CVE-2026-81853 (GCVE-0-2026-81853)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-31 02:31
Modified
2026-08-31 15:58
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Summary
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.
AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.
This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ash-project | ash_admin |
Version: 0.1.0 ≤ cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_admin:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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|
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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