CVE-2026-80683 (GCVE-0-2026-80683)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2026-08-28 06:52
Modified
2026-08-29 06:22
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: SCO: give the socket its own sco_conn reference
sco_conn_del() drops a reference it does not own. It takes one transient
reference via sco_conn_hold_unless_zero() and releases it with the
sco_conn_put() that follows sco_sock_hold(); the additional put in the
!sk branch releases a second one:
conn = sco_conn_hold_unless_zero(conn);
...
sk = sco_sock_hold(conn);
sco_conn_unlock(conn);
sco_conn_put(conn);
if (!sk) {
sco_conn_put(conn);
return;
}
When close() races the controller's Disconnection Complete, sco_chan_del()
clears conn->sk and drops the socket's reference while sco_conn_del() is
running. sco_conn_del() then sees sk == NULL, its own put drops the count
to zero and frees the conn, and the second put writes to the freed kref:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_put.part.0+0x1a/0x190
Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881099dec74 by task kworker/u17:3/413
Workqueue: hci1 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
sco_conn_put.part.0+0x1a/0x190
hci_disconn_complete_evt+0x1ee/0x3e0
hci_event_packet+0x54a/0x650
hci_rx_work+0x321/0x3d0
Allocated by task 413:
sco_conn_add+0x72/0x1a0
sco_connect_cfm+0x88/0x670
Freed by task 413:
sco_conn_del.isra.0+0x3f/0xf0
hci_disconn_complete_evt+0x1ee/0x3e0
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
The root cause is that the socket stores the connection without holding a
reference of its own. __sco_chan_add() does:
sco_pi(sk)->conn = conn;
so the socket borrows whatever reference its caller happened to hold, and
the callers paper over that with ad-hoc holds and puts. Give the socket a
counted reference instead: __sco_chan_add() takes one and it is released
together with the channel (sco_chan_del()) and in sco_sock_destruct().
With the socket holding its own reference, sco_conn_del() no longer needs
the extra put and the redundant hold in sco_conn_ready() goes away.
Making the socket own its reference means the connection is now actually
freed on the error paths of sco_connect() where it used to leak, which in
turn runs sco_conn_free() and its hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon). To keep the
hci_conn accounting balanced, make that ownership explicit as well:
sco_conn_add() consumes one hci_conn reference and the sco_conn owns it for
its lifetime. sco_connect() hands over the reference returned by
hci_connect_sco() and no longer drops it on the error paths;
sco_connect_cfm(), which is not given a reference, takes one with
hci_conn_hold() before handing it to sco_conn_add() (and drops it again if
the allocation fails); and the explicit hci_conn_hold() in sco_conn_ready()
is removed. Every reference then has a single, clear owner.
References
Impacted products
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/bluetooth/sco.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "a33bc07b4730b6cd5681ac77d18ae0de3e739690",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e6720779ae612a14ac4ba7fe4fd5b27d900d932c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "8fe627192fa5da7157f9a48608f13c04b6373e43",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e6720779ae612a14ac4ba7fe4fd5b27d900d932c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "abd93c85c8667add738ee82aeab95dd9fc8265a2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e6720779ae612a14ac4ba7fe4fd5b27d900d932c",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/bluetooth/sco.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.13"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.13",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.44",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.44",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.13",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.1.8",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.13",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.13",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: SCO: give the socket its own sco_conn reference\n\nsco_conn_del() drops a reference it does not own. It takes one transient\nreference via sco_conn_hold_unless_zero() and releases it with the\nsco_conn_put() that follows sco_sock_hold(); the additional put in the\n!sk branch releases a second one:\n\n conn = sco_conn_hold_unless_zero(conn);\n ...