CVE-2026-98166 (GCVE-0-2026-98166)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-06 08:44
Modified
2026-10-26 15:12
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/ttm: fix swapped-out resources never leaving their bulk_move range
ttm_tt_swapout() returns the number of pages swapped out on success and
a negative error code on failure; for a populated ttm it never returns
zero. Commit b2ed01e7ad3d ("drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_swapout() infinite LRU
walk on swapout failure") moved the bulk_move bookkeeping in
ttm_bo_swapout_cb() under "if (!ret)", so the
ttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() / ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail()
pair is now skipped on every successful swapout. The equivalent change
for the shrinker in commit 1d59f36e95f7 ("drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_shrink()
infinite LRU walk on backup failure") tests "lret > 0", which is what
was intended here as well.
Before b2ed01e7ad3d the resource was taken off the bulk_move before the
swapout; since then a swapped-out resource stays inside its BO's
bulk_move range (and on the manager LRU) although it is unevictable.
When it is later freed or the BO leaves the bulk_move
(ttm_resource_free(), ttm_bo_set_bulk_move() via amdgpu_vm_bo_del()),
ttm_resource_del_bulk_move() skips it because of its
!ttm_resource_unevictable() guard, so a range endpoint in pos->first /
pos->last is left pointing at freed memory. The next
ttm_lru_bulk_move_tail() or ttm_resource_add_bulk_move() on that cursor
is a use-after-free, seen as the resv WARN in ttm_lru_bulk_move_add(),
"list_del corruption" in ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail() or a NULL
dereference in ttm_resource_manager_next() -- minutes to hours after a
hibernation, or at process exit / reboot following one. Samuel
Ainsworth's analysis of drm/amd issue 5387 (see Link) identified the
dangling cursor; the missing removal at swapout time is the reason it
dangles.
Testing the condition for success restores the removal. On an AMD
Phoenix APU (ASUS UM3406GA, gfx1103) running suspend-then-hibernate on
a 7.0.y stable kernel carrying the backport (Ubuntu 7.0.0-31) the bug
crashed 5 of 18 hibernation cycles; a function profile of one
hibernation showed 336 ttm_tt_swapout() calls and zero
ttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() calls. With this change the
removal happens for every swapped-out resource and 12 further cycles
were clean.
References
Impacted products
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "b48ebe399b4e72baa323462580fdd83ebda561e1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "060f8f3020516d71bc4d6159d4d0beef85606a74",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1169fe8c11ca45e3f91d59a73eb271d0ca8a7fb0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b2ed01e7ad3de80333e9b962a44024b094bc0b2b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "3db7d7d583419f7b1f2e141e36418802dbb25cf8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b2ed01e7ad3de80333e9b962a44024b094bc0b2b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "0124a09e3e5f5f6080efe9663b27af27933f8382",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.18.59",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.18.57",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.0.10",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.1"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.1",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.59",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.59",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.18.57",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.2.8",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.1",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.3",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.1",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.0.10",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/ttm: fix swapped-out resources never leaving their bulk_move range\n\nttm_tt_swapout() returns the number of pages swapped out on success and\na negative error code on failure; for a populated ttm it never returns\nzero. Commit b2ed01e7ad3d (\"drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_swapout() infinite LRU\nwalk on swapout failure\") moved the bulk_move bookkeeping in\nttm_bo_swapout_cb() under \"if (!ret)\", so the\nttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() / ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail()\npair is now skipped on every successful swapout. The equivalent change\nfor the shrinker in commit 1d59f36e95f7 (\"drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_shrink()\ninfinite LRU walk on backup failure\") tests \"lret \u003e 0\", which is what\nwas intended here as well.\n\nBefore b2ed01e7ad3d the resource was taken off the bulk_move before the\nswapout; since then a swapped-out resource stays inside its BO\u0027s\nbulk_move range (and on the manager LRU) although it is unevictable.\nWhen it is later freed or the BO leaves the bulk_move\n(ttm_resource_free(), ttm_bo_set_bulk_move() via amdgpu_vm_bo_del()),\nttm_resource_del_bulk_move() skips it because of its\n!ttm_resource_unevictable() guard, so a range endpoint in pos-\u003efirst /\npos-\u003elast is left pointing at freed memory. The next\nttm_lru_bulk_move_tail() or ttm_resource_add_bulk_move() on that cursor\nis a use-after-free, seen as the resv WARN in ttm_lru_bulk_move_add(),\n\"list_del corruption\" in ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail() or a NULL\ndereference in ttm_resource_manager_next() -- minutes to hours after a\nhibernation, or at process exit / reboot following one. Samuel\nAinsworth\u0027s analysis of drm/amd issue 5387 (see Link) identified the\ndangling cursor; the missing removal at swapout time is the reason it\ndangles.\n\nTesting the condition for success restores the removal. On an AMD\nPhoenix APU (ASUS UM3406GA, gfx1103) running suspend-then-hibernate on\na 7.0.y stable kernel carrying the backport (Ubuntu 7.0.0-31) the bug\ncrashed 5 of 18 hibernation cycles; a function profile of one\nhibernation showed 336 ttm_tt_swapout() calls and zero\nttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() calls. With this change the\nremoval happens for every swapped-out resource and 12 further cycles\nwere clean."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:L - The attacker drives ttm_bo_swapout_cb() through local DRM render-node ioctls (amdgpu GEM_CREATE with VM_ALWAYS_VALID, then CS), with ttm_tt_populate() calling ttm_global_swapout() once ttm_pages_limit is exceeded, or through hibernation. No remote protocol carries any input.\nAC:L - Hibernation is not needed: the attacker allocates per-VM BOs past ttm_pages_limit to force swapout, closes the swapped BO so ttm_resource_free() frees a resource still referenced by the bulk_move cursor, then submits CS to run ttm_lru_bulk_move_tail(). Every step is the attacker\u0027s own action.\nPR:L - AMDGPU_GEM_CREATE, GEM_CLOSE and AMDGPU_CS are DRM_RENDER_ALLOW ioctls on /dev/dri/renderD*, open to an ordinary render-group or seat user without root or capabilities.\nUI:N - The attacker runs the whole sequence in their own process with their own buffer objects. No other user has to act.\nS:U - The freed ttm_resource and the corrupted manager LRU lists are kernel memory, so the impact stays within the kernel\u0027s own security authority.\nC:H - After ttm_resource_free() frees the swapped resource, bulk_move pos-\u003efirst/pos-\u003elast still point at it, so a reallocated object can be read and walked as a ttm_resource by ttm_lru_bulk_move_tail() and the ttm_lru_next_res()/prev_res() helpers.\nI:H - list_bulk_move_tail() and ttm_lru_bulk_move_pos_tail() write list pointers through the dangling cursor into freed memory. The commit message reports this showing up as list_del corruption, a write primitive usable against a sprayed object.\nA:H - The use-after-free crashes the kernel through list_del corruption, the dma_resv WARN in ttm_lru_bulk_move_add(), or a NULL dereference in ttm_resource_manager_next(). The reporter crashed 5 of 18 hibernation cycles."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T15:12:59.824Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b48ebe399b4e72baa323462580fdd83ebda561e1"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1169fe8c11ca45e3f91d59a73eb271d0ca8a7fb0"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3db7d7d583419f7b1f2e141e36418802dbb25cf8"
}
],
"title": "drm/ttm: fix swapped-out resources never leaving their bulk_move range",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-98166",
"datePublished": "2026-10-06T08:44:11.927Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:25:14.321Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T15:12:59.824Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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