CVE-2026-82685 (GCVE-0-2026-82685)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-09-17 13:08
Modified
2026-09-17 18:23
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Summary
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an authenticated attacker to overwrite and confirm another user's email address, and so take over that account. A confirmation token issued to one user is accepted on any other user's record.
AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.ConfirmChange verifies the token's signature and its act claim, then applies the changes stored against that token to whichever record the changeset targets, never comparing the sub claim against changeset.data. An attacker who registers an account and changes their own email replays the resulting token against a victim's record id, writing in their own address with force_change_attributes/2 and stamping confirmed_at, after which an ordinary password reset yields the account. The library's own confirmation flow is unaffected, because AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.Actions.confirm/3 resolves sub to a user and targets that record.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.5.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| team-alembic | ash_authentication |
Version: 0.5.0 ≤ Version: 5.0.0-rc.0 ≤ cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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