CVE-2026-85712 (GCVE-0-2026-85712)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-11-06 21:07
Modified
2026-11-06 21:07
CWE
  • CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Summary
Chartbrew is an open-source web application that can connect directly to databases and APIs and use the data to create charts. Prior to 5.2.3, the shared project permission check trusted a caller-controlled team_id and let the teamOwner/teamAdmin branch continue without confirming that the target project belonged to that team. The vulnerable surface is project routes and related authorization checks that accepted user-controlled project identifiers. An authenticated user who is an owner or admin of their own team submits a victim project id together with the attacker's own team_id in the request body; default self-signup grants the required role on the user's own team. Authorization is evaluated against the attacker-selected team instead of the target project's team, and the update path mass-assigns the request body without a project field allow-list. The attacker needs a valid Chartbrew account, an owner or admin role on their own team, and a victim project identifier; requests without the body team_id trick are rejected. The attacker can re-parent the victim project into their own team, gain full read and write access, expose it publicly, remove password protection, and cause the victim to lose it; the shared delete route also permits cross-tenant deletion. This issue is fixed in version 5.2.3.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
chartbrew chartbrew Version: < 5.2.3
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Show details on NVD website


{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "chartbrew",
          "vendor": "chartbrew",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 5.2.3"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Chartbrew is an open-source web application that can connect directly to databases and APIs and use the data to create charts. Prior to 5.2.3, the shared project permission check trusted a caller-controlled team_id and let the teamOwner/teamAdmin branch continue without confirming that the target project belonged to that team. The vulnerable surface is project routes and related authorization checks that accepted user-controlled project identifiers. An authenticated user who is an owner or admin of their own team submits a victim project id together with the attacker\u0027s own team_id in the request body; default self-signup grants the required role on the user\u0027s own team. Authorization is evaluated against the attacker-selected team instead of the target project\u0027s team, and the update path mass-assigns the request body without a project field allow-list. The attacker needs a valid Chartbrew account, an owner or admin role on their own team, and a victim project identifier; requests without the body team_id trick are rejected. The attacker can re-parent the victim project into their own team, gain full read and write access, expose it publicly, remove password protection, and cause the victim to lose it; the shared delete route also permits cross-tenant deletion. This issue is fixed in version 5.2.3."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 8.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-639",
              "description": "CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-06T21:07:29.566Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/chartbrew/chartbrew/security/advisories/GHSA-6gv3-8wxh-6vfq",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/chartbrew/chartbrew/security/advisories/GHSA-6gv3-8wxh-6vfq"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/chartbrew/chartbrew/commit/9db1e57c95014256ef0a7a8a4d60af6e7ade42a5",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/chartbrew/chartbrew/commit/9db1e57c95014256ef0a7a8a4d60af6e7ade42a5"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/chartbrew/chartbrew/releases/tag/v5.2.3",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/chartbrew/chartbrew/releases/tag/v5.2.3"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-6gv3-8wxh-6vfq",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Chartbrew: Cross-tenant project takeover via body.team_id in /project routes"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-85712",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-06T21:07:29.566Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-04T14:45:10.647Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-06T21:07:29.566Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}


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