CVE-2026-88823 (GCVE-0-2026-88823)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-10 18:15 – Updated: 2026-11-10 18:15
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
AES-GCM-SIV AAD Forgery After Zero-length Incremental AAD Update
Summary
Issue summary: The AES-GCM-SIV implementation treats a zero-length Additional
Authenticated Data (AAD) update as a reset of all the AAD supplied so far,
instead of leaving the AAD unchanged. An application that supplies its AAD in
several fragments, one of which is empty, therefore produces or verifies
messages whose authentication tag does not cover the AAD supplied before
the empty fragment.
Impact summary: Data an application intended to authenticate alongside a
message is silently left unauthenticated. An attacker can forge the AAD of such
a message.
CWE: CWE-325: Missing Cryptographic Step
Description: An application passing AAD in multiple chunks of which some have
zero length will have the previous AAD chunks effectively unauthenticated. Also,
on context re-initialisation, the AAD was not reset, which meant that any AAD
accumulated from the previous context usage were also included in the AAD of the
new message.
The fix makes a zero-length AAD update a no-op and clears any accumulated AAD
whenever the context is re-initialised with a key or a nonce.
A re-initialisation that only changes parameters keeps the AAD.
FIPS impact: no
The FIPS modules are not affected, as AES-GCM-SIV is not a FIPS approved
algorithm and is implemented only in the default provider, outside the
OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
- CWE-325 - Missing Cryptographic Step
Assigner
openssl
CNA
References
4 references
Impacted products
Date Public
2026-11-10 11:05
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"product": "OpenSSL",
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"type": "reporter",
"value": "J\u00e9r\u00e9my Jean (ANSSI)"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Bhargava Shastry"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Jonathan Bateman (Rochester Institute of Technology)"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Daniel Kubec"
}
],
"datePublic": "2026-11-10T11:05:35.000Z",
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"value": "Issue summary: The AES-GCM-SIV implementation treats a zero-length Additional\u003cbr\u003eAuthenticated Data (AAD) update as a reset of all the AAD supplied so far,\u003cbr\u003einstead of leaving the AAD unchanged. An application that supplies its AAD in\u003cbr\u003eseveral fragments, one of which is empty, therefore produces or verifies\u003cbr\u003emessages whose authentication tag does not cover the AAD supplied before\u003cbr\u003ethe empty fragment.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eImpact summary: Data an application intended to authenticate alongside a\u003cbr\u003emessage is silently left unauthenticated. An attacker can forge the AAD of such\u003cbr\u003ea message.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eCWE: CWE-325: Missing Cryptographic Step\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eDescription: An application passing AAD in multiple chunks of which some have\u003cbr\u003ezero length will have the previous AAD chunks effectively unauthenticated. Also,\u003cbr\u003eon context re-initialisation, the AAD was not reset, which meant that any AAD\u003cbr\u003eaccumulated from the previous context usage were also included in the AAD of the\u003cbr\u003enew message.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe fix makes a zero-length AAD update a no-op and clears any accumulated AAD\u003cbr\u003ewhenever the context is re-initialised with a key or a nonce.\u003cbr\u003eA re-initialisation that only changes parameters keeps the AAD.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFIPS impact: no\u003cbr\u003eThe FIPS modules are not affected, as AES-GCM-SIV is not a FIPS approved\u003cbr\u003ealgorithm and is implemented only in the default provider, outside the\u003cbr\u003eOpenSSL FIPS module boundary."
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"value": "Issue summary: The AES-GCM-SIV implementation treats a zero-length Additional\nAuthenticated Data (AAD) update as a reset of all the AAD supplied so far,\ninstead of leaving the AAD unchanged. An application that supplies its AAD in\nseveral fragments, one of which is empty, therefore produces or verifies\nmessages whose authentication tag does not cover the AAD supplied before\nthe empty fragment.\n\nImpact summary: Data an application intended to authenticate alongside a\nmessage is silently left unauthenticated. An attacker can forge the AAD of such\na message.\n\nCWE: CWE-325: Missing Cryptographic Step\n\nDescription: An application passing AAD in multiple chunks of which some have\nzero length will have the previous AAD chunks effectively unauthenticated. Also,\non context re-initialisation, the AAD was not reset, which meant that any AAD\naccumulated from the previous context usage were also included in the AAD of the\nnew message.\n\nThe fix makes a zero-length AAD update a no-op and clears any accumulated AAD\nwhenever the context is re-initialised with a key or a nonce.\nA re-initialisation that only changes parameters keeps the AAD.\n\nFIPS impact: no\nThe FIPS modules are not affected, as AES-GCM-SIV is not a FIPS approved\nalgorithm and is implemented only in the default provider, outside the\nOpenSSL FIPS module boundary."
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"dateUpdated": "2026-11-10T18:15:49.358Z",
"orgId": "3a12439a-ef3a-4c79-92e6-6081a721f1e5",
"shortName": "openssl"
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"references": [
{
"name": "OpenSSL Advisory",
"tags": [
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"url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20261110.txt"
},
{
"name": "4.1.1 git commit",
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"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/2f5fc833ff9b5bfe00b32f8b5c74f73c5773c682"
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{
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"tags": [
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"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/159e1de0c448d7b9f09ad768c8e141def4aa1eb4"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "AES-GCM-SIV AAD Forgery After Zero-length Incremental AAD Update",
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-88823",
"datePublished": "2026-11-10T18:15:49.358Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-10T09:08:26.966Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-10T18:15:49.358Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
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