CVE-2026-84897 (GCVE-0-2026-84897)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-10-07 02:42
Modified
2026-10-07 18:37
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
Summary
src/internal.c in wolfSSL wolfSSH through 1.5.0 admits the server-to-client Diffie-Hellman group exchange messages SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP (31) and SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY (33) when a server receives them from an unauthenticated client. IsMessageAllowedServer() applies no direction check to the key exchange message range: when the peer is keying and no particular message is expected, which is the state a server is in for the whole window after it processes the client's KEXINIT because nothing sets handshake->expectMsgId there, the function falls out of its expectation branch without a verdict and reaches a numeric bound that admits every message id from 30 through 34. A client that negotiates diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 and then sends message 31 makes the server run the client-side handler DoKexDhGexGroup(), which validates the attacker-supplied group with two 8-round Miller-Rabin primality tests, one on p and one on (p-1)/2, on a value of up to 8192 bits. The handler then returns success: the server stores the attacker's prime and generator, generates a Diffie-Hellman key pair in the attacker's group, and sends the client-role message SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT (32) back to the attacker. Published RFC 3526 safe primes are the worst-case input and cost the attacker nothing to obtain. The primality validation was added in 1.5.0; versions from 1.2.0 through 1.4.22 admit the same message and enter the same client-role path without the primality cost. Message 33 is admitted as well, but on a server it is rejected before any cryptography because no public key check callback is registered, so it carries no comparable cost. Builds that define WOLFSSH_NO_DH_GEX_SHA256, which is implied by WOLFSSH_NO_DH or NO_SHA256, are unaffected.
References
| URL | Tags | |||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| wolfSSL Inc. | wolfSSH |
Version: 1.2.0 ≤ 1.5.0 |
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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