CVE-2026-81316 (GCVE-0-2026-81316)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-30 11:59
Modified
2026-08-30 11:59
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
- CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization
Summary
Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash_sql allows a caller to receive an aggregate value computed over rows a more restrictive filter should have excluded, disclosing counts, sums, or lists across an authorization or tenancy boundary.
AshSql.Aggregate.different_queries?/2 reports two aggregate queries as different only when their filter and their sort both differ. Aggregate queries rarely carry a sort, so two aggregates that share a name but carry entirely different filters compare as identical. The colliding aggregate keeps its name and is treated as already computed, and select_aggregates returns the first-registered variant's value. The same name reaches the builder twice with different filters when actor or tenant context is stamped into each aggregate's query, so a narrowly filtered aggregate can be served the value of a previously registered broad one.
This issue affects ash_sql: from 0.1.0 before 0.7.1.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ash-project | ash_sql |
Version: 0.1.0 ≤ cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_sql:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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