CVE-2026-90133 (GCVE-0-2026-90133)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-09-17 16:06
Modified
2026-10-19 08:58
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: Fix index_root heap OOB write in ntfs_ir_to_ib() ntfs_ir_to_ib copies all entries from index_root into a freshly allocated index_block_size-byte buffer without verifying that the entries fit in the available space. The entries in index_root may be larger than the usable entry space in the index block. This can cause OOB writes past the end of the allocation. The validator ntfs_index_root_inconsistent() checks that entries are self-consistent within the IR value, but never cross-checks them against index_block_size. There is no bounds check in ntfs_ir_to_ib() before the memcpy. Fixing this at the sink in ntfs_ir_to_ib() since ntfs_index_root_inconsistent() validates the logical consistency of index_root as a structure and a root with large entries is a structurally valid root. The bug is a size conflict of ntfs_ir_to_ib(). Also, the validator is called once per inode load in ntfs_read_locked_inode() while ntfs_ir_to_ib() is only called during a reparent, a check there adds no overhead to the common path. Moreover, even a future call path that bypasses the validator would still be protected. With NULL as first parameter of ntfs_error(), the volume error flag is never set by this call, so the device name will be absent from the error message. In any case, that the caller, ntfs_ir_reparent(), prints an error message that includes the device name on NULL returns. I think this is the best solution available without adding 'struct super_block *sb' as a parameter to ntfs_ir_to_ib(). This heap out-of-bounds write is triggered by a crafted filesystem image, which is not in the kernel threat model, anyway, fixing memory errors would be nice to keep things secure.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: 0a8ac0c1fa0b99a5b29002bc7f232ed7eafddef0
Version: 0a8ac0c1fa0b99a5b29002bc7f232ed7eafddef0
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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/ntfs/index.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "825dec5120933e90c54e30e31ccfa6c3449043a8",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0a8ac0c1fa0b99a5b29002bc7f232ed7eafddef0",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "dc09bf79b76f9a7157e225f449655f3f62f96c9c",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0a8ac0c1fa0b99a5b29002bc7f232ed7eafddef0",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/ntfs/index.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7.1"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7.1",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2.6",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "7.1",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.3",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "7.1",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nntfs: Fix index_root heap OOB write in ntfs_ir_to_ib()\n\nntfs_ir_to_ib copies all entries from index_root into a freshly allocated\nindex_block_size-byte buffer without verifying that the entries fit in the\navailable space. The entries in index_root may be larger than the usable\nentry space in the index block.\n\nThis can cause OOB writes past the end of the allocation.\n\nThe validator ntfs_index_root_inconsistent() checks that entries are\nself-consistent within the IR value, but never cross-checks them against\nindex_block_size. There is no bounds check in ntfs_ir_to_ib() before the\nmemcpy.\n\nFixing this at the sink in ntfs_ir_to_ib() since\nntfs_index_root_inconsistent() validates the logical consistency of\nindex_root as a structure and a root with large entries is a structurally\nvalid root. The bug is a size conflict of ntfs_ir_to_ib().\nAlso, the validator is called once per inode load in\nntfs_read_locked_inode() while ntfs_ir_to_ib() is only called during a\nreparent, a check there adds no overhead to the common path.\nMoreover, even a future call path that bypasses the validator would still\nbe protected.\n\nWith NULL as first parameter of ntfs_error(), the volume error flag is\nnever set by this call, so the device name will be absent from the error\nmessage. In any case, that the caller, ntfs_ir_reparent(), prints an error\nmessage that includes the device name on NULL returns.\nI think this is the best solution available without adding\n\u0027struct super_block *sb\u0027 as a parameter to ntfs_ir_to_ib().\n\nThis heap out-of-bounds write is triggered by a crafted filesystem image,\nwhich is not in the kernel threat model, anyway, fixing memory errors would\nbe nice to keep  things secure."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The overflow source is on-disk $INDEX_ROOT (ir-\u003eindex_block_size and the resident entries) that ntfs_ir_to_ib() memcpy()s; the trigger is vfs_create/mkdir/link/rename \u2192 ntfs_create/__ntfs_link \u2192 ntfs_index_add_filename \u2192 ntfs_ie_add \u2192 ntfs_ir_make_space \u2192 ntfs_ir_reparent. No protocol message carries those fields.\nAC:L - ntfs_read_locked_inode() accepts any power-of-two index_block_size in [512, PAGE_SIZE] and ntfs_index_root_inconsistent() never compares entry bytes to that size, so a 512-byte IB plus a packed resident INDEX_ROOT in a full MFT record makes ntfs_ir_truncate() return -ENOSPC and ntfs_ir_reparent() run on the next create, with no race.\nPR:N - mount_capable() needs init-namespace CAP_SYS_ADMIN because ntfs_fs_type lacks FS_USERNS_MOUNT; that mount is the victim or udisks2/vold action (UI:R), not attacker privilege. After mount, ntfs_create() is an ordinary VFS create on a directory whose mode the image controls, so the attacker needs no account.\nUI:R - ntfs_ir_to_ib() is called only from ntfs_ir_reparent(), not from ntfs_fill_super(), so attaching the volume is not enough. A victim or automounter must mount the attacker-supplied NTFS image, and then create/mkdir/link/rename must add a filename so ntfs_ie_add() takes the ENOSPC reparent path.\nS:U - The kvzalloc(index_block) overflow in ntfs_ir_to_ib() corrupts host-kernel heap in the same OS authority as fs/ntfs; it is in-kernel memory corruption, not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or sandbox breakout.\nC:H - memcpy() in ntfs_ir_to_ib() writes attacker-controlled INDEX_ROOT entry bytes (UTF-16 names, MFT refs) past the kvzalloc(ir-\u003eindex_block_size) object into adjacent slab, a heap OOB write that can be groomed to disclose neighboring kernel objects.\nI:H - The same memcpy is an unbounded heap out-of-bounds write of attacker-chosen index-entry contents past the allocated index_block, which can corrupt adjacent slab objects and hijack kernel control flow.\nA:H - Writing past the kvzalloc index_block into unmapped or poisoned adjacent heap oopses or panics on the ntfs_ir_reparent() create/mkdir path, fully denying availability even when the overflow is not turned into a write primitive."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T08:58:31.458Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/825dec5120933e90c54e30e31ccfa6c3449043a8"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc09bf79b76f9a7157e225f449655f3f62f96c9c"
        }
      ],
      "title": "ntfs: Fix index_root heap OOB write in ntfs_ir_to_ib()",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-90133",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-17T16:06:33.234Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-11T19:38:34.788Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T08:58:31.458Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}


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