CVE-2026-87119 (GCVE-0-2026-87119)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-09-22 11:16
Modified
2026-09-22 12:02
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-294 - Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
Summary
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.
The payer signs a Tempo KeyAuthorization over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4 deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, claim_activation succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer's wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain's own semantics for re-installing an existing key.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2.
References
Impacted products
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MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4 deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, claim_activation succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer\u0027s wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain\u0027s own semantics for re-installing an existing key.\\n\\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eAuthentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eThe payer signs a Tempo \u003ccode\u003eKeyAuthorization\u003c/code\u003e over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. \u003ccode\u003eMPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003elib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex\u003c/code\u003e pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. \u003ccode\u003eMPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4\u003c/code\u003e deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, \u003ccode\u003eclaim_activation\u003c/code\u003e succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer\u0027s wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain\u0027s own semantics for re-installing an existing key.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.\\n\\nThe payer signs a Tempo `KeyAuthorization` over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. `MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3` in `lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex` pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. `MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4` deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, `claim_activation` succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer\u0027s wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain\u0027s own semantics for re-installing an existing key.\\n\\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-294\", \"description\": \"CWE-294 Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay\"}]}], \"configurations\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Only deployments offering Tempo subscriptions are affected, which requires subscription_access_key_private_key in the Tempo method_config. Exploitation further requires the attacker to have obtained a payer\u0027s signed activation credential, in transit over a hop that is not TLS-protected or at rest in a log, an intermediary, or a client retry buffer.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eOnly deployments offering Tempo subscriptions are affected, which requires \u003ccode\u003esubscription_access_key_private_key\u003c/code\u003e in the Tempo \u003ccode\u003emethod_config\u003c/code\u003e. Exploitation further requires the attacker to have obtained a payer\u0027s signed activation credential, in transit over a hop that is not TLS-protected or at rest in a log, an intermediary, or a client retry buffer.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"Only deployments offering Tempo subscriptions are affected, which requires `subscription_access_key_private_key` in the Tempo `method_config`. Exploitation further requires the attacker to have obtained a payer\u0027s signed activation credential, in transit over a hop that is not TLS-protected or at rest in a log, an intermediary, or a client retry buffer.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"cpeApplicability\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"negate\": false, \"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"0.16.2\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"0.14.0\"}], \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": \"AND\"}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"shortName\": \"EEF\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-09-22T11:16:56.232Z\"}}}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-87119\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-09-22T12:02:31.484Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-09-11T18:00:02.032Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-09-22T11:16:56.232Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"EEF\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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