CVE-2026-82754 (GCVE-0-2026-82754)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-09-07 22:23
Modified
2026-09-08 14:41
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-424 - Improper Protection of Alternate Path
Summary
Improper Protection of Alternate Path vulnerability in ash-project ash_authentication_oauth2_server exposes the state-changing OAuth endpoints under an unintended URL prefix, bypassing controls scoped to the canonical prefix.
oauth2_server_protocol_routes/1 in AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Oauth2Server.Router forwards the same ProtocolRouter at both the /oauth prefix and the /.well-known prefix. Phoenix forward strips the matched prefix before dispatch, so the full route table answers under both mounts, and POST /register, POST /token, and POST /revoke are reachable as /.well-known/register, /.well-known/token, and /.well-known/revoke. Edge controls such as WAF rules, rate limits, or authentication exemptions written against the /oauth paths, or that allow-list /.well-known as unauthenticated, do not apply to the alias.
This issue affects ash_authentication_oauth2_server: from 0.1.0 before 0.3.1.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ash-project | ash_authentication_oauth2_server |
Version: 0.1.0 ≤ cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_authentication_oauth2_server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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|
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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