CVE-2026-90089 (GCVE-0-2026-90089)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-09-17 16:06
Modified
2026-10-19 08:57
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Validate the FW dump header length nxp_process_fw_dump() pulls the ACL header off the frame and then reads seq_num and buf_len from a struct nxp_fw_dump_hdr placed at skb->data, without checking that the ACL payload is long enough to contain it. h4_recv_buf() collects HCI_ACL_HDR_SIZE bytes of header followed by the number of payload bytes named in that header, so skb->len is 4 + dlen with dlen supplied by the controller and possibly smaller than the 8 byte dump header, or zero. A short frame with connection handle 0xfff therefore reads both fields from beyond the received data. Beyond the read itself, buf_len is what terminates a dump: a value of zero makes the driver call hci_devcd_complete() and reset the controller, so a truncated frame can end a dump early. Use skb_pull_data() to validate and pull the FW dump header before accessing its fields. Warn and reject the chunk if the header is truncated.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: 998e447f443f138c90faa6ff3845082af419070e
Version: 998e447f443f138c90faa6ff3845082af419070e
Version: 998e447f443f138c90faa6ff3845082af419070e
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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/bluetooth/btnxpuart.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "a644b8df94966b672ac656577df98bd01bc88393",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "998e447f443f138c90faa6ff3845082af419070e",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "22d419db7f9a01bea22cfcf66774d2b2fd4bb354",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "998e447f443f138c90faa6ff3845082af419070e",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "060fa7592bdc043a93b6b7870f5b8551206d315d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "998e447f443f138c90faa6ff3845082af419070e",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/bluetooth/btnxpuart.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.15"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.15",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.52",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.18.52",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.15",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2.6",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.15",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.3",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.15",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: btnxpuart: Validate the FW dump header length\n\nnxp_process_fw_dump() pulls the ACL header off the frame and then reads\nseq_num and buf_len from a struct nxp_fw_dump_hdr placed at skb-\u003edata,\nwithout checking that the ACL payload is long enough to contain it.\n\nh4_recv_buf() collects HCI_ACL_HDR_SIZE bytes of header followed by the\nnumber of payload bytes named in that header, so skb-\u003elen is 4 + dlen\nwith dlen supplied by the controller and possibly smaller than the 8\nbyte dump header, or zero. A short frame with connection handle 0xfff\ntherefore reads both fields from beyond the received data.\n\nBeyond the read itself, buf_len is what terminates a dump: a value of\nzero makes the driver call hci_devcd_complete() and reset the\ncontroller, so a truncated frame can end a dump early.\n\nUse skb_pull_data() to validate and pull the FW dump header before\naccessing its fields. Warn and reject the chunk if the header is\ntruncated."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.1,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:A - The malformed nxp_fw_dump_hdr is taken from HCI ACL frames with connection handle 0xFFF. Those frames are assembled by h4_recv_buf() from UART bytes in btnxpuart_receive_buf() and dispatched by nxp_recv_acl_pkt() into nxp_process_fw_dump(). A nearby attacker who induces an NXP firmware dump over the air supplies that ACL dump chunk; Bluetooth range is Adjacent.\nAC:L - nxp_process_fw_dump() loads seq_num and buf_len after skb_pull_data() of only the 4-byte HCI ACL header. h4_recv_buf() delivers any dlen the controller advertised, including zero, so one handle-0xFFF ACL with dlen\u003c8 deterministically over-reads with no race or uninfluenced layout.\nPR:N - nxp_recv_acl_pkt() and nxp_process_fw_dump() run on the serdev RX path with no pairing, HCI authentication, or capability check; handle 0xFFF dump chunks are consumed before they reach the normal HCI ACL stack.\nUI:N - btnxpuart_receive_buf() always passes complete H4 ACL frames to nxp_recv_acl_pkt(); no user must pair, confirm a prompt, or write the HCI coredump sysfs entry for a dump chunk to be parsed.\nS:U - The over-read, hci_devcd_init/append/complete dump state, and nxp_set_ind_reset() controller reset all stay in the host kernel\u0027s btnxpuart/HCI authority; no VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:L - After pulling the ACL header, the driver loads the 8-byte nxp_fw_dump_hdr (seq_num and buf_len) from skb-\u003edata even when skb-\u003elen is 0\u20137. That is a strictly bounded 8-byte over-read of the H4 ACL skb tailroom allocated at HCI_MAX_FRAME_SIZE, and those fields are never copied to userspace.\nI:N - The path only reads seq_num/buf_len to decide dump start/complete and does not write past the skb; hci_devcd_append() copies only skb-\u003elen valid bytes, so there is no OOB write or control-flow hijack primitive.\nA:H - When the over-read buf_len is 0, nxp_process_fw_dump() calls hci_devcd_complete() and nxp_set_ind_reset(), which injects HCI_EV_HARDWARE_ERROR 0xb0 (BTNXPUART_IR_HW_ERR) and runs the independent-reset path (nxp_hw_err \u2192 HCI_NXP_IND_RESET), taking the Bluetooth controller down; a truncated handle-0xFFF frame can repeat this at will."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T08:57:47.078Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a644b8df94966b672ac656577df98bd01bc88393"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22d419db7f9a01bea22cfcf66774d2b2fd4bb354"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/060fa7592bdc043a93b6b7870f5b8551206d315d"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Validate the FW dump header length",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-90089",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-17T16:06:04.201Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-11T19:38:34.786Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T08:57:47.078Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
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