CVE-2026-82726 (GCVE-0-2026-82726)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-31 03:05 – Updated: 2026-08-31 14:47
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
AshPhoenix get_subdomain maps a crafted or differently-cased Host header to an arbitrary tenant
Summary
Permissive Regular Expression vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets a remote client select the tenant an Ash application uses, or degrade the request, by sending a crafted Host header.
AshPhoenix.Helpers.get_subdomain/2 stripped the root domain with String.replace(host, ~r/.?#{root_host}/, ""). The root host was interpolated raw, so each . became a wildcard and any metacharacter a pattern, and the replace was global and unanchored, so a match was removed from anywhere in the string. With root_host example.com, Host: foo.exampleXcom.attacker.net returned the tenant foo.attacker.net. A metacharacter-bearing or nil root host degraded the pattern or raised on every request. The comparison was also case-sensitive, so TENANT.EXAMPLE.COM and EXAMPLE.COM slipped past the root-host allowlist. conn.host comes from the client Host header. The fix matches the root host case-insensitively and only as an exact trailing suffix.
This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 2.1.26 before 2.3.25.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-31 14:47 UTC
Assigner
EEF
CNA
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/ash-project/ash_phoenix/securi… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82726.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82726 | related |
| https://github.com/ash-project/ash_phoenix/commit… | patch |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ash-project | ash_phoenix |
Affected:
2.1.26 , < 2.3.25
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_phoenix:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| ash-project | ash_phoenix |
Affected:
9a5ea4d377bc263de321d79574872a3dfc4fb541 , < 8306f29e77526840c89f3cd244996ce7c0fa2cda
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_phoenix:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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{
"cweId": "CWE-178",
"description": "CWE-178 Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-31T03:05:38.612Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash_phoenix/security/advisories/GHSA-rpf8-q9jh-qxrr"
},
{
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82726.html"
},
{
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82726"
},
{
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash_phoenix/commit/8306f29e77526840c89f3cd244996ce7c0fa2cda"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "AshPhoenix get_subdomain maps a crafted or differently-cased Host header to an arbitrary tenant"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-82726",
"datePublished": "2026-08-31T03:05:38.612Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-31T00:59:08.960Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-31T14:47:35.274Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.