CVE-2026-91085 (GCVE-0-2026-91085)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-09-29 08:39
Modified
2026-10-01 14:18
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
Summary
Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.
The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role.
config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.
Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.
By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier.
MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.
References
| URL | Tags | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache Karaf |
Version: 0 ≤ |
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The safety valve for this,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003ekaraf.secured.command.compulsory.roles\u003c/code\u003e, ships commented out in\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eetc/system.properties\u003c/code\u003e, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eThe shipped\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eorg.apache.karaf.command.acl.config\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;ACL (\u003ccode\u003eassemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml\u003c/code\u003e, mirrored into\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003einstance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg\u003c/code\u003e) has no\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003einstall\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;entry. It restricts\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003edelete\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;to\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eadmin\u003c/code\u003e, restricts\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eedit\u003c/code\u003e/\u003ccode\u003eproperty-*\u003c/code\u003e/\u003ccode\u003eupdate\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;on the\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003ejmx.acl.*\u003c/code\u003e,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eorg.apache.karaf.command.acl.*\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;and\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eorg.apache.karaf.service.acl.*\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;PIDs to\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eadmin\u003c/code\u003e, and allows\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003emanager\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;for everything else, but\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003econfig:install\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eviewer\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;role.\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cspan\u003econfig:install \u0026lt;url\u0026gt; \u0026lt;finalname\u0026gt;\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;fetches\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eurl\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;and writes it into\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e${karaf.etc}\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;as\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003efinalname\u003c/code\u003e. It calls\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003ePathUtils.checkWithin()\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;to block\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e..\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;traversal outside\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003ekaraf.etc\u003c/code\u003e, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships:\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eusers.properties\u003c/code\u003e,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003ekeys.properties\u003c/code\u003e,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003ehost.key\u003c/code\u003e, and all\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eorg.apache.karaf.*.acl.*\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e-o\u003c/code\u003e/\u003ccode\u003e--override\u003c/code\u003e, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eBecause\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003efelix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc}\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;(\u003ccode\u003eetc/config.properties\u003c/code\u003e), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e.cfg\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eBy contrast,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003ebundle:install\u003c/code\u003e,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003efeature:install\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;and\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003ekar:install\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;are all\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eadmin\u003c/code\u003e-only in their own ACLs, and\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003econfig:delete\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;is\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eadmin\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;in this same ACL,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003econfig:install\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;was the outlier.\u003c/div\u003e\u003ch3\u003eMitigation\u003c/h3\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eAdd\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003einstall = admin\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;in\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eetc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;(create the file is absent), and/or set\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003ekaraf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;in\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eetc/system.properties\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;(and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.\u003c/div\u003e\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-862\", \"description\": \"CWE-862\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09\", \"shortName\": \"apache\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-09-29T08:39:33.209Z\"}}}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-91085\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-10-01T14:18:12.957Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-09-14T17:55:38.562Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-09-29T08:39:33.209Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"apache\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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