CVE-2026-81318 (GCVE-0-2026-81318)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-30 11:56
Modified
2026-08-30 11:56
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization
Summary
Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash_sql allows a caller in a schema-based multitenant application to receive aggregate values computed from another tenant's rows.
When an aggregate is computed over a distinct query, AshSql.AggregateQuery.add_single_aggs/5 rebuilds the outer query from query.from.source alone, which is only the {table, schema} tuple and does not carry query.prefix or query.from.prefix. For strategy(:context) multitenancy those hold the tenant schema, so the rebuilt outer query reads the repo's default schema while the inner correlated subquery still reads the tenant schema, and the two are joined only on primary key. The aggregate, and any relationship join added off the prefix-less binding, is then computed against the wrong tenant's rows. The neighbouring limit and exists branches instead wrap the query with subquery/1, which preserves the prefix.
This issue affects ash_sql: from 0.1.0 before 0.7.1.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ash-project | ash_sql |
Version: 0.1.0 ≤ cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_sql:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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{
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"versions": [
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"cpeApplicability": [
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"credits": [
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"type": "finder",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
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{
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"type": "reporter",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
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{
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"type": "remediation developer",
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eIncorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash_sql allows a caller in a schema-based multitenant application to receive aggregate values computed from another tenant\u0027s rows.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhen an aggregate is computed over a \u003ccode\u003edistinct\u003c/code\u003e query, \u003ccode\u003eAshSql.AggregateQuery.add_single_aggs/5\u003c/code\u003e rebuilds the outer query from \u003ccode\u003equery.from.source\u003c/code\u003e alone, which is only the \u003ccode\u003e{table, schema}\u003c/code\u003e tuple and does not carry \u003ccode\u003equery.prefix\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003equery.from.prefix\u003c/code\u003e. For \u003ccode\u003estrategy(:context)\u003c/code\u003e multitenancy those hold the tenant schema, so the rebuilt outer query reads the repo\u0027s default schema while the inner correlated subquery still reads the tenant schema, and the two are joined only on primary key. The aggregate, and any relationship join added off the prefix-less binding, is then computed against the wrong tenant\u0027s rows. The neighbouring limit and exists branches instead wrap the query with \u003ccode\u003esubquery/1\u003c/code\u003e, which preserves the prefix.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects ash_sql: from 0.1.0 before 0.7.1.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"value": "Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash_sql allows a caller in a schema-based multitenant application to receive aggregate values computed from another tenant\u0027s rows.\n\nWhen an aggregate is computed over a `distinct` query, `AshSql.AggregateQuery.add_single_aggs/5` rebuilds the outer query from `query.from.source` alone, which is only the `{table, schema}` tuple and does not carry `query.prefix` or `query.from.prefix`. For `strategy(:context)` multitenancy those hold the tenant schema, so the rebuilt outer query reads the repo\u0027s default schema while the inner correlated subquery still reads the tenant schema, and the two are joined only on primary key. The aggregate, and any relationship join added off the prefix-less binding, is then computed against the wrong tenant\u0027s rows. The neighbouring limit and exists branches instead wrap the query with `subquery/1`, which preserves the prefix.\n\nThis issue affects ash_sql: from 0.1.0 before 0.7.1."
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"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
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"descriptions": [
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"description": "CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization",
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"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-30T11:56:52.921Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
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"references": [
{
"tags": [
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"url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash_sql/security/advisories/GHSA-ww8j-58rc-f8h3"
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{
"tags": [
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"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-81318.html"
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"tags": [
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"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-81318"
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"url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash_sql/commit/3d95478cc9e1d5bfaf6144fe9b9793f29e5ab889"
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"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Distinct-query aggregate drops the tenant schema prefix, leaking across tenants in AshSql"
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"datePublished": "2026-08-30T11:56:52.921Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-30T02:30:02.111Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-30T11:56:52.921Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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