CVE-2026-82726 (GCVE-0-2026-82726)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-31 03:05
Modified
2026-08-31 14:47
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
Summary
Permissive Regular Expression vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets a remote client select the tenant an Ash application uses, or degrade the request, by sending a crafted Host header.
AshPhoenix.Helpers.get_subdomain/2 stripped the root domain with String.replace(host, ~r/.?#{root_host}/, ""). The root host was interpolated raw, so each . became a wildcard and any metacharacter a pattern, and the replace was global and unanchored, so a match was removed from anywhere in the string. With root_host example.com, Host: foo.exampleXcom.attacker.net returned the tenant foo.attacker.net. A metacharacter-bearing or nil root host degraded the pattern or raised on every request. The comparison was also case-sensitive, so TENANT.EXAMPLE.COM and EXAMPLE.COM slipped past the root-host allowlist. conn.host comes from the client Host header. The fix matches the root host case-insensitively and only as an exact trailing suffix.
This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 2.1.26 before 2.3.25.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ash-project | ash_phoenix |
Version: 2.1.26 ≤ cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_phoenix:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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|
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The comparison was also case-sensitive, so `TENANT.EXAMPLE.COM` and `EXAMPLE.COM` slipped past the root-host allowlist. `conn.host` comes from the client `Host` header. 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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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