CVE-2026-98385 (GCVE-0-2026-98385)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-12 05:48
Modified
2026-10-24 14:08
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/cache: Decouple sched_cache_group from mm to fix UAF
Currently the sched cache grouping is by mm and the scheduling statistics
sched_cache_stat lives in the mm structure. This ties the life cycle
of scheduling stats with mm.
In account_mm_sched(), the scheduling stats are accessed by
task->mm->sc_stat. However, a task may be switching mm on one CPU when
another CPU is running account_mm_sched(), and possibly accessing the
old mm that was freed. This problem was found when running tests with
KASAN by Hyunwoo:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/apPb-Dr4nPYuHQOK@v4bel/
Instead of serializing the mm access by introducing extra acquisition of
rq lock in the mm free path, extract sched_cache_stat from mm_struct,
rename it as sched_cache_group and manage its life cycle apart from
mm_struct with its own ref counting. This allows us in the next patch
access sched_cache_group directly from task, and add a refcount
on sched_cache_group when a task links to it. This prevents the use
after free issue when accessing stale and released old mm and its
sched cache stat a task switches to a new mm while account_mm_sched()
is done elsewhere.
The other benefit of this restructure is in the future, the grouping of
tasks to a LLC would have the flexibility to be associated with a user
defined grouping, or cgroup, cookie group, numa_group or others instead
of just with a single mm address space.
Rename sched_cache_stat to sched_cache_group and turn it into a refcounted
object allocated from mm_struct. The mm_struct now holds a pointer
(sched_cache_grp) to this object instead of embedding it.
References
Impacted products
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/linux/mm_types.h",
"include/linux/sched.h",
"kernel/exit.c",
"kernel/sched/fair.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "852ecb6bc0bc0106f44f74ba3944524732486025",
"status": "affected",
"version": "df0d98475954d655571979aa061ecb07d7e00392",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "28f9c0e0a0b94c5d3e1b634db545f6e1f94858c5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "df0d98475954d655571979aa061ecb07d7e00392",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/linux/mm_types.h",
"include/linux/sched.h",
"kernel/exit.c",
"kernel/sched/fair.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.2"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.9",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.2.9",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.2",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.3",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.2",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
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]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsched/cache: Decouple sched_cache_group from mm to fix UAF\n\nCurrently the sched cache grouping is by mm and the scheduling statistics\nsched_cache_stat lives in the mm structure. This ties the life cycle\nof scheduling stats with mm.\n\nIn account_mm_sched(), the scheduling stats are accessed by\ntask-\u003emm-\u003esc_stat. However, a task may be switching mm on one CPU when\nanother CPU is running account_mm_sched(), and possibly accessing the\nold mm that was freed. This problem was found when running tests with\nKASAN by Hyunwoo:\n\n https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/apPb-Dr4nPYuHQOK@v4bel/\n\nInstead of serializing the mm access by introducing extra acquisition of\nrq lock in the mm free path, extract sched_cache_stat from mm_struct,\nrename it as sched_cache_group and manage its life cycle apart from\nmm_struct with its own ref counting. This allows us in the next patch\naccess sched_cache_group directly from task, and add a refcount\non sched_cache_group when a task links to it. This prevents the use\nafter free issue when accessing stale and released old mm and its\nsched cache stat a task switches to a new mm while account_mm_sched()\nis done elsewhere.\n\nThe other benefit of this restructure is in the future, the grouping of\ntasks to a LLC would have the flexibility to be associated with a user\ndefined grouping, or cgroup, cookie group, numa_group or others instead\nof just with a single mm address space.\n\nRename sched_cache_stat to sched_cache_group and turn it into a refcounted\nobject allocated from mm_struct. The mm_struct now holds a pointer\n(sched_cache_grp) to this object instead of embedding it."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:L - An unprivileged local write(2) to an attacker-created pipe reaches anon_pipe_write()-\u003etry_to_wake_up()-\u003ettwu_queue()-\u003eenqueue_task_fair()-\u003eupdate_curr()-\u003eupdate_se()-\u003eaccount_mm_sched(), while the attacker\u0027s execveat(2) frees rq-\u003ecurr\u0027s old mm. No protocol supplies the trigger.\nAC:L - On a qualifying multi-LLC SMP host, CONFIG_SCHED_CACHE and sysctl_sched_cache_user both default enabled. The attacker controls both race sides by repeatedly waking or updating its queued task and execveat()ing its pinned trampoline, and can groom the freed per-CPU slot.\nPR:L - user_check_sched_setscheduler() permits the same-owner SCHED_IDLE/lower-priority sched_setattr() used to force update_curr() without CAP_SYS_NICE; pipe creation, permitted CPU affinity, and execveat() of the attacker\u0027s memfd also require no capability.\nUI:N - The attacker creates the pipe and tasks, drives sched_setattr() or write(), and calls execveat() to replace and release its own mm; no other user must mount, open, or approve anything.\nS:U - account_mm_sched() and mm_destroy_sched() are host-kernel scheduler/mm code, and the demonstrated result is UID-0 execution under that same kernel authority, not a guest-to-host or IOMMU boundary crossing.\nC:H - After mm_destroy_sched() frees sc_stat.pcpu_sched, __update_mm_sched() accesses its reclaimed epoch and runtime. The demonstrated reclaim corrupts a futex reference and reaches UID 0 through pipe/page-cache manipulation, enabling unrestricted data reads.\nI:H - The stale pcpu_sched-\u003eepoch write changes a reclaimed futex per-CPU reference from 1 to 0; the demonstrated follow-on UAF decrements pipe_buffer.flags, enables page-cache overwrite of /usr/bin/newgrp, and executes as UID 0.\nA:H - __update_mm_sched() and pcpu_sched-\u003eruntime += delta_exec access freed per-CPU storage; if reclamation is not steered, these writes can corrupt reused kernel objects and cause an oops or panic."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-24T14:08:42.034Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/852ecb6bc0bc0106f44f74ba3944524732486025"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28f9c0e0a0b94c5d3e1b634db545f6e1f94858c5"
}
],
"title": "sched/cache: Decouple sched_cache_group from mm to fix UAF",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
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"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-98385",
"datePublished": "2026-10-12T05:48:52.248Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:25:14.345Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-24T14:08:42.034Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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