CVE-2026-87038 (GCVE-0-2026-87038)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-04 06:09 – Updated: 2026-11-09 21:27
VLAI
Title
Time-of-check/time-of-use double fetch in the Zephyr i3c_transfer() syscall handler allows kernel-mode control-flow hijack from user mode
Summary
The user-mode verification handler for the i3c_transfer() system call, z_vrfy_i3c_transfer() in drivers/i3c/i3c_handlers.c, validated the caller-supplied struct i3c_device_desc in place instead of snapshotting it. It confirmed only that the descriptor was readable by the calling thread (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_READ()), read target->bus once to check it with K_SYSCALL_OBJ(), and then passed the caller's live pointer down. The implementation z_impl_i3c_transfer() re-reads target->bus from that user memory and dispatches through it as DEVICE_API_GET(i3c, target->bus)->i3c_xfers(...), so the bus that was validated is not necessarily the bus that is used. DEVICE_API_GET() performs no runtime type check outside CONFIG_DEVICE_API_ASSERT builds. On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE and an I3C controller driver, a user thread that has been granted an I3C device object can exploit this with a second thread in the same memory domain: one thread calls i3c_transfer() while the other rewrites the bus field of the descriptor. The window between the check and the use spans the num_msgs validation, the message-array access check, a stack VLA allocation and a memcpy() of up to 32 struct i3c_msg, so the race is repeatable and can simply be retried until it lands. When the substitution succeeds, the kernel dereferences an attacker-chosen pointer as a struct device, loads a function pointer from the attacker-controlled api table and calls it in supervisor mode with attacker-influenced arguments. This yields kernel-mode code execution from an unprivileged user thread — a complete escape of the userspace memory-protection sandbox; lesser outcomes are an arbitrary two-level kernel read or a kernel fault. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE, or without an I3C driver, are unaffected. The fix copies the descriptor into a kernel-stack local with k_usermode_from_copy(), validates the bus in that copy, and dispatches on the copy, so the validated value is provably the value used.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-09 21:26 UTC
CWE
Assigner
zephyr CNA
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
zephyrproject zephyr Affected: 3.2.0 , < 4.3.2 (semver)
Affected: 4.4.0 , < 4.5.0 (semver)
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
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              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-87038",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-11-09T21:26:26.046959Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-11-09T21:27:15.411Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
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        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
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          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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          "product": "zephyr",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/i3c/i3c_handlers.c"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "z_impl_i3c_transfer"
            },
            {
              "name": "z_vrfy_i3c_transfer"
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          "versions": [
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              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3.2.0",
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          "lang": "en",
          "value": "The user-mode verification handler for the i3c_transfer() system call, z_vrfy_i3c_transfer() in drivers/i3c/i3c_handlers.c, validated the caller-supplied struct i3c_device_desc in place instead of snapshotting it. It confirmed only that the descriptor was readable by the calling thread (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_READ()), read target-\u003ebus once to check it with K_SYSCALL_OBJ(), and then passed the caller\u0027s live pointer down. The implementation z_impl_i3c_transfer() re-reads target-\u003ebus from that user memory and dispatches through it as DEVICE_API_GET(i3c, target-\u003ebus)-\u003ei3c_xfers(...), so the bus that was validated is not necessarily the bus that is used. DEVICE_API_GET() performs no runtime type check outside CONFIG_DEVICE_API_ASSERT builds.\n\nOn a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE and an I3C controller driver, a user thread that has been granted an I3C device object can exploit this with a second thread in the same memory domain: one thread calls i3c_transfer() while the other rewrites the bus field of the descriptor. The window between the check and the use spans the num_msgs validation, the message-array access check, a stack VLA allocation and a memcpy() of up to 32 struct i3c_msg, so the race is repeatable and can simply be retried until it lands.\n\nWhen the substitution succeeds, the kernel dereferences an attacker-chosen pointer as a struct device, loads a function pointer from the attacker-controlled api table and calls it in supervisor mode with attacker-influenced arguments. This yields kernel-mode code execution from an unprivileged user thread \u2014 a complete escape of the userspace memory-protection sandbox; lesser outcomes are an arbitrary two-level kernel read or a kernel fault. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE, or without an I3C driver, are unaffected.\n\nThe fix copies the descriptor into a kernel-stack local with k_usermode_from_copy(), validates the bus in that copy, and dispatches on the copy, so the validated value is provably the value used."
        }
      ],
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            "baseScore": 7,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "format": "CVSS"
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      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-367",
              "description": "race",
              "lang": "en",
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      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-04T06:09:03.711Z",
        "orgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad",
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      "references": [
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          "name": "Fix commit",
          "tags": [
            "patch"
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          "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/550437bc9efd7b733f13b9be73e77fd98858c8a2"
        },
        {
          "name": "GHSA-86xj-2q6x-h82w",
          "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-86xj-2q6x-h82w"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Time-of-check/time-of-use double fetch in the Zephyr i3c_transfer() syscall handler allows kernel-mode control-flow hijack from user mode",
      "x_generator": {
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    "assignerOrgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad",
    "assignerShortName": "zephyr",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-87038",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-04T06:09:03.711Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-08T18:40:38.161Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-09T21:27:15.411Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}



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