CVE-2026-90244 (GCVE-0-2026-90244)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-09-17 16:07
Modified
2026-10-19 09:00
Severity ?
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/dma: Restore locking around msi_page_list Unlike a group's default domain, which is always freshly allocated and privately owned (iommu_group_alloc_default_domain()), VFIO type1's legacy container merges any newly attached group into an existing domain whenever their iommu_ops and cache-coherency enforcement match. iommu_dma_get_msi_page() only asserts the caller's own group mutex is held (iommu_group_mutex_assert()). On an IOMMU that publishes IOMMU_RESV_SW_MSI, e.g. ARM SMMU, a VM with two such devices assigned through the legacy container can have their guest drivers probe and allocate MSIs in parallel; each host-side VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS lands on a different device fd and group mutex, but both devices' domains are the same merged domain, so both can enter iommu_dma_get_msi_page() concurrently and corrupt msi_page_list. commit 288683c92b1a ("iommu: Make iommu_dma_prepare_msi() into a generic operation") dropped the prior msi_prepare_lock on the reasoning that "each iommu_domain is unique to a group," which holds for default domains but not this VFIO type1 case. Restore the static lock, since it's only guarding a corner case and will likely never be contended. iommufd avoids the equivalent problem by having its own callers (iommufd_sw_map_msi()) take a ctx-wide sw_msi_lock before ever reaching the shared list. VFIO type1 can't mirror that since it dispatches to iommu_dma_sw_msi() which is outside VFIO's jurisdiction.
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: 288683c92b1abc32277c83819bea287af614d239
Version: 288683c92b1abc32277c83819bea287af614d239
Version: 288683c92b1abc32277c83819bea287af614d239
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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "e3c53e9173a47d5ce1fae020f2c6b1fb3c1123c2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "288683c92b1abc32277c83819bea287af614d239",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2af1e99ec14d226d66ceb9f16c663ee2568e6676",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "288683c92b1abc32277c83819bea287af614d239",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5a9e89ea34e0e34ac5d7e949042d665533549e40",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "288683c92b1abc32277c83819bea287af614d239",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.15"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.15",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.52",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.18.52",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.15",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2.6",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.15",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.3",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.15",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/dma: Restore locking around msi_page_list\n\nUnlike a group\u0027s default domain, which is always freshly allocated\nand privately owned (iommu_group_alloc_default_domain()), VFIO type1\u0027s\nlegacy container merges any newly attached group into an existing\ndomain whenever their iommu_ops and cache-coherency enforcement match.\n\niommu_dma_get_msi_page() only asserts the caller\u0027s own group mutex is\nheld (iommu_group_mutex_assert()). On an IOMMU that publishes\nIOMMU_RESV_SW_MSI, e.g. ARM SMMU, a VM with two such devices assigned\nthrough the legacy container can have their guest drivers probe and\nallocate MSIs in parallel; each host-side VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS lands\non a different device fd and group mutex, but both devices\u0027 domains\nare the same merged domain, so both can enter\niommu_dma_get_msi_page() concurrently and corrupt msi_page_list.\n\ncommit 288683c92b1a (\"iommu: Make iommu_dma_prepare_msi() into a\ngeneric operation\") dropped the prior msi_prepare_lock on the\nreasoning that \"each iommu_domain is unique to a group,\" which holds\nfor default domains but not this VFIO type1 case. Restore the static\nlock, since it\u0027s only guarding a corner case and will likely never\nbe contended.\n\niommufd avoids the equivalent problem by having its own callers\n(iommufd_sw_map_msi()) take a ctx-wide sw_msi_lock before ever\nreaching the shared list. VFIO type1 can\u0027t mirror that since it\ndispatches to iommu_dma_sw_msi() which is outside VFIO\u0027s jurisdiction."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The race is entered only via ioctl(VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS) on a local vfio-pci fd: vfio_pci_core_ioctl \u2192 vfio_pci_ioctl_set_irqs \u2192 vfio_pci_set_msi_trigger \u2192 vfio_msi_enable \u2192 pci_alloc_irq_vectors \u2192 its_irq_domain_alloc \u2192 iommu_dma_prepare_msi \u2192 iommu_dma_get_msi_page. No received packet or protocol message carries the trigger.\nAC:L - The attacker issues concurrent VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS on two device fds whose groups vfio_iommu_type1_attach_group already merged onto one domain; iommu_dma_prepare_msi takes only each device\u0027s own group-\u003emutex, so both threads run iommu_dma_get_msi_page() on the shared msi_page_list. The attacker owns both sides of the race.\nPR:L - vfio_pci_ioctl_set_irqs() and vfio_group_fops_open() have no capable() check on the IOMMU-backed path; CAP_SYS_RAWIO gates only VFIO_NO_IOMMU. An unprivileged qemu/kvm-group or DPDK user with two assigned /dev/vfio nodes can attach them to a type1 container and call SET_IRQS.\nUI:N - The attacker attaches its own groups with vfio_iommu_type1_attach_group and fires the concurrent SET_IRQS ioctls on fds it already holds; no other user must mount, open, or otherwise act.\nS:U - The race corrupts the host kernel\u0027s msi_page_list of iommu_dma_msi_page objects. iommu_map() still maps only the irqchip doorbell from its-\u003eget_msi_base() into the IOMMU_RESV_SW_MSI window vfio_iommu_has_sw_msi() reserved; that does not install extra host-RAM translations or bypass the DMA/VM isolation boundary.\nC:H - Concurrent list_for_each_entry() versus unlocked list_add() on msi_page_list can follow a torn next pointer into a freed iommu_dma_msi_page, a use-after-free read of phys/iova and neighboring slab.\nI:H - Unlocked list_add() of iommu_dma_msi_page nodes overwrites kernel list next/prev, and the unlocked msi_cookie-\u003emsi_iova bump in iommu_dma_alloc_iova() can alias IOVAs; a sprayable UAF of that object is an arbitrary-write and control-flow primitive.\nA:H - A corrupted msi_page_list walk or list_add in iommu_dma_get_msi_page() dereferences invalid list pointers and oopses or panics the host kernel even if the UAF is not fully weaponized."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T09:00:20.156Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e3c53e9173a47d5ce1fae020f2c6b1fb3c1123c2"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2af1e99ec14d226d66ceb9f16c663ee2568e6676"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a9e89ea34e0e34ac5d7e949042d665533549e40"
        }
      ],
      "title": "iommu/dma: Restore locking around msi_page_list",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-90244",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-17T16:07:47.121Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-11T19:38:34.795Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T09:00:20.156Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}


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