CVE-2026-98995 (GCVE-0-2026-98995)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-23 12:20
Modified
2026-10-24 14:09
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: reset the old parent's ->overmount in mnt_change_mountpoint()
__umount_mnt() resets ->overmount of the parent when it unmounts the
mount that overmounts it. mnt_change_mountpoint() doesn't. It moves the
mount to its new parent and leaves the old one pointing at it.
For a mount that is moved beneath in attach_recursive_mnt() that doesn't
matter. The new mount has already reset ->overmount of the old parent by
the time the old top mount is moved onto it.
It matters for reparent() though. propagate_umount() moves a surviving
overmount onto the first ancestor that isn't going to be unmounted. The
mount it was taken from is unmounted immediately afterwards. If a file
descriptor keeps that unmounted mount alive ->overmount points at the
moved mount. That's a dangling pointer and UAF as the moved mount is
unmounted and freed.
do_lock_mount() follows ->overmount from the target path under
mount_lock. With a file descriptor on such a mount as the target of a
mount beneath topmost_overmount() walks into the freed mount and
do_lock_mount() takes references on whatever it finds there.
So reset ->overmount of the old parent in mnt_change_mountpoint() the
same way __umount_mnt() does. A mount's ->overmount is then always a
mount that is attached to it.
References
Impacted products
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/namespace.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "5e0a1f2c753a79749bc2ead3ae2f2ede3941daa5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ffdc52fbbd5835a936ad683c943d6d103a2d4514",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "08d575ee89393fd812dbdca7b5d7b4574cd5a564",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ffdc52fbbd5835a936ad683c943d6d103a2d4514",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "476ef286a7a5db8bda51325dc0c45887b4d99d9a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ffdc52fbbd5835a936ad683c943d6d103a2d4514",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/namespace.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.17"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.17",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.57",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.57",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.17",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.2.11",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.17",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.3",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.17",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnamespace: reset the old parent\u0027s -\u003eovermount in mnt_change_mountpoint()\n\n__umount_mnt() resets -\u003eovermount of the parent when it unmounts the\nmount that overmounts it. mnt_change_mountpoint() doesn\u0027t. It moves the\nmount to its new parent and leaves the old one pointing at it.\n\nFor a mount that is moved beneath in attach_recursive_mnt() that doesn\u0027t\nmatter. The new mount has already reset -\u003eovermount of the old parent by\nthe time the old top mount is moved onto it.\n\nIt matters for reparent() though. propagate_umount() moves a surviving\novermount onto the first ancestor that isn\u0027t going to be unmounted. The\nmount it was taken from is unmounted immediately afterwards. If a file\ndescriptor keeps that unmounted mount alive -\u003eovermount points at the\nmoved mount. That\u0027s a dangling pointer and UAF as the moved mount is\nunmounted and freed.\n\ndo_lock_mount() follows -\u003eovermount from the target path under\nmount_lock. With a file descriptor on such a mount as the target of a\nmount beneath topmost_overmount() walks into the freed mount and\ndo_lock_mount() takes references on whatever it finds there.\n\nSo reset -\u003eovermount of the old parent in mnt_change_mountpoint() the\nsame way __umount_mnt() does. A mount\u0027s -\u003eovermount is then always a\nmount that is attached to it."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:L - Local umount2() reaches do_umount()-\u003eumount_tree()-\u003epropagate_umount()-\u003ereparent()-\u003emnt_change_mountpoint(), and local move_mount(MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH) later consumes the dangling overmount; no network or physical input reaches this path.\nAC:L - The regression test deterministically creates the propagation topology, pins X_b, frees its reparented overmount, and triggers the UAF; no race or external state is required, and any mount-cache grooming is attacker-controlled.\nPR:L - can_umount() and move_mount() require may_mount(), but the test\u0027s unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNS) gives an ordinary local user CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the child mount namespace, satisfying every mount-operation gate without init-namespace root.\nUI:N - The attacker personally creates the shared/private tmpfs mounts, opens the O_PATH descriptor, performs both lazy unmounts, and invokes move_mount(); no victim must mount, open, or otherwise act on anything.\nS:U - The dangling struct mount created by mnt_change_mountpoint() corrupts the same host kernel that enforces the attacker\u0027s mount namespace; this is ordinary kernel privilege escalation, not a VM, hypervisor, or IOMMU boundary crossing.\nC:H - topmost_overmount() reads freed struct mount contents, and where_to_mount() then consumes its stale overmount, mnt_mountpoint, and mnt_parent pointers; reclaiming the mnt_cache object permits redirected kernel-memory accesses and high-impact disclosure.\nI:H - do_lock_mount() calls mntget() and dget() through the freed mount-derived pointers, causing reference-count writes through stale mnt_pcp and dentry state; mount-cache reclamation and heap grooming can turn these UAF writes into control-flow corruption.\nA:H - Following the freed overmount and then dereferencing or locking the stale dentry-\u003ed_inode can produce a kernel UAF oops or panic, and the complete mount/unmount/move_mount sequence is repeatable by the same unprivileged process."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-24T14:09:55.095Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e0a1f2c753a79749bc2ead3ae2f2ede3941daa5"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08d575ee89393fd812dbdca7b5d7b4574cd5a564"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/476ef286a7a5db8bda51325dc0c45887b4d99d9a"
}
],
"title": "namespace: reset the old parent\u0027s -\u003eovermount in mnt_change_mountpoint()",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-98995",
"datePublished": "2026-10-23T12:20:14.155Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:25:14.384Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-24T14:09:55.095Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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