CVE-2026-87038 (GCVE-0-2026-87038)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-04 06:09 – Updated: 2026-11-09 21:27
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Time-of-check/time-of-use double fetch in the Zephyr i3c_transfer() syscall handler allows kernel-mode control-flow hijack from user mode
Summary
The user-mode verification handler for the i3c_transfer() system call, z_vrfy_i3c_transfer() in drivers/i3c/i3c_handlers.c, validated the caller-supplied struct i3c_device_desc in place instead of snapshotting it. It confirmed only that the descriptor was readable by the calling thread (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_READ()), read target->bus once to check it with K_SYSCALL_OBJ(), and then passed the caller's live pointer down. The implementation z_impl_i3c_transfer() re-reads target->bus from that user memory and dispatches through it as DEVICE_API_GET(i3c, target->bus)->i3c_xfers(...), so the bus that was validated is not necessarily the bus that is used. DEVICE_API_GET() performs no runtime type check outside CONFIG_DEVICE_API_ASSERT builds.
On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE and an I3C controller driver, a user thread that has been granted an I3C device object can exploit this with a second thread in the same memory domain: one thread calls i3c_transfer() while the other rewrites the bus field of the descriptor. The window between the check and the use spans the num_msgs validation, the message-array access check, a stack VLA allocation and a memcpy() of up to 32 struct i3c_msg, so the race is repeatable and can simply be retried until it lands.
When the substitution succeeds, the kernel dereferences an attacker-chosen pointer as a struct device, loads a function pointer from the attacker-controlled api table and calls it in supervisor mode with attacker-influenced arguments. This yields kernel-mode code execution from an unprivileged user thread — a complete escape of the userspace memory-protection sandbox; lesser outcomes are an arbitrary two-level kernel read or a kernel fault. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE, or without an I3C driver, are unaffected.
The fix copies the descriptor into a kernel-stack local with k_usermode_from_copy(), validates the bus in that copy, and dispatches on the copy, so the validated value is provably the value used.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-09 21:26 UTC
CWE
- CWE-367 - race
Assigner
zephyr
CNA
References
2 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject | zephyr |
Affected:
3.2.0 , < 4.3.2
(semver)
Affected: 4.4.0 , < 4.5.0 (semver) |
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"title": "Time-of-check/time-of-use double fetch in the Zephyr i3c_transfer() syscall handler allows kernel-mode control-flow hijack from user mode",
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