying connect.port == P\nrejects [::1]:P with -EACCES at addr_len 28 but connects at addr_len 24.\n\nUse SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 as the threshold. sin6_scope_id stays zero when\nabsent.\n\nThe threshold mismatch was found by an AI coding assistant (Claude Code)\ncomparing this hook against the net/ipv6 length checks on my\ninstructions; it also drafted the reproducer and this patch. I verified\nthe bypass and the fix in a VM on 7.3-rc6 and that 7.2 has the same\ncode."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 8.4,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:L - An attacker reaches the patched io_connect_bpf_populate() by locally submitting IORING_OP_CONNECT through io_uring_enter(), with sqe-\u003eaddr2 supplying the malicious 24-byte length. No network packet carries the value creating the mismatch.\nAC:L - Against a CONNECT filter denying an IPv6 port or address, addr2=24 deterministically makes io_connect_bpf_populate() expose zero port/address while tcp_v6_connect() accepts and uses the real fields; no race or uncontrolled condition is involved.\nPR:L - No capability check exists in io_uring_enter(), io_connect_prep(), or io_connect(), and AF_INET6 SOCK_STREAM creation avoids inet6_create()\u0027s CAP_NET_RAW check. An ordinary confined process with access to the filtered ring can trigger the bypass.\nUI:N - The confined process prepares and submits the 24-byte sockaddr itself, and io_connect_prep() copies it during io_uring_enter(); no other user must mount, open, approve, or otherwise act.\nS:C - The false port/address view escapes the io_uring BPF CONNECT sandbox: __io_uring_run_bpf_filters() allows an operation that an inherited or ring-level filter intended to deny, reaching network resources outside that policy scope.\nC:H - After the filter sees :: and port 0, tcp_v6_connect() uses sin6_addr and sin6_port from the same 24 bytes; the confined process can establish a full socket and read responses from IPv6 services the CONNECT filter explicitly made inaccessible.\nI:H - tcp_v6_connect() stores the hidden destination in sk_v6_daddr and inet_dport and establishes the denied socket, enabling arbitrary application data and requests to be sent to IPv6 services and ports prohibited by the sandbox policy.\nA:N - The bug only substitutes zero values in the filter context; move_addr_to_kernel() safely copies 24 bytes and the IPv6 socket layer accepts that size. It introduces no corruption, out-of-bounds access, oops, hang, or resource exhaustion."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-24T14:10:09.161Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
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"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/596a955d2d01b7e29d9fed60ebcf7c4ba518b8e5"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa5d5f8e502318e783545ba5d04bb40130b83e20"
}
],
"title": "io_uring/net: populate CONNECT filter fields for 24-byte sockaddr_in6",
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"cveMetadata": {
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"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-99042",
"datePublished": "2026-10-23T12:22:01.804Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:25:14.387Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-24T14:10:09.161Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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