CVE-2026-89681 (GCVE-0-2026-89681)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-09-11 19:46
Modified
2026-10-19 08:50
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix layout fence worker double-reference race
The workqueue core clears WORK_STRUCT_PENDING before the callback
is invoked, so delayed_work_pending() in lm_breaker_timedout() can
return false while the fence worker is already running. This lets
the breaker take a duplicate sc_count reference and schedule a new
worker that coalesces with the in-progress one. The extra reference
is never put, leaking the layout stateid.
Replace the racy delayed_work_pending() check with an
ls_fence_inflight boolean set atomically with
refcount_inc_not_zero() under ls_lock, and cleared under ls_lock
before the final nfs4_put_stid() on the dispose path; the retry
path intentionally retains it. Remove the self-rearm
mod_delayed_work() at the top of the worker.
References
Impacted products
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/nfsd/nfs4layouts.c",
"fs/nfsd/state.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "a278d361e0e8f242211891193d56483a7a9f47a8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f52792f484ba2316853736856dde19b7e7458861",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "8580571227451384399b3fa53fcde19848c48e5a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f52792f484ba2316853736856dde19b7e7458861",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/nfsd/nfs4layouts.c",
"fs/nfsd/state.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.1"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.1",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.2.4",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.1",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.3",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.1",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: fix layout fence worker double-reference race\n\nThe workqueue core clears WORK_STRUCT_PENDING before the callback\nis invoked, so delayed_work_pending() in lm_breaker_timedout() can\nreturn false while the fence worker is already running. This lets\nthe breaker take a duplicate sc_count reference and schedule a new\nworker that coalesces with the in-progress one. The extra reference\nis never put, leaking the layout stateid.\n\nReplace the racy delayed_work_pending() check with an\nls_fence_inflight boolean set atomically with\nrefcount_inc_not_zero() under ls_lock, and cleared under ls_lock\nbefore the final nfs4_put_stid() on the dispose path; the retry\npath intentionally retains it. Remove the self-rearm\nmod_delayed_work() at the top of the worker."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:N - The flaw is in nfsd pNFS SCSI layout fencing (nfsd4_layout_lm_breaker_timedout \u2192 nfsd4_layout_fence_worker in fs/nfsd/nfs4layouts.c), reached over NFSv4.1 COMPOUND on TCP/2049: LAYOUTGET installs an FL_LAYOUT lease, then a conflicting OPEN/WRITE hits nfsd_open_break_lease \u2192 time_out_leases after recall timeout.\nAC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the delayed_work_pending race: one client holds a SCSI layout and ignores CB_LAYOUTRECALL so the fence worker runs, while other attacker connections spam OPEN/WRITE so concurrent nfsd threads call lm_breaker_timedout while WORK_STRUCT_PENDING is already clear; the sequence is retryable.\nPR:N - Typical nfsd exports accept AUTH_SYS/AUTH_NULL with no cryptographic RPC authentication; EXCHANGE_ID, CREATE_SESSION, OPEN, and LAYOUTGET succeed for any host permitted by the export, so a remote NFSv4.1 client needs no kernel-verified credentials or local account on the server.\nUI:N - The attacker is the NFS client and sends LAYOUTGET plus conflicting OPEN/WRITE compounds against an already-running pNFS SCSI export; no victim user must mount a filesystem, open a file, or take any other action on the host.\nS:U - Impact is kernel nfsd layout-stateid and nfs4_client lifetime on the NFS server host and does not cross a VM, hypervisor, sandbox, or IOMMU security boundary.\nC:H - The unmatched sc_count leaves the nfs4_layout_stateid on nfs4_file.fi_lo_states without pinning nfs4_client; after that client is expired, a later LAYOUTGET walks the list and nfsd4_run_cb dereferences freed cb_clp, a use-after-free that can be reused for arbitrary kernel reads.\nI:H - The same use-after-free of nfs4_client (cl_cb_session, cl_callback_wq, and nfsd4_callback_ops) from nfsd4_recall_file_layout \u2192 nfsd4_run_cb enables heap spraying and function-pointer hijack of the CB_LAYOUTRECALL work path.\nA:H - Each won race permanently leaks a layout stateid (and can pin nfs4_client via cl_lo_states); repeating LAYOUTGET/fence races exhausts nfsd state and kernel memory, and the later nfs4_client use-after-free oopses or panics the nfsd thread."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T08:50:54.644Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a278d361e0e8f242211891193d56483a7a9f47a8"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8580571227451384399b3fa53fcde19848c48e5a"
}
],
"title": "nfsd: fix layout fence worker double-reference race",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-89681",
"datePublished": "2026-09-11T19:46:04.121Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-11T19:38:34.748Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T08:50:54.644Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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