CVE-2026-84786 (GCVE-0-2026-84786)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-18 11:43 – Updated: 2026-11-20 11:19- CWE-476 - NULL Pointer Dereference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/33634 | patch |
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