\n sk = sco_sock_hold(conn);\n sco_conn_unlock(conn);\n sco_conn_put(conn);\n\n if (!sk) {\n sco_conn_put(conn);\n return;\n }\n\nWhen close() races the controller\u0027s Disconnection Complete, sco_chan_del()\nclears conn-\u003esk and drops the socket\u0027s reference while sco_conn_del() is\nrunning. sco_conn_del() then sees sk == NULL, its own put drops the count\nto zero and frees the conn, and the second put writes to the freed kref:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_put.part.0+0x1a/0x190\n Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881099dec74 by task kworker/u17:3/413\n Workqueue: hci1 hci_rx_work\n Call Trace:\n sco_conn_put.part.0+0x1a/0x190\n hci_disconn_complete_evt+0x1ee/0x3e0\n hci_event_packet+0x54a/0x650\n hci_rx_work+0x321/0x3d0\n Allocated by task 413:\n sco_conn_add+0x72/0x1a0\n sco_connect_cfm+0x88/0x670\n Freed by task 413:\n sco_conn_del.isra.0+0x3f/0xf0\n hci_disconn_complete_evt+0x1ee/0x3e0\n refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.\n\nThe root cause is that the socket stores the connection without holding a\nreference of its own. __sco_chan_add() does:\n\n sco_pi(sk)-\u003econn = conn;\n\nso the socket borrows whatever reference its caller happened to hold, and\nthe callers paper over that with ad-hoc holds and puts. Give the socket a\ncounted reference instead: __sco_chan_add() takes one and it is released\ntogether with the channel (sco_chan_del()) and in sco_sock_destruct().\nWith the socket holding its own reference, sco_conn_del() no longer needs\nthe extra put and the redundant hold in sco_conn_ready() goes away.\n\nMaking the socket own its reference means the connection is now actually\nfreed on the error paths of sco_connect() where it used to leak, which in\nturn runs sco_conn_free() and its hci_conn_drop(conn-\u003ehcon). To keep the\nhci_conn accounting balanced, make that ownership explicit as well:\nsco_conn_add() consumes one hci_conn reference and the sco_conn owns it for\nits lifetime. sco_connect() hands over the reference returned by\nhci_connect_sco() and no longer drops it on the error paths;\nsco_connect_cfm(), which is not given a reference, takes one with\nhci_conn_hold() before handing it to sco_conn_add() (and drops it again if\nthe allocation fails); and the explicit hci_conn_hold() in sco_conn_ready()\nis removed. Every reference then has a single, clear owner."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:A - The UAF is triggered in sco_conn_del() from hci_disconn_complete_evt on hci_rx_work when the Bluetooth controller reports SCO/eSCO teardown, which is driven by an in-range peer disconnect; Bluetooth SCO is an adjacent-radio protocol path, not a local-only syscall entry point.\nAC:L - The failure is a close()-versus-Disconnection-Complete race where the attacker controls both sides by concurrently closing the SCO socket while inducing HCI disconnect (local threads or a nearby peer hanging up), and can repeat connect/disconnect cycles until the window is hit.\nPR:N - An adjacent Bluetooth peer can send the disconnect that produces Disconnection Complete without any Linux credentials on the victim, and SCO sockets have no capability gate; only an active SCO session on init_net is needed, not root or CAP_NET_ADMIN.\nUI:N - Exploitation does not require victim interaction beyond an already-active SCO link (headset/call); the attacker can time peer-initiated disconnects against automatic socket teardown without social engineering or manual victim steps.\nS:U - The refcount use-after-free corrupts kernel Bluetooth connection state within the same kernel security authority; it is standard kernel memory corruption, not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or other cross-scope boundary violation.\nC:H - sco_conn_del() performs a double sco_conn_put() that writes to a freed kref (4-byte slab UAF), enabling heap reuse and arbitrary kernel memory disclosure primitives consistent with kernel use-after-free confidentiality impact.\nI:H - The post-free kref decrement is a controlled kernel heap write that can be groomed via repeated SCO connect/close and disconnect cycles to corrupt adjacent slab objects and achieve arbitrary write or control-flow hijack.\nA:H - The bug reliably triggers kernel KASAN slab-use-after-free and refcount underflow on hci_rx_work during disconnect handling, producing oops/panic, and can be retriggered to deny service."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-29T06:22:10.283Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a33bc07b4730b6cd5681ac77d18ae0de3e739690"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8fe627192fa5da7157f9a48608f13c04b6373e43"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abd93c85c8667add738ee82aeab95dd9fc8265a2"
}
],
"title": "Bluetooth: SCO: give the socket its own sco_conn reference",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-80683",
"datePublished": "2026-08-28T06:52:50.099Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-26T14:34:25.784Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-29T06:22:10.283Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